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ABSTRACT
This study analyses the impact of scale, establishment mobility and
policy substitution in the corporation's geographical behaviour. To
maximise opportunities for observing change, the effects of recession
on firms using a particular marketing system -- product franchising
are examined. It is argued that competitive powers, represented by
company structural attributes and expressed through relative network
control capacities, should assist larger organisations to undertake
spatial tactics which maintain their market and economic standing.
Nineteen agricultural machinery franchisors are classified on a number
of key variables into large and small groups. Their manufacturing,
wholesaling and retailing activity between 1967 and 1972 is compared on
criteria relating to the entry and exit of outlets. Certain locational
strategies adopted by major competitors are seen to stabilise or improve
distribution control, thus demonstrating a relationship of structural
factors, channel management and representation courses. However, a
broader association of these measures and market and general financial
performance cannot be shown because of data limitations. Subsidiary
findings point out the greater stability of large corporations in a
setback, the lower probability of continuation suffered by small
franchisors' dealers and the attack on small towns enforced by the
economic contraction. Through the use of an operational model within
an intensive, longitudinal analysis, the enquiry concludes that scale
effects pervade locational decision-making, not only among enterprises
but across the whole business sector. For the largest firms, spatial
policy is clearly an interchangeable means to goals and, thus,
establishment mobility can be pronounced. The divergence of such findings
from previous work contributes to the ongoing review of traditional
thinking in industrial geography and economics and prompts further
research into the interface of the corporation and the entrepreneur.
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CONVENTIONS
1. All measures are in metric units.
2. Currencies are related specifically to the country of origin.
One billion is taken to mean 'one thousand million' throughout the
work.
3. Company names are written in abbreviated form. A list of
participants and other selected organisations is presented in
Appendix One.
4. The sources of direct statements from industry executives have
been referenced in a standardised format to preserve confidentiality.
On similar grounds, individual firm data have been concealed in the
presentation of many tables and figures.
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Statistics. Both titles are used and should be regarded as
synonomous. The former Tariff Board also became known as the
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used in references and commentary.
6. The Australian 'header' is essentially the same machine as the
American 'combine harvester'.
7. Unless stated to the contrary, any emphases in quotations are
those of the oPiginaZ writer.
8. Round parentheses in quotations indicate the primary text.
Square brackets represent additions by the present author.
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PREFACE
The corporation has become a major business force in advanced
countries since the Second World War, having expanded its activities
both internationally and across a wide range of goods and services.
Despite the growing importance of large concerns, geographical work
attempting to analyse the distribution of industries or individual
manufacturing facilities has been generally pitched at the level of
the entrepreneur. After a spirited call for research into the firm
in 1958, interest waned until the late 1960s. Today in Australia,
public attention is increasingly directed towards the role of
enterprises; their broad impact on host nations' economies and
environments adds new urgency into investigations of their spatial
behaviour.
A serious difficulty in this respect is the limited assistance
which classical location theory can provide. Not only have its
assumptions of economic rationality and certainty been criticised, but
a more significant weakness from the present viewpoint is that its
focus -- the single-plant undertaking -- is a vastly different
proposition to the multi-nodal conglomerate. To improve the
applicability of existing formulations, the immediate need is for
empirical studies of processes and interrelationships within corporate
decision-making. Areas of special concern, distinguished because of
their apparent divergence from the situation of the small businessman,
are scale effects, outlet mobility, and the substitutability of
locational with other operating strategies. To observe these
contingencies, a topic offering extensive geographical change is
required. The study therefore centres on marketing, the raison d' etre
of the majority of a sizeable merchant's establishments. Possibilities
of movement are enhanced by concentrating on recession, whose negative,
xiv
contractive and expulsive forces accentuate the need for adjustment.
This fresh outlook proposes results which, apart from their practical
bearing, could be used later to highlight regularities in large
producers' conduct under more favourable conditions.
Problem and objective
Like the major company, vertical marketing has enjoyed
unprecedented progress since the Second World War. A contributing
factor has been the spectacular growth of franchising. Through its
success, this particular technique has attracted an ebullient
literature but prospects for user firms during a setback have been
almost wholly neglected. The issue raises an important applied
problem with direct relevance to the questions above. Thus, the
objective of the thesis is to determine the economic and spatial
response to depressed demand of corporations engaging this mode of
distribution.
Hypothesis and methodology
Given current constraints, the enquiry must be narrowed to a single
alternative within the franchise system -- product franchising --
a method providing producers with outstanding advantages of centralised
marketing administration without undertaking costly forward integration.
In a business downswing, when competitive pressures in the channel and
market threaten survival, a network's fortunes relate strongly to the
control applied by the franchisor through managerial and financial
means. Since capacities for authority are derived from structural
attributes signifying economic and positional power, the larger supplier
could be expected to enjoy more embracing channel leadership than his
small opposition in both distribution policy and practice. Two
applications ensue from this 'structural' hypothesis. First, a spatiaZ
xv
postulate advances that principal producers should exhibit locational
representation in the productive, administrative, wholesale and
retail sectors which is intended to maintain or augment their existing
distribution management. However, such courses may not be always open
to minor competitors. Second, in a financial framework, it is
anticipated that these geographical tactics, together with a
purposeful marketing code, should assist bigger undertakings to better
overall market and economic performance. In sum, structural features,
proxied in relative franchise strength, should emerge as decisive
influences on corporate strategy-formation during a commercial
contraction.
These contentions are tested with evidence from the Australian
agricultural machinery industry during the rural crisis of 1967-72.
Nineteen leading undertakings are grouped into 'large' and 'small'
divisions on the basis of structural attributes. Relative authority
is then distilled from their dealer contracts, distributien, and
accounting results, thus affording an evaluation of the economic
postulate. Similarly, detailed analyses of subject firms' locational
adjustments allow assessment of the spatial argument and conclusions
to the specific problems about corporate policy-formation.
Overview
Part One covers the rise of the enterprise, outlines its
divergence from the entrepreneur and considers the shortcomings of
formal location theory. Attention is focussed initially on the
marketing function in recession (Chapter One). Chapter Two is devoted
to franchising, the derivation of the applied problem and the
formulation of hypotheses.
Part Two reviews the extraordinary malaise which recently beset
product franchising organisations in the farm equipment industry
xvi
(Chapter Three). Leading sellers are identified and then classified
with a computer-based technique into structural divisions for the
subsequent analysis (Chapter Four) •
Part Three incorporates the empirical enquiry into the distribution
policy and practices of sampled companies (Chapters Five to Eight) .
Relative levels of network control are examined within the terms of the
main argument (Chapters Six and Seven). The discussion encompasses
both spatial and economic performance and proposes a solution to the
applied problem (Chapter Eight) .
Part Four uses these results to develop conclusions about
specific processes and relationships of corporate decision-making
queried at the outset of the thesis (Chapter Nine). The overall
design is shown in Figure P.l.
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FIGtJRE P.1: Design of the thesis and subject-interests
of the various chapters.
Source: Adapted from an idea of P.J. Rimmer.
PART ONE
PROBLEM SETTING AND STATEMENT
1
2Until the late 1960s, the rise of the corporation received little
attention in geography because of researchers' preoccupation with the
small firm of classical location theory. Present evidence, however,
suggests that the enterprise's locational dynamics vary greatly from
those of the entrepreneur, thus questioning the applicability of many
previous findings to new problems. The disparity can be evaluated
through study of scale effects, establishment turnover and
substitutability of spatial policy. To maximise opportunities for
observation of facility movement, a focus is proposed on marketing in
recession. More specifically, as outlined in Chapter Two, distribution
under product franchising offers a suitable applied issue through which
certain processes and relationships of the large company's strategy
selection may be assessed.
3CHAPTER ONE
THE CORPORATION: A NEW FORCE IN BUSINESS
SPATIAL DECISION-MAKING
Researchers became acutely conscious in the late 1960s that commercial
trends warranted a reappraisal of traditional perspectives in
industrial geography and economics. Their uneasiness crystallised into
a concern with the rise of the modern corporation, in which a number of
subsidiary firms assume a parentjholding company structure to achieve
certain group objectives (cf. Parsons, 1972: 99). Throughout the
advanced countries, the post-1945 era has seen an increase in the size
of both individual manufacturing establishments and legal business
enterprises. Large undertakings now dominate the most important
1
sectors and, by the year 2000, could easily account for more than half
the world's gross product (Bergman, 1973: 255). They have played a
pre-eminent role in the development and exploitation of Australian
resources and now exercise a prominent influence on the total economy
(Logan, 1965: 12; Mason, 1974: 1).
Though these giant operations are associated principally with
fields of mass output -- automobiles, iron and steel, chemicals,
petroleum and aluminium -- they are also well-represented in such
activities as the production of foodstuffs, trucks and agricultural
machinery. They can be observed in various stages of maturity (Steed,
1971c: 55). Initially, they accumulate capital and rationalise its use.
Next, they integrate horizontally and vertically to allow the continuing
absorption of overheads and attainment of scale economies. Finally, new
frameworks are constructed within which assets can be mobilised rapidly
to meet short and long-term market movements. Many corporations are,
therefore, adopting a conglomerate, multi-plant disposition through
merger and acquisition or by diversification into unrelated £orms of
endeavour (Mautz, 1968: 10). Meanwhile, others are winning
multi-national status through direct foreign investment2
4
a phenomenon
of interest to geographers because of its implications for host nations
in both the develop~d and third worlds (see Blackborn, 1972; Venu,
1974). Recently, the interregional ramifications of expansion have
occupied Krumme (1970) and Parsons (1972), while the aggregate effects
of corporate growth have been reviewed by Browaeys (1974) and Lindgren
et aZ. (1974). As the pervasive impact of the large company commands
increasing public attention through vociferous media coverage, research
into its locational dynamics must assume a high priority among academics.
THE NEED FOR A NEW OUTLOOK
For the explanation of complex spatial behaviour
of modern industrial firms, traditional
locational concepts still represent an essential
but insufficient basis (Krumme, 1970: 318).
Geography and micro-economics have long been absorbed with the individual
3
entrepreneur, the superstar of classical location theory. Yet, the
parameters of his small operation are somewhat remote from those of the
corporation (Krumme, 1969a: 34). A large organisation is a coalition
of sub-groups, each with specific tasks, authorities and
responsibilities, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. Its objectives,
derived by internal negotiation rather than personal edict, become
stabilised through bureaucratic measures such as the budget and
administration manual. Unlike the circumstances of the proprietor or
partnership, the control and possession of the enterprise are separated;
for this reason, peculiar types of perceptual and motivational disparity
inevitably emerge (Mueller, 1972: 202-06). Functional heterogeneity
compounds the variety of issues affecting decision-making. Such
complexity has. occasioned a revision of the conventional theoretical
standpoint on 'the firm' as a spatial strategist.
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6'The firm' under pressure
While accountants grapple with issues of diversified reporting
(Rappaport et al.~ 1968) 1 social scientists are questioning purely
deterministic ideas about 'the firm' and the 'location process' in an
awareness that policy-formation is an explicitly behavioural procedure
or, at least, one which occurs with incomplete information4 . Although
economic theory might still be valid for a wide class of events (cf.
Alchian, 1965: 31), a number of writers since 1950 have tried to modify
or supplant the monistic doctrine that entrepreneurs optimise location
to secure the highest possible profits5 • Their argument advances that
in uncertain surroundings there is no objective means of_~know:ing 'when
these maximising situations occur. One school, organisation theory,
sees the company as a network of human relationships governed bya
'bounded rationality' and operating in a socio-economic homeostasis with
the ultimate goal of survival (McGuire, 1964: 30-31); the well-known
proposition of 'satisficing' behaviour advanced by Simon (1959: 262-64)
has, however, drawn some criticism (Marris, 1964: 266-77). Alternative
prescriptions have concentrated on either the role of inter-firm
association or the managerial utility function in an attempt to
generalise the standard micro-economic approach (see Phillips, 1962:
22; Gordon, 1974: 125-28). More recently, Webber and Daly (1971: 16)
have re-directed attention to the concept of a minimum acceptable level
of returns. If a rate of profi tabili ty compatible wi th the immediate
aims of management and shareholders is reached, a producer may possibly
turn to other goals such as increases in sales6 , net assets or even
all-round growth as an end in itself (Baumol, 1964: 325). In sum, the
challenge to marginalist theory, while at present unconsummated, has
created far greater acknowledgement of the processes of commercial
decision-making and has emphasized the central part played by the
.. th 1 7tactlclans erose ves .
7These considerations have prompted a fresh outlook in geography;
complementing explanations of industries' metropolitan and national
patterns or the Weberian course of delimiting the optimal placement
for a particular activity, some authors are taking location as given
and dwelling on the methods by which companies and their environments
interact. Their stance recognises the need to discuss the economics
of a site in terms of a continuous, chronological time-dimension, thus
obliging additional dynamic studies of the internal machinery o£ the
firm (Dziewonski, 1966: 18). Already, enterprises in fields as
disparate as shipbuilding (Steed, 1968), linen (Steed, 1971b), pulp
production (Barr and Fairbairn, 1974) and the beet sugar industry (Watts,
1974) have been investigated. In a more general frame, Daly and Webber
(1973) have considered company growth in the context of the Australian
city. All these papers are contributing to a new thrust pioneered by
McNee (1958, 1959, 1960) and Keuning (1960) in analysing the spatial
dynamics o£ the corporation.
The corporation and the entrepreneur
Despite insights flowing from organisational and behavioural
viewpoints, the methods of major suppliers' adjustment are generally
uncharted. The immediate need is for empirical studies which analyse
the means, interrelationships, and ramifications of their geographical
policy-making. Potentially, such enquiries should also assist in
evaluating the applicability of existing location theories by relating
results to established frameworks centred on the small businessman.
Thus, areas in which the response of the enterprise and entrepreneur is
assumed to diverge must be addressed from the outset.
Three issues deserve closer examination. The first is the general
influence of scaZe effects in business location, both at the corporate
8level and along the whole company size spectrum. The meagre evidence
to hand indicates that industry leaders' operations are unrelated to
those of the small businessman. For example, their market spans
a nation or continent rather than a metropolis and complete coverage
might require several manufacturing and numerous distribution outlets.
Since strategy selection is seldom pervaded by lifestyle factors, the
incidence of relocation in response to demand shifts can be pronounced:
major corporations have a surprisingly high
turnover of ••• facilities and .•• their plants
are by no means tied to particular products
(Steed, 1971a: 207).
Hence, mobiZit~y within the networks of enterprises constitutes a second
concern in this investigation.
Traditionally, the geographic initiatives ofe_the single-plant firm
have been regarded as infrequent events which presume heavy capital
investment. Among more sizeable undertakings, much spatially-oriented
strategy is probably accomplished without a full-scale commitment of
funds (see Rees, 1972: 204). Such policy is usually a minor component
of a total set of choices made by corporations in their efforts to
survive and grow in a constantly-changing environment. But, even in
a non-investment framework, any form of locational alteration is
a costly and risky proposition and, often, companies may be able to
entertain a less disruptive course. In the past, the limited
perspectives of conventional analysis and predisposition to find the
reaons behind the entrepreneurial 'location decision' may well have
missed instances in which alternative financial or structural measures
were used to avoid the expense and upheaval involved in the movement of
personnel and fixed assets (cf. Rudd, 1954: 72-79). Therefore, this
study's third thrust is directed towards the pre-conditions of policy-
formation among major suppliers and, in particular, the potential
9substitutabiZity of spatial tactics with alternative solutions to
problems.
Objective of the study
To amplify these three specific interests, the project's purpose
is to analyse the:
(a) processes of corporate decision-making with special reference
to scale effects, mobility and strategy substitution;
(b) interrelationships among endogenous and exogenous issues which
govern g~ographical choice procedures.
Clearly, a situation affording strong possibilities of plant movement
is demanded. It can be found during a recession within the business
cycle -- a contingency rather neglected in Australian literature
because postwar prosperity has restrained interest in economic
contraction. Under such circumstances, it becomes tenuous to hold the
activities of many organisations, especially the financially-weaker, as
progressing towards long-run profit maximisation. Quite apart from the
conceptual difficulties accompanying the notion of negative profits
(losses), the assumption of an extended perspective is tantamount to
a somewhat Goethean view of the world in which success ultimately
prevails over failure. Statistics on the life expectancy of companies8
sho~ beyond doubt that so benign an attitude would be misplaced. If
disadvantaged concerns are not actually climaxing long-term returns,
they could be undertaking a variety of more immediate objectives.
Courses which provide security and ensure survival by curtailing losses
are obvious contenders but would be regarded in decision theory as
divergent from the maximax criterion proposed in the standard account of
f " 9the lrm. They are probably also more serious abberations than
temporary deviations in a search process which the marginalist counter
might prescribe (cf. Alchian, 1965: 30).
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Thus, in a depression, business could react in ways other than
those directed in the strict, micro-economic approach. This apparent
anomaly suggests that conditions of extreme uncertainty -- anathema to
determinism -- can give an unusual and cogent view of corporate
decision-making. Recession might force spatial action which would not
have otherwise eventuated, accentuate short as opposed to long-term
motivations in ensuing policy, and stress the often-overlooked role of
demand factors in location (cf. Greenhut, 1964). Since competition
should appear highly disarrayed, the conclusions could also serve to
point up 'normal' patterns in a more favourable era.
In order to interpret the interaction of an industry with its
environment and to see implications in plant movement, the study must
be operationalised with an applied problem. From the outset,
concentration within one of a company's functional sectors affords the
analysis manageable proportions and a practical setting (cf. Figure 1.1).
At this (divisional) level, operating as well as investment strategy
options may be ascertained, so granting an equitable test of the
substitutability theme mentioned above. From the current viewpoint, an
emphasis on marketing (at the expense of the enterprise's other
activities) provides the most suitable focus.
MARKETING: A PROBLEM FIELD
The examination is drawn around marketing for several reasons. Because
of Australia's limited demand but vast areal extent, most corporations
require many more distribution than manufacturing facilities. In
contrast to the asset fixity and inertia typical of the latter, sales
outlets are usually relatively footloose, with lower entry thresholds
and greater sensitivity to turnover, income and consumer shifts. As
a direct variable cost component, they bear the brunt of initial
11
management cut-backs in a financial setback. Marketing, perhaps the
most widespread and volatile of commercial operations, thus maximises
the opportunities for empirical observation of change and creates
better prospects for evaluating the mobility of company installations.
In view of post-1945 progress in distribution practices, it is
appropriate to acknowledge the growing importance to corporate success
of the 'marketing concept' (Hise, 1966: 9-12; Barraclough, 1970: 246).
Executives' long-standing concern with output has instigated a remarkable
by-passing of selling expenses which, when taken to include simply
advertising, transport, and wholesale and retail margins, can comprise
10half or even more of the final price of a good Geographers and
economists have paralleled practitioners in their preoccupation with
production. Seemingly little is known of Australia's marketing
organisation, since none appear to have followed the pioneer attempt of
Lengyel and Beecroft (1947, 1949) to establish methods or costs by
industry. Censuses have avoided the questions and available statistics
are crude and sparse. Yet, the function's importance is illustrated
in the fact that, in June 1971, twenty-two per cent of the non-
agricultural workforce in government, secondary or tertiary employment
were engaged in occupations relating to wholesaling, retailing, storage
. 11
or transportatlon Such activities have not been extensively
. · d 12lnvestlgate partly due to the Zaissez-faipe atmosphere which has
prevailed in this area since the time of Adam Smith (Adelman, 1962: 266,
Stacey and Wilson, 1965: 100).
One manifestation of the insouciance is that recent advances in
distribution technology have lagged behind those in manufacturing (Cox
et aZ.~ 1965: 196-97). Since sales channels are still dominated by
small, conservative merchandisers, it is questionable whether research
advances, especially in retail management, would be readily accepted
12
(McClelland, 1964: 165)13. Even in general metropolitan commerce, the
fundamentals of control may be lacking. Among Sydney and Melbourne
firms, Winter (1966: 206) found that, although nearly all maintained
continuous production cost accounts, only sixty per cent kept
distribution records; Neuschel (1967: 125) provides corroborating
evidence from the united States. Such inadequacies combined with
extensive specialisation have precluded much rationalisation or moves
towards scale economies in distribution. It took powerful analytical
techniques and the advent of computing in the 1950s to show that
performance could improve. In future, as manufacturing reaches
asymptotic efficiency, attention to wholesaling and retailing will offer
the most effective means of curbing expense and enhancing overall
productivity (Parker, 1962: 16; Stolle, 1967: 100). Thus in its own
right marketing constitutes worthwhile research topic.
Marketing: definition and theoretical status
Though the term 'marketing' has various interpretations14 , the
following definition of the American Marketing Association is stipulated
in most publications:
marketing -- the performance of business activities
that direct the flow of goods and services from the
producer to the consumer (Alexander et al.~ 1963:
15) •
In the United states, recognition of the subject began in about 1900 in
response to lengthening supply channels, loss of contact with the
ultimate consumer, attitudes of caveat emptor~ and the growing
complexity of retailing (Bartels, 1962: 12-27). According to Converse
et al.~ 1965: 125-26), the main approaches have included:
(a) the investigation of institutions, an account of the various
agencies involved in distributing a product;
(b) commodity analysis, reviewing the processes required to
wholesale and retail specific classes of goods (see Mount,
1969) ;
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(c) the functional school, which examines operational aspects of
marketing such as sales administration, invoicing, materials
handling, and so forth.
Yet, as a consequence of the insufficient research noted before
marketing theory is not well developed and has long drawn criticism,
even from within the discipline (e.g. Alderson and Cox, 1948: 138;
Grether, 1950: 113). In an area of enquiry which has grown 'rather
like Topsy' (Kernan and Sommers, 1968: vii), there is no deductive
formulation which can be used to explain the location or relocation of
distribution facilities. Such theory as exists has been incorporated
from the methodological sciences (operations research, Bayesian
statistics, game and decision theory, simulation), b~siness studies,
economics, and social and behavioural disciplines (sociology, psychology,
linguistics, anthropology). The important early contributions of
marketing geography (e.g. Reilly, 1931), have not been maintained.
Marketing geography: the problems
Despite its wide scope, the 'delimitation and measurement of
markets and ... [investigation] of channels of distribution' (Applebaum,
1954: 246), marketing geography has had a blighted career:
since 1961 ... there have been many fewer
publications in marketing geography than in other
fields .•.with practical applications ... the major
publications refer only to business conditions in
the United States ... there has been especially
little sign of ... acceptance .•. in [Australian]
professional journals (Doddridge and Mackenzie,
1971: 2).
The 1971 Research in Progress, published by the Institute of Australian
Geographers15 , substantiates Doddridge and Mackenzie's lamentations.
The limited interest accorded the specialisation -- twenty-two of some
thousand tertiary-level projects -- has been pitched primarily at the
consumer. Household surveys, shopping centres and retailing have been
key topics. The cost ratio of marketing in business could alone
14
demonstrate the seriousness of the neglect; more particularly, only
two entries considered the virtually-forgotten angle of the producer.
This viewpoint is now adopted because of its pertinence to studies
of enterprises. By use of a restricted sample and intensive interview
and data collection procedures, the present analysis deals with the
core facts of companies -- the accounting and economic statistics
which, despite their omission in the past, form the crux of decision-
making in an aggressive, competitive milieu. The relationship of this
information with other variables which shape corporate behaviour cannot
be assessed satisfactorily without some appreciation of the conduct of
marketing. The following discussion raises the possibility of
alternative distribution systems and, in the next Chapter, one is
selected as a suitable focus for investigation of the problems outlined
above.
MARKETING PROCESSES
Marketing has many facets. For one author, it should maximise
consumer satisfaction, provide the opportunity for optimum-scale
manufacturing, deploy effort to the greatest social advantage and
realise entrepreneurial profits (Lockley, 1951: 61-62). Clearly,
a holistic and integrative activity is involved. The structural schema
portrayed in Figure 1.2 encompasses the interaction of the main elements
in any marketing initiative (Mallen, 1967: 102). The direct components
pricing, product determination, product mix and distribution,
promotion and market research -- can be seen influencing and, in turn,
reflecting strategies formulated elsewhere in the company and the
outside world. Given such complexity, a producer-based study must
engage a sub-model of the locational decision-making process in order to
pursue any meaningful empirical analysis.
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FIGURE 1.2:
Mallen (1967: 102)
The elements of marketing.
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Corporate spatial strategy in marketing
Among the interrelationships outlined in Mallen's diagram, most
spatially-oriented policy occurs within the ambit of distribution. Its
development is detailed in a planning schema adapted from Stern (1966:
13) and shown in Figure 1.3. Before a plan is commenced, the company
directorate must recognise its overall aims the higher-level, long-
range manifestations of its economic philosophy. Although these goals
have attracted much academic debate (see Machlup, 1967), they can be
assumed multi-dimensional, varying with the nature of the firm, the
market, and environmental and perceptual influences (Townroe, 1969: 17;
Mueller, 1972: 200). After they have been shown to be feasible in the
light of contemporary conditions, the corporation's marketing division
can generate its own short to medium-term ohje~tives. Those with spatial
application may range from concrete proposals -- the enforcement of
national coverage or an upgrading of retail outlets -- to less tangible
schemes typified in an intensification of sales promotion. These
strategies are evaluated first in relation to overall goals and then to
three elements which affect the firm's general operations.
(i) The business environment covers a gamut of macro-economic,
social, technological, ethical, governmental, historical,
legal and competitive considerations.
(ii) The market applies a filter to spatial propositions. For
example, methods adopted in one regional or product market
might be quite inappropriate in another. Market size,
intensity and distance all affect the geographical dynamics of
the distribution structure necessary to provide adequate
coverage.
(iii) The company situation provides the means to implement policies.
Firm size, measured in asset or turnover terms, is perhaps the
most important single variable affecting distribution. It
largely determines the nature of any existing system and the
extent of its throughput. A company's financial position
similarly constrains or enhances its spatial actions,
especially when extraordinary adjustments are under review.
The organisation of representation, level of management
experience and perception all influence policy-formation (cf.
Udell, 1968 j Aylmer, 1970). Attitudes to risk are also
important.
Overall
company
goals
.......--------~---.1Ie
17
~.-----.{Communications
sub-mix
Distribution
sub-mix
~ Marketing mix
Yes
Cost -performance
evaluation
Yes
Implementation
Product
sub-mix
FIGURE 1.3: A schema for spatial decision-making
within distribution.
Source: Adapted from Stern (1966: 13).
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If a spatial plan is acceptable within the current state of these
inter-dependent constraints and anticipated competitor counter-
strategies, it undergoes a more specialised assessment among the
elements of the 'marketing mix'. This framework of variables has been
characterised as
a battery of devices or types of marketing
activities that are coordinated into a single
effort to reach a particular target. The ...
attack advances on several fronts simultaneously.
[Its] coordination is a critical element in the
development of marketing strategy (Bell, 1966:
351) .
An equilibrium of forces in the marketing function must be achieved
before a company can perform satisfactorily and accomplish its
aspirations. Thus, a strategy must be compatible with ongoing activity
in three main sub-mixes (Lazer, 1962: 13).
(i) The product sub-mix covers such interests as product line
analysis, innovation, planning, service, quality, warranty,
pricing and so forth.
(ii) The communications sub-mix includes personal selling
activities -- the allocation of sales effort, integration of
sales and service, lines of administration and feedback from
the field to headquarters, marketing responsibilities and
territory coverage by representatives. Non-personal aspects
of merchandising incorporate advertising, sales promotions,
public relations, research and reporting.
(iii) The distribution sub-mix involves decision-making in physical
distribution and channel analysis. The former is concerned
with transportation, shipping, storage and inventory control.
The latter requires a continuous appraisal of the present and
future adequacy of the company's distribution system to fulfil
the tasks demanded by the marketing objectives.
A spatial proposal which is still satisfactory after this extensive
testing is subject to cost/benefit analysis before final implementation.
The development of policy is well attended by feedback loops which allow
for substantial modification~ and major internal and external
interrelationships exist within and among marketing operations. Thus,
in the product sub-mix, service provisions depend on product quality and
warranty conditions. Yet, they are also affected by the manufacturer's
19
brand image, the importance of replacement demand, type of user, and
size of unit sales -- questions determined primarily in the
communications area. Substitutions can enhance or inhibit the chances
of spatial action. For example, a firm unwilling or unable to undertake
communications responsibilities in a region could calIon an independent
distributor for assistance -- thus varying its distribution sub-mix.
Product requirements infiltrate all aspects of marketing (Miracle,
1965: 20-23). High-value goods are unlikely to be supplied through
middlemen because they are able to stand the costs of direct supply.
Similarly, technical goods are sold without intermediaries so that
their performance can be demonstrated adequately. In contrast, bulky
or heavy products are usually sent to brokers who can achieve economies
of scale through specialisation and superior materials handling.
Perishable or fashion articles typically have short channels while,
with durables, the reverse applies. The extent of a firm's range is
also important for it governs the type and quality of agencies for whom
business will be attractive.
Stern's model advances a crisp but comprehensive statement which
clearly recognises the role of endogenous and exogenous influences and
inter-divisional conflict in a company's conduct under uncertainty.
Closer inspection of the marketing function in terms of a particular
distribution method favoured by large, capital-goods producers -- the
franchise system -- permits further insights into corporate spatial
behaviour. Indeed, franchising, a means of selling through a small
number of relatively-permanent wholesale and retail establishments on
the basis of written agreements, is ideally suited for current purposes
since it exhibits a degree of formalisation, definition and operational
'compactness' unmatched by other alternatives.
20
Enterprises have acquired a dominant place in the commercial world and
are attracting increasing academic interest. Their spatial impact,
assumed to be different to that of the entrepreneur, can be probed most
efficiently in their product distribution, although marketing geography
is not sufficiently developed to allow a highly theoretical approach.
Yet, the relevant procedures of Iocational decision-making are
interpretable through an adaptation of stern's (1966: 13) planning
model. Recognition of different distribution modes enables franchising
to be chosen as a focus for study of scale effects, establishment
mobility and policy substitution in corporate behaviour.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE FRANCHISE SYSTEM: ALL THAT GLITTERS •••
Since the Second World War, vertical distribution structures have
gained prominence in advanced economies l . Their growth has been
assisted by the rise of three forms of franchising which, together,
constitute one of several contractual styles of marketing (Table 2.1).
Franchising's unique characteristics distinguish it not only from major
alternative distribution methods 2 but also from minor variations which
I " d·· 3rely on employees, lcensees an conceSSlonalres A historical review
of the system's headlong rush into the commercial limelight of the
1960s exposes the inherent over-enthusiasm of some attendant literature
and the need to examine the efficacy of franchising in recession.
Later, large and small firms from a selected industry are studied in
order to elucidate the aspects of corporate'decision-making highlighted
previously.
THE FRANCHISE SYSTEM
Few definitions of franchising4 are as pointed as that of Ingraham
(1963: 13) who sees the technique as incorporating
an organisation composed of distributive units
established and administered by a supplier
through the device of a contract called a
'Franchise Agreement' as a medium for expanding
and controlling the marketing of his products.
The insinuation of supplier manipulation in these arrangements is not
inappropriate, since many American franchisors have been prosecuted
for infringement of fair trade and anti-trust legislation this
5
century. However, the difficulties of describing so broad a concept
succinctly are such that Ingraham does not explain the differentiation
TABLE 2.1: ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
IN ADVANCED-ECONOMIES
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Orientation
or Class
Horizontal
( laissez-f-aire)
Vertical
Variants
(and Sub-types)
Numerous hybrid
forms
Corporate
(chain stores)
Contractual
(franchising)
(co-operatives)
(voluntary chains)
Administered
Cormnentary
'fragmented networks in which
loos~ly aligned manufacturers,
wholesalers and retailers have
customarily bargained agress-
ively with each other, esta-
blished trade relationships on
an individual transaction basis,
severed business relationships
with impunity, and otherwise,
behaved independently'.
, [systems which aim to allow]
establishments at each level [of
distribution] to operate at an
optimum scale so that the
marketing functions within the
system are performed at the most
advantageous level or position'.
Source: Adapted from Davidson (1970: 7-10).
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from other types of marketing implied in the 'agreement'. The
h i I h 6main features of conventional franc lSlng are t at
(a) a contractual relationship proposing numerous
responsibilities, contributions and benefits is voluntarily
adopted by two parties for a specified time;
(b) this association affords to the franchisee the right to
offer, sell or distribute the goods, services or concepts
of the franchisor in a prescribed manner;
(c) the franchise typically employs selective distribution and
requires the full activity of the franchisee as a legally
independent businessman;
(d) both participants share a common public identity through
trade marks, advertising and goodwill;
(e) the franchisee normally takes full title to any products
obtained from his supplier.
In essence, this system achieves vertical integration in two or
more successive stages of distribution and thereby offers its founder
a certain degree of network control (Malacki, 1973: 7-10). It relies
on a normal licence, coupled with ongoing provisos to ensure uniformity
and acceptable standards of service. Depending on the type of
franchising, retailers may use their own or their producer's business
name; generally, however, they have little flexibility to alter
product features or their overall marketing mix. Franchising is
initiated when a merchant installs a limited number of outlets to
intensify and promote his links with the market. The retailers sign
contracts outlining the basis of the association. In return for their
distribution activities, they receive discounts ranging in most trades
from ten to twenty-five per cent of a product's selling price as
determined by the manufacturer. Dealers of large firms generally
finance stock from their own funds or from floor-plan sources; small
franchisors, on the other hand, might be required to provide retail
credit assistance, since their sales organisations are usually less
established. Goods may be supplied direct from the production works
but, in many cases, company-owned or independent distributors are used.
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While the impact of franchising is becoming increasingly apparent
in Australia7 , the system has already contributed significantly to the
economy of the United States. Principally, it has:
(a) encouraged higher standards in retailing by its enforcement
of proven techniques which are generally more consonant
with the market than those of unaligned businessmen;
(b) improved retail management by affording entrepreneurs the
training, experience and logistics support of the franchisor,
together with economies of scale in supply usually associated
with large corporations (Curry et al.~ 1966: 92);
(c) helped to stabilise small business by spreading retail risk,
stimulating local employment and dispersing modern marketing
techniques in areas which otherwise might not have been
serviced (Ingraham, 1963: 219; Fine, 1968: 19);
(d) broadened the economic base of the nation by allowing
distributive organisations to expand despite limited capital
and by giving many former employees the opportunity to
conduct their own business (Ozanne and Hunt, 1971: 114;
Hunt, 1972: 35-38).
Franchised outlets appear attractive and well-run because they offer
merchandise of standard quality and dependability from convenient1y-
situated premises (Lewis and Hancock, 1963: 85-92). Along with the
provision of a wider range of goods and services to the consumer, this
type of distribution has fostered marketing innovation (Ingraham, 1963:
219). Its pluralistic features are highly regarded in the land of free
enterprise. As Judge Dawson commented during Susser versus Carvel
(1962)8:
the .•• system has the advantage, from the standpoint
of our American ... competitive economy, of enabling
numerous groups with small capital to become
entrepreneurs. [It] provides the public with ..•
a uniform product ... from small ..• contractors,
rather than the employees of a vast chain. The
franchise system is therefore good for the economy
(italics added).
Development of the franchise system
Modern franchise practice arose from the fusion of two separate
forces which originated in medieval Europe9 .
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(i) In a constitutional strain, franchises were feudal laws which
permitted freedom from restraint or servitude and later
came to represent an immunity or privilege conferred by
a sovereign.
(ii) From a commercial standpoint, licensing arrangements first
developed in the Middle Ages and were prevalent among
British and American merchants by the Colonial Period.
Thereafter, the rise of oligopoly in various industries
during the Industrial Revolution made possible the
standardised marketing agreements now characteristic of
franchising. stronger producers soon attained sufficient
power to ensure that these contracts were upheld.
Despite this background, the exact emergence of the system, as presently
conceived, is uncertain. A number of authors refer to its use by sewing
machine companies in the American economy of the 1860s. Probably it
was taken up by agricultural machinery suppliers at the same time. Yet
the chief impetus came after 1900 with the upsurge of the United states
automobile industrylO, in which technological progress was rapid,
products often unreliable and consumers uneducated. An exclusive
dealer force could cushion many inadequacies of production-oriented
manufacturers by offering a high level of service over a dispersed
market (Davisson, 1954: 92).
Before 1920, the new measures were concurrently being incorporated
in other fields. Drug producers became involved after 1902 followed
by soft-drink bottlers who recognised a medium for attaining
standardisation and quality control over wide areas. The final boost
to manufacturer (or wholesaler) inspired product franchising came with
the induction of the oil magnates after 1930, partly as a result of
institutional issues (see McLean and Haigh, 1954). Despite some
h ·· · 11 h b · fl' ·ybrldlsatlon , t e aS1C ormu a lS now consplcuously strong as a means
of petroleum distribution (Hall, 1964: 62; Townsend, 1965).
Though product franchising is still the dominant form of the
general system, most postwar growth has occurred in the business or trade
name variants l2 (Table 2.2). Both date back to the 1920s, when foods,
variety and hardware merchants formed 'voluntary chains' as a strategy
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TABLE 2.2: TYPES OF FRANCHISING
Type of
Franchising
Product
Business
Trade name
or service
Typical Distribution
Channels
Manufacturer-
(wholesaler) -
retailer
Wholesaler-retailer
Manufacturer-
wholesaler
Manufacturer-
wholesaler
Service sponsor-
manufacturer
Service sponsor-
(wholesaler) -
retailer
Franchisor-
franchisee both on
all levels of
distribution
Principal Industries Involved
Automobiles, trucks,
petroleum, hearing aids,
agricultural machinery, con-
struction equipment, water
conditioners, swimming pools
Foods, drugs, hardware, home
and automobile accessories,
variety stores
Soft drinks, beer
Fast foods, beverages, soft
ice cream
Fabricated textiles
Carpet cleaning, soft ice
cream, fast foods, removals,
car rentals, beverages, hotels/
motels, tools/equipment
rentals, coin-op laundries and
dry cleaners
Bread, milk, mattresses
Source: Adapted from Thompson (1968: 41) and McGuire (1971: 11-12).
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against burgeoning corporate distribution (Ingraham, 1963: 64; Hall,
1964: 63). After the Second World War, the United states experienced
massive socio-economic change, exemplified in suburban sprawl, increased
leisure time, greater personal mobility, and the marketing revolution.
Huff (1961: 9) suggests that these factors, combined with pent-up
demand and affluence, a pool of available entrepreneurship provided by
ex-servicemen, progress in small-scale electronic data processing
equipment, and consumer requirements for increased levels of retailer
accessibility all favoured the rapid expansion of franchise activity.
Also, the ongoing attack on small business by discount houses, shopping
centres and chain stores was a formidable catalyst. Retailers were
looking for protection through affiliation with national marketing
organisations. Franchise offers of comprehensive sales programmes
and management expertise were a winning incentive with many new
operators.
The 'franchise boom' of the 1960s
Franchising's heyday during the 1960s has been so poorly attended
with accurate statistics that a comprehensive, integrated time series
13
cannot be presented . Initial computations of the International
Franchise Association suggested that 339', 000 outlets turned over $USS9
billion in 1963 (Buckley, 1964: 37). Four years afterwards, the
Association claimed that $US89 billion (a plausible volume) passed
( · l' · 14)through 513,000 sales establishments a s~emlng y hlgh estlmate · The
tupnover levels were corroborated in a later survey which highlighted
considerable growth in the triennium to 1971 (Table 2.3). In the latter
year, the reported 407,000 franchised stores in the United States (about
fifteen per cent of all wholesale and retail facilities) achieved sales
of $US13l billion -- over ten per cent of the country's gross national
product of $USl,047 billionlS .
TABLE 2.3: FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1969-71
Total Franchisor/ Total Franchisor/
Franchisee Franchisee Sales
Principal Type Establishments ($US billion)
of Retailing (thousand)
1969 1970 1971 1969 1970 1971
Automobi1e/trucksa 37.80 37.20 37.00 66.40 53.10 69.00
Automotive products 18.90 20.40 20.60 1.80 1.90 2.00
and servicesa
Fast foods 28.70 32.60 35.60 3.80 4.60 5.30
Gasoline stationsa 222.20 222.00 220.00 25.10 26.50 27.30
General retailing 27.60 29.30 31.00 12.10 13.10 14.40
All other industries 48.70 54.80 60.80 10.30 12.00 13.60
Total franchising 383.90 396.30 407.00 119.50 111.20 131.60
a Indicates industries mainly engaged in product franchising.
Source: united States of America [Department of Commerce] (1971: 2-4).
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An enormous variety of functions now subscribes to this type of
distribution. In the United Kingdom, Mendelsohn (1970: 25-33) lists
some sixty-five which range from accounting services to weight control
courses, but many more could be enumerated. Some of the best-known
companies such as Kentucky Fried Chicken, McDona1ds, and Burger Chef
dominate the fast-foods industry and have expanded into Australia
within the last decade. Other widely-patronised participants are
automotive supply stores (e.g. B.F. Goodrich), hotels/motels (e.g.
Holiday Inns of America) and car-hiring services (Avis, Hertz, Budget).
Slater's (1964: 20) assertion that 'just about everything is, and can
be, franchised' apparently has been recognised by some of America's
most sizeable non-franchising conglomerates which are now perpetrating
a trend of acquisitions (Sherwood, 1968: 27). Typical examples are
the takeovers of the Automation Institute by Control Data Corporation
and of Jack-in-the-Box by Ralston Purina (Bernstein, 1968: 36; Ozanne
and Hunt, 1971: 351-53). From many accounts, the franchise system
appears as a conspicuously successful phenomenon of modern marketing.
THE APPLIED PROBLEM
The name of the system is franchising. Franchising
is as American as Mom, apple pie, and lately Bob
Dylan ..• franchising is America's answer to
monopoly capitalism, the newest and by far the
most secure niche carved out for that typical
American who refuses to fade from the scene, the
small businessman (Rosenberg and Bedell, 1969: 6).
In a number of publications and the statements of many franchisors, the
spectacular boom of the 1960s encouraged an unreflective bullishness,
lack of objectivity and preoccupation with the specific to the
detriment of the general. By no means has the system been free of
problems. One of its chief advocates, Slater (1964: 20), laments that
it is 'woefully misunderstood' -- at best, a euphemistic evaluation.
Franchising's expansion attracted a significant share of illegal
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business practices which rather tarnished its reputation16 • Lengthy
litigation and federal anti-trust action have beset several user
industries. Moreover, for various reasons, a percentage of outlets
have failed and their owners have sometimes complained to the press
about conditions under which they had to operate (Lyons, 1966; Levy,
1969).
The iconoclasts
In recent literature, such excesses have culminated in a timely
undercurrent of iconoclasm, originally infused by Hewitt (1956). This
17 · 1 hmovement, composed mainly of business lawyers ,questl0ns not ony t e
equitability and legal rectitude of the franchise relationship but also
whether the system achieves all the benefits which its proponents
claim. Yet even these searching examinations seem to obfuscate an
important point. Difficulties which the more radical writers and
legislators seek to overcome have arisen in a so-called 'boom' period
for franchise development. There has been little thought as to the
possible ramifications of less favourable economic circumstances:
the probZem of adjustment of franchise systems
to changing market conditions is not necessarily
of universal concern. [It] has direct meaning
to [long-founded] franchisors ••• who .•• have
undergone little or no adjustment in the
products, the locations, the operating practices,
and the physical style of their businesses. It
has indirect meaning to the more-recently-
established-franchise systems insofar as they
may fail to adjust to future ... conditions (Lewis
and Hancock, 1963: 76).
These comments skirt an issue which, as shown by the Ford Motor
Company's experience in the 1930s, is crucially significant to all
franchisors (Palamountain, 1955: 118-19; Brown, 1970: 107). There are
few business handbooks which outline either 'appropriate' strategies
for survival or the effects of past setbacks on organisations involved.
A study of economic contraction would spotlight aspects of corporate
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decision-making (as suggested in Chapter One), and fill an urgent
applied need in our knowledge of product distribution. The present
operational problem, to determine the economic and spatial response to
depressed demand of enterprises operating within a franchise system,
thrusts into both fields with a completely fresh approach. Yet before
any progress can be made, one of three forms of franchising must be
selected as the focus; it is beyond the scope of this project to
investigate them all. Although exuberant claims have not been directed
specifically at product franchising, it is the logical emphasis for the
current study.
THE CASE FOR PRODUCT FRANCHISING
In terms of either number of outlets or sales volume, product
franchising is easily the most important variant of the general system.
Thus, results obtained should be highly representative of franchise
practice as a whole (see Table 2.3). Unlike their youthful counterparts
in the 'business' and 'trade name' applications, the older product
franchisors are precisely those who have undergone 'little or no
adjustment' -- to re-quote Lewis an~ Hancock (1963: 76). The problem
is 'directly' relevant in this sector. Moreover, participant
industries are clearly distinguishable and long-established and their
cyclical behaviour is better recorded than that of suppliers in the
other two areas.
Rationale of product franchising
To the major user organisations -- those involved in automobiles,
petroleum, electrical goods and agricultural and construction
equipment -- the rationale of product franchising rests on three
interrelated factors (Ingraham, 1963: 56-85).
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(i) The demands of the product. Product franchising is usually
employed in marketing strongly-differentiated capital
durables which exact high degrees of retailer and brand
loyalty. Selective or exclusive distribution can be used
to create attractive sales opportunities but these goods
demand a concentrated pitch, technical expertise and
a commitment towards spare parts, service and warranty. The
manufacturer cannot economically overcome such retail entry
barriers without independent local assistance and, often,
substantial investment from prospective dealers (Lewis and
Hancock, 1963: 7).
(ii) Managerial considerations. capitaladurables engender high
risks for all channel participants . Through product
franchising, suppliers can ameliorate market forces by
dealing with only a select group of retailers. Stock
investment and bad debt exposure is reduced, local display
facilitated and the company's marketing arm extended by
motivated and well-trained entrepreneurs.
(iii) Financial and network control needs. Firms in developing
markets must increase their sales or lose penetration and
court failure. Yet, capital is often unavailable for this
purpose. The franchise system offers rapid growth prospects
without the asset fixity of corporate distribution or the
intangibles of horizontal marketing. A producer can regulate
his entry through variable cost distribution. His risk is
spread throughout the channel, from which he gains access to
sales, working finance, service, publicity, storage and credit
collection facilities.
The prospective user must weigh these three considerations in terms of
his company situation. In general, however, product franchising
decreases uncertainty for the manufacturer and provides cheap
distribution with substantial levels of network control. As such, it
would appear reasonably adaptable to the stringencies of recession.
Application of product franchising
Use of product franchising as an aggressive marketing device has
been most fully exploited in the American automobile industry.
According to Hewitt (1956: 55-57), the more successful vehicle
manufacturers found that:
(a) selling expenses were contained by restricting the number of
outlets, and pricing was more easily policed;
(b) exclusive franchise territories attracted financially-stronger
dealers and allowed better production planning;
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(c) the intra-brand sales protection offered by product
franchising could be used to enforce exclusive
representation, through which dealers acquired a specialised
investment and became subject to high levels of control;
(d) similarly, service and spare parts operations could be
oriented to exclude competition.
In most present applications, at least in the United States,
legislation has rectified excesses concerning exclusive territories
and representation, tying agreements and resale price maintenance
which, before, blatantly favoured the franchisor (Stephenson and House,
1971: 39). Yet, in many respects, product franchising still affords
a means by which a supplier can enjoy the outstanding advantages
accruing from centralised marketing administration without undertaking
costly forward integration -- an attractive situation since,
entrepreneurs dO seek to gain control over the
activities of others and they realise it in
varying degrees. They do so because their
operations are affected, often quite significantly,
by the activities of others in the channel
(Little, 1970: 32).
The practical impact of Little's argument is clear. Though the
generally-held purpose of franchising is to allow both vendor and
vendee to exploit the potentially-greater gains which arise from
concerted distribution action, their channel aims can vary. Factory
profits for the former often require increased sales, whereas this
course may not be the most lucrative for the franchisee operating under
a different cost structure (see Woll, 1968). In recognition of the
frequent resolution to this apparent impasse, Ingraham (1963: 27) and
Hewitt (1967: 1075) contend that the primary objective of any franchise
system is to govern and expand the marketing of the producer's goods
on a profitable basis. This goal of network authority can be fulfilled
by employing two main techniques. The supplier's first interest is in
managerial dominion over the operations of his dealer force without
monetary commitment. Indeed, in many less-important aspects of
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administration, his aim is achieved solely through the marketing
contract. Yet, financial measures are invariably involved as a second
form of control. They may include direct ownership or investment in
the fixed assets of the reseller, funding equipment, stock or working
· 119 h" f'" fcaplta , t e co-slgnlng 0 notes or acqulsltlon 0 master-leases on
sales premises (Ingraham, 1963: 18). Since such provisions constitute
direct forward integration and entail extra uncertainty, they are
avoided if the managerial alternative is possible.
Applied strictly, the principles of channel leadership allot
retailers a position of low autonomy but offer the whole system peak
efficiency from a solely technical viewpoint. (Stephenson and House,
1971: 36). However, since the vendee has too great a legal, financial
and moral stake to permit all issues to turn to the other party's
advantage, disputes will emerge in th'e absence of provision for an
equitable allocation of income based on economic exposure and risk
(cf. Rosenberg and stern, 1970: 45; Stephenson and House, 1971: 41).
FORMATION OF HYPOTHESES
The importance of management is underscored in times of recession, when
the producer's existence is threatened by pressures in both his
distribution organisation and in the market at large. Mallen (1967:
105) lists four possible areas of contention:
(a) among channel members (manufacturer-wholesaler-retailer);
(b) between competitors for use of agencies (manufacturer-
manufacturer for a wholesaler);
(c) between channel competitors (manufacturer-manufacturer,
wholesaler-wholesaler, retailer-retailer);
(d) between distribution systems (franchising vepsus corporate
marketing in a single industry; manufacturer-retai:ler
vepsus manufacturer-wholesaler-retailer).
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In an integrated sales organisation, the fortunes of manufacturer and
dealer are inextricably bound. Yet, the former bears major
responsibility for the prosperity of all participants because
the degree and quality of control •.• exercised
by the franchisor usually is a decisive
factor in determining the ••. success that the
system achieves (Hewitt, 1967: 1076).
The preconditions to network authority are derived from a franchising
company's structural attributes signifying two forms of power:
(i) Economic force accrues from concentration of capital20 • For
example, larger producers often engage corporate distribution
systems featuring considerable vertical integration, whereas
smaller or weaker sellers may have to seek wholesalers or
retailers to accommodate their entire output, thus abrogating
most of their flexibility.
(ii) positional strength, derived from accessibility to consumers,
is a negotiable commodity. A strong enterprise can offset
the effects of a marginal location by recruiting independent
agencies -- such as dealers -- better placed in relation to
its clientele.
Therefore, depending on the positioning of his strategic facilities,
the large franchisor should be capable of asserting greater control
than smaller competitors. His power woUld be reflected in a more
embracing franchise code, and market tactics which maintain or improve
existing channel relationships in his favour and dispel any threat of
undesired contraction in the sales force. In this respect, considering
the operating costs of the establishments involved, representation
policies in the central administrative and production, wholesale and
retail sectors must playa significant role. Therefore, in a franchise
system experiencing recession, an association may be hypothesized of
company structural factors· (expressed through the exercise of network
management) and the direction of corporate spatial decision-making.
Related to this geographic prediction is a purely financial
postulate. If, as Hewitt (1967: 1076) has contended, a franchise
system's fortunes depend on the degree of authority with which it is
conducted, larger firms' operations should adapt better to market
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contraction than those of small competitors. The differences necessary
to test this second hypothesis will be evinced in distribution policy
(as proxied in franchise agreements) and practice (viewed here
principally in terms of locational representation strategies). Yet,
ceteris paribus~ more inclusive channel management should contribute
to superior market and economic results among large franchisors. Hence,
these variables must also be considered in assessing the relative
'success' of various organisations.
Based on this structural hypothesis with its spatial and financial
applications, the enquiry integrates the themes of corporate policy-
formation, marketing and product franchising. Yet, so broad a problem
must be narrowed to one subject industry. Part Two, comprising
Chapters Three and Four, centres on a select group of recession-bound
enterprises which is differentiated into 'large' and 'small' segments.
Part Three (Chapters Five to Eight) analyses each group's relative
network capacities and their bearing on tactics undertaken. Conclusions
about processes and relationships in major firm@' ..policy formation are
derived in Part Four (Chapter Nine).
~ ~
RESUME
Following their segregation from all possible distribution media, the
three forms of franchising were defined in terms of a general system.
A review of its development pointed up serious oversights which
pervaded the literature during the boom period of the 1960s. Most
noticeably, the repercussions of business downturns on the performance
of user corporations have: been neglected. The specific' interest of the
project was then directed to product franchising, in which channel
control -- represented in a business' financial size and strength and
market accessibility -- was assumed a significant influence on its
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decision-making and ultimate success. To develop these ideas, a search
for a suitable test industry was initiated.
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CHAPTER TWO FOOTNOTES
1. Alternative forms of distribution have arisen in response to the
needs of many different kinds of products (cf. Miracle, 1965). The
rise of vertical structures is noted in Bucklin (1970a: 21) and
Davidson (1970: 7-10). For further details, see Bucklin (1970b) and
Blois (1972).
2. Among other contractual systems, co-operatives do not profess the
individual profit motive while voluntary chains (usually non-integrated
retail alliances) lack many of the administrative and management
controls of franchising (see Konopa, 1963). Corporate distribution
relies on the use of company retail outlets in contrast to independent
entrepreneurs (see Ridgeway, 1957: 468-70). Finally, administered
marketing operates through lessees who rent space in large stores and
provide their own sales personnel (see Davidson, 1970: 8).
3. Franchisees can be differentiated from three other types of
marketing functionary:
(a) employees, who undertake a task in the manner specified by the
employer to achieve a stated necessary outcome;
(b) licensees, who work under arrangements offering less vertical
integration, fewer provisos and little of the continuing
relationship characteristic of the franchise contract (see
Ingraham, 1963: 21);
(c) concessionaires, whose relationship with a host organisation
seldom amounts to more than a lessor-lessee arrangement and
certainly does not incorporate the usual legal vendor-vendee
status of the franchise contract.
General information is provided by Glickman (1972: 2/1-2/27). More
specialised papers include Keck (1968); Rahl (1968); Baker (1969).
4. For example, Curry et al. (1966: 17); Mendelsohn (1970: 5);
Rosenfield (1970: 9-18); Izraeli (1972: 3-8).
5. See Hewitt (1956,1958); Whitney (1958); Zeidman (1967);
Thompson (1968); Clabault (1970).
6. Based on the United states' 'Fairness in Franchising Act', the
Hart Bill -- SR No. 2507 [A Bill Relating to Dealings between Parties
to Franchise Agreements] and SR No. 2321 [A Bill to Supplement the
Anti-trust Laws of the United States in order to Prevent Anti-
Competitive Practices etc.]. See Rosenfield (1970: 9-18; Izrae1i
(1972: 3-4). For operational descriptions, see Schwartz (1959); Curry
et al. (1966); Cameron (1970).
7. Bellin (1970: 756-57). A complete lack of reference material
about Australian franchising restricts the present commentary to the
situation in the United States. Information in Table 2.3 is not
available for Australia.
8. BernaJYd Susser et al. vepsus Carvel Corporation et al.~ Commerce
Clearing House Inc., Trade Regulation Reporter No.5, Current Comment
-- Trade Cases 1962, quoted in Lewis and Hancock (1963: 92).
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9. Much detail exists on the origins of the franchise system. This
account has been based on Hewitt (1956); Kursh (1962); Lewis and
Hancock (1963); Slater (1964); Rothenberg (1967); Konopa (1970);
Rosenfield (1970); Izrae1i (1972).
10. For further treatment of various aspects of franchising in the
automobile industry, see Hewitt (1956); Koo (1959); Pashigian (1960);
Brown et ale (1962: 103-26); Kessler (1962); Sloan (1964); Freed
(1964); Phelps (1965); Brownlee (l966); Curry et ale (1966).
11. Ridgeway (1957: 477).
is found in Cross (1962);
More information about gasoline marketing
Dixon (1964); Winer (1967).
12. See Oxenfe1dt and Thompson (1968: 4).
13. The inadequacies were first pointed out by Lewis and Hancock
(1963: 85) and Ingraham (1963: 5). Yet, some years later, they
remained still apparently unrectified (Best, 1968: 46); Bond (1969:
44); Levy (1969: 37); United States of America [Senate] (1970: 17-18).
14. Estimates recorded in Konopa (1970: 19/41) and McGuire (1971: 2).
15. U.S.A. statistics in Brief 1972, [Supplement to The Statistical
Abstract of the United States, 93 (1972)], Bureau of Census, Department of
Commerce, United States Government P~inting· Office, Washington, D.C., 1972.
16. See Wilson (1966); Mockler and Easop (1968: 28-29); Levy (1969);
van eise (1969); Augustine and Hrusoff (1970: 1349-51).
17. Brown (1970); Rosenfield (1968, 1970).
18. Alexander et ale (1963: 10) define a channel of distribution as
'the .•. intra-company organisation units and extra-company agents and
dealers, wholesale and retail, through which a commodity, product, or
service is marketed'. Apart from the stipulation of independent
retailers, franchising does not presume any particular distribution
channel structure. If involved at all, wholesalers could be either
corporate or non-corporate agencies. They might employ sub-distributors
who could, in turn, sell to their own retailers. Dealers might rely on
spotter or commission agents. For further general information on
channels of distribution, see Beckman (1932); Elder (1935); C1ewett
(1954); Diamond (1963); Bucklin (1966).
19. Supplementary financing is the most co~~on form of franchisor
participation at retail in capital~durable product franchising
industries. Oil producers and those engaged in business or trade name
applications tend to use the other alternatives.
20. As pointed out later, 'concentration of capital' or asset strength
can be interpreted through other financial parameters in certain
circu..TUs tarlces •
PART TWO
SAMPLE SELECTION AND STRATIFICATION
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In order to evaluate this project's hypotheses, study of a product
franchising industry under recession is required. A suitable focus
obtains in the experience of agricultural machinery firms between
1967 and 1972. The development of excess capacity in world equipment
manufacturing during the 1960s and consequent saturation of the
Australian market are examined together with the onset of the rural
crisis as long and short-term environmental stimuli contributing to
the demise of suppliers. Similarly, the decline in the domestic
demand is reviewed. For practical reasons, the enquiry then narrows
to nineteen leading companies responsible for the bulk of the
nation's tractor and implement output; in preparation for the
subsequent analysis, they are classified into 'large' and 'small'
divisions on the basis of structural attributes.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE TEST CASE: THE AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURAL
MACHINERY INDUSTRY
Despite its research opportunities, the widespread Australian rural
malaise of the late 1960s has attracted little more than press
1
coverage • Centred in the wheat industry2, it was born of a cost/price
squeeze3 , uncertainty exacerbated by unfavourable media, inadequate
credit4 and, most importantly, years of neglect of the need for
consolidation and restructuring (Campbell, 1971: 68). The officially-
counternanced over-capacity and lack of adjustment in productive
resources relative to world requirements became chronic after the boom
of 1963-64. The years until 1968 brought economic turbulence,
rapidly-expanding acreages 5 , variable seasons, rising expenses and
falling prices, and an increasing dependence on temperamental export
opportunities. During the financial year 1970-71, farm income
plummeted to a postwar low of $AO.89 billion, while gross rural debt
spiralled to $A2.10 billion (Table 3.1). Small operators and
sharefarmers -- a significant proportion of all landholders -- were
jeopardised; even big producers lacked the liquidity to effect plant
6
alterations necessary in combating cost pressures. As cut-backs
applied by the farm community ricocheted among their suppliers, the
demand function for producer durables left manufacturers of
agricultural machinery among the worst affected such that, eventually,
their plight became public knowledge:
the primary producer [has] never been in a better
position to buy top quality machinery at the
keenest possible price ... this [is] a direct result
of the present recession [in which] used equipment
inventories [have] risen to an alarming level,
sales of new products [have] dropped drastically,
and discounting by all major organisations ... [has]
... created a buyers' market (paraphrase of a speech
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by Mr R.M. Cherry~ President~ Tractor and Machinery
Association of Australia~ quoted in "The "Land
[Sydney]~ 29 April 1971).
Farm equipment is as essential to urbanised, twentieth-century
life as agriculture itself. Hence, the study probes the experience of
these merchants in the 1967-72 recession to illustrate aspects of
corporate decision-making. Knowledge of the general and international
economics of the industry not only addresses its diversity and
complexity but also assists forthcoming analysis of the behaviour of
selected member firms. After outlining the suitability of the chosen
field, this chapter shows the contribution of demand and other elements
to the current global arrangement of production. It then demonstrates
the bearing of worldwide excess capacity on Australia during the 1960s
and details the decline after 1969. This discussion acts as
a springboard to the sampling in Chapter Four of individual companies
for further analysis.
CHOOSING THE TEST CASE
Although the agricultural machinery industry was adopted for the
investigation from limited alternatives, it offers several distinct
advantages.
(i) Availability of material. As the recession lifted in 1972,
marketing documents were still to hand in firms and the
issues fresh in the minds of policy-makers. Secondary
sources were a7so well-covered by a substantial body ofpublished data .
(ii) Easily-segregated products. As farm equipment is functionally
distinct, the complexities of substitutes and cross-
elasticities could be avoided. As a corollary, assuming
reasonable degrees of firm specialisation, the corporate
repercussions of economic contraction should be undiluted
because the nominated product has no application outside
the rural sector.
(iii) Practicality. There is definite applied value in examlnlng
this industry for, despite its small size, it is of crucial
importance to a significant part of the national economy.
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However, a criterion more telling than any of the above is that
product franchising is central to the market conduct of equipment
producers.
Product franchising in the agricultural machinery industry
The word 'FRANCHISE' •.•means that the Dealer and
[the Company] have joined together in a working
partnership with the farmer, and •.• under this
mutual understanding••.all dealers can profit,
grow and prosper ••. and serve agriculture, the
community and this wonderful country of ours,
Australia (dealer prospectus of a Melbourne
agriculturaZ machinery producer~ early to mid-
1960s) .
Product franchising was apparently imported into Australia by
North American companies towards the end of the nineteenth century.
At the 1906 Royal Commission on customs and Excise Tariffs, it was
denounced as an exogenous 'curse' which prevented the farmer from
obtaining his goods at a reasonable price,
[taking] hundreds of thousands of pounds out
of [his] pocket (Australia [Parliament], 1906:
92) •
Despite these accusations, the direct distribution advocated by local
manufacturers was superseded by the prevalent use of commission agents
(Horns, 1918: 76). These forerunners of the modern dealer held
consigned stock for sale or hire in a rigidly-defined territory. They
were expressly forbidden, at the risk of their own trading margin
which ranged from five to fifteen per cent, to ask other than fixed
prices. Though advised to demand cash or notes on delivery, the
agents also made collections and repossessions. Any interest in
competing lines was prohibited as was latitude to pledge the
manufacturer's word, incur expenses on his behalf, or promise delivery
dates.
Real change from this principal/agent relationship was delayed by
the Second World War and the sellers' market which followed. By the
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early 1960s, in accordance with the growing intricacy and cost of
equipment, most major companies had modified their contracts and
8
retreated to a completely wholesale role. Discount margins were
raised commensurately with enlarged performance obligations, formal
exclusivity clauses of all types gradually disappeared, consignment
was virtually abolished, and provision was made for passing title.
Invoicing was thenceforth directed to the retailer rather than the
consumer, thus enforcing substantial savings to the supplier. The
agent became a dealer under what could be construed as a legal vendor/
vendee association (Hewitt, 1956: 189).
Notwithstanding such modifications, the agreements still offered
ample scope for franchisor control. :Considering the--environment- i-n-
which agricultural machinery is sold, strong centralised administration
is probably more necessary than in most other areas of distribution.
Indeed, its use has been allied closely with a highly-variable demand
schedule and the development of competitive oligopoly. Such factors,
in turn, are paramount influences on world and local markets, as
indicated by succeeding sections.
THE DEMAND FUNCTION
Farm mechanisation has led a trend of increased capital substitution
in advanced agriculture since 1945. Greatly intensified research and
development has produced dramatic technological improvement, best
demonstrated in the application of power take-off, assisted steering,
sophisticated hydraulics, sensing devices, and an ubiquitous upgrading
of capacity and motive power (Vicas, 1970: 38-44). A Bureau of
Agricultural Economics (1969: 45-53) study of Australian wheat farms
reveals the financial import of agricultural equipment; for the
triennium ending 1966-67, plant and equipment represented nine per cent
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of the assets and fifty-two per cent of the annual gross value of
capital increments. Yet, while the quality and size of machinery has
risen, its price relative to labour and land has fallen (Heady and
Tweeten, 1963: 265-67). Thus, the adoption of more efficient products
is being paralleled by emigration of rural workers and sUbstantial
amalgamation of properties. In Australian primary industries, change
was initiated by the reconstruction of dairying in 1960 and has been
since accelerating (Campbell, 1971: 68).
The demand for agricultural machinery
Both the growing lumpiness of equipment inputs and the need to
achieve efficiency and scale economies have made farmers more aware
of the relative abilities of different goods and their support
facilities. Users are reacting to a more complicated factor market by
assuming characteristics of the industrial buyer, requiring specialised
economic and technical data from salesmen and assurances of readily-
available after-sales and spare parts service9 . A survey in the
Canadian broadacre belt suggests that the chief precursors of machinery
buying are discussions among the farming community, magazine articles
and demonstrations on neighbours' properties (Segall, 1969: 7-9). Yet,
the impact of such publicity can remain latent, because purchases of
capital durables can be frequently postponed until a decline in the
utility of existing stock or the flow of its services prompts
replacement action. Alternatively, the desire to improve performance
and work capacity through a new model might stimulate sales. Given
the price of equipment relative to other factor inputs, crop returns,
the discount rate and current level of technology, economic theory
contends that there exists at any time a stock position which the
farmer considers optimum. Shifts in any independent variable will
necessitate an inventory movement to re-institute equilibrium.
50
Therefore, annual purchases are determined by sensitivity to changed
conditions.
Econometricians lO have used both stock-adjustment and investment-
flow regression models to identify correlates of demand. A number of
common features have emerged. An emphasis on the price of machinery
in relation to a perceived operating criterion (such as labour rates
or crop prices) reflects the role of expanded educational and
extension services in broadening the economic foundation of farm
decisions. In isolation, however, the price elasticity of demand is
low to moderate and, in all but times of crucial recession, competition
on this measure is not encouraged by the oligopolists controlling
supply. Rather, product characteristics and after-sales service are
emphasized and engender brand conservatism as a serious barrier to
entry in selling (Conant, 1953: 22; Wadley, 1970: 144).
The high income elasticity of demand, first postulated by Shearer
(1951: 412) and Phillips (1956: 93-97), has been pronounced in the
analyses. In a setback, the relative decrease in equipment turnover
exceeds any fall in farm revenue. Net earnings are applied initially
to consumer-goods requirements to maintain living standards.
Thereafter, loan repayments are met and the more divisible operating
inputs such as fertilisers bought but, unless a complete breakdown of
services ensues, machinery buying simply ceases until prospects
brighten. Much also depends on the association of farm equity to the
general interest rate and the availability of loans. In the Pi?-st,
funding has been derived mainly from accumulated assets but, now,
commercialisation of agriculture has brought strong participation in
liquid capital markets (Heady and Tweeten, 1963: 268-69). Since
credit renders the product less sensitive to price and income changes,
some major equipment merchandisers have set up finance subsidiaries
as another form of non-price competition (see Diesslin, 1955: 22-28).
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Several other factors affecting demand may be noted briefly. At
least two analyses consider farm size a significant influence on
demand, reflecting the ongoing thrust for rural' rationalisation and
the role of critical thresholds in investment. Stock levels have a
bearing, not only in the replacement function, but also in
precipitating the need for new components for integrated machine-
systems. Governmental subsidy programmes or investment allowances can
also stimulate sales, as can technological innovation (Allen, 1952:
351) .
In sum, demand is highly susceptible to a number of institutional
parameters, foremost of which is farm income. Its volatility is
aggravated by structural elements. The effects of seasonality -- .a
perennial problem for manufacturers -- are compounded in Australia
because farmers invariably delay purchasing until the cro~ and price
outlook is known. To spread production and contain inventory, prior-
season discounts on sales and definite orders are required. Despite
these incentives, specialised small companies can suffer troug~s
which pose problems in maintaining workloads for staff and dealers
(Figure 3.l). Throughout the industry, a marketing programme can
collapse at short notice because of adverse climatic influences,
leaving retailers with substantial stock carry-over. If extra floor-
planning is not forthcoming from commercial sources, a competitor's
only option might be a costly intercession to save key dealerships.
Predicated upon many other fluctuations are long-term cyclical swings,
to which agricultural industries are especially prone. Apart from the
usual shifts in the mood of the nation, primary producers and their
suppliers have to face the hardship caused by fire, flood, drought,
and commodity surpluses. All these vagaries, seen in relation to the
complexity and expense of equipment, make the industry one of the
riskier fields of business endeavour. Two main counters -- franchising
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in the marketing sector, and product and functional diversification
in manufacturing -- have contributed much to the size and structural
differentiation critical to the performance of machinery companies
in recession.
GLOBAL MARKET STRUCTURE: THE BACKGROUND TO
CORPORATE OLIGOPOLY
Technological innovation, in addition to demand inconsistency, has
been significant in shaping the current form of worldwide production.
Major development in agricultural equipment began in North America
11in the l830s with McCormick's reaper and Deere's steel plough . In
the ensuing expansion, patent acquisition was emphasized as a means
of broadening output ranges; early 'patent pools' gave way to formal
merger which, by the l890s, was happening on a massive scale. This
strategy, which accomplished diversification to cope with the whims
of the market and realised economies of scale, was seen most spectacularly
in the emergence of Massey Harris in Canada in 1891 and International
Harvester in the United States in 190212 •
After 1900, the advent of the internal combusion engine raised
entry thresholds in the production and distribution of all major
machinery groups. By the 1930s, when Ford had pioneered the lightweight
farm tractor (Conant, 1953: 35) and the combine harvester had been
developed, only companies with superior reserves were in a position to
exploit all the benefits of market leadership. Thus, before the
Second World War, the evolution of the North American industry was
virtually complete with Massey Harris, International Harvester, Case,
John Deere, Allis Chalmers, Cockshutt, Oliver, and Minneapolis-Moline
pre-eminent in the field. Since 1945, despite the strides of long-
line firms such as Ford and New Holland in the United States and
Leyland, David Brown, Fiat and Claas in Europe, no other company has
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joined the full-line set. Therefore, postwar free-world trade has
been ruled by a small clique of oligopolists. For two major lines,
tractors and harvesting equipment, exactly forty-seven per cent of
1966 output emanated from the three largest firms; four-fifths came
from about a dozen enterprises (Table 3.2). Tight concentration
reduced opportunities to expand penetration or production; combined
with wavering aggregate demand, it encouraged a multi-national and
conglomerate disposition among the principal undertakings.
The recoiling world market
The aggregate value of world exports of farm equipment --
comprised mainly of higher-priced items -- rose by only three per cent
per annum from 1967 to reach $US2.16 billion in 1971 (Table 3.3). The
rather desultory progress is reiterated in United Nations production
statistics. Only one category -- seeding and planting implements
exhibited any appreciable uplift during the 1960s (Table 3.4).
Technological issues and agricultural rationalisation in advanced
lands (the major consumers) now point to slow growth in the dollar
volume of total sales but an absolute decrease in the number of goods
required (Barber, 1971: 76). In many countries including Australia,
static or declining stocks of machinery on rural holdings augur poorly
for long-term replacement demand. Similarly, contractors who can
operate equipment at near-maximum efficiency are playing a greater role
in the developed lands so that, unless vast new acreages are opened up,
prospects for the industry in traditional markets are limited.
Although hopes are held for the emerging nations, their relative
purchasing power is presently low. In 1966, for example, they received
only one quarter of the world's equipment exports (Barber, 1971: 259).
The depressed state of global demand throughout the last decade
TABLE 3.2: MARKET CONCENTRATIONS, MAJOR AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY LINES,
UNIT PRODUCTION ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED, NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, 1966
unit Production
Firm Country Wheeled tractors Combine harvesters
of
Origin Number Number
(thousands) Percentage <thousands) Percentage
Allis Chalmers U.S.A. 15.50 1.91 9.00 7.31
Bolinder-Munkte11 Sweden - - 4.90 4.00
Brand n.a. - - 3.30 2.68
David Brown Britain 18.00 2.22 - -
Case U.S.A. 17.50 2.16 4.80 3.90
Claas Germany - - 22.00 17.87
Clayson (New Holland) U.S.A. - - 10.00 8.12
John Deere U.S.A. 78.00 9.64 15.00 12.18
Deutz Germany 17.00 2.11 - -
Fiat Italy 41.50 5.13 - -
Ford U.S.A. l18.40
a 14.63 - -
International Harvester U.S.A. 108.00 13.34 11.00 8.94
Leyland Britain 15.00 1.85 - -
Massey Ferguson Canada 153.80
a 19.00 21.40a 17.38
Minneapolis Moline U.S.A. 7.00 0.86 - -
Oliver (Cockshutt) U.S.A. 15.00a 1.85 4.00
a 3.25
Renau1t/Porsche France 19.00 2.35 - -
Valonet Finland 4.00 0.49 - -
Versatile U.S.A. - - 0.50 0.40
Volvo Sweden 14.70
a 1.82 - -
Other (known companies) n.a. 9.40
a 1.16 - -
Other (unidentified) n.a. 157.20 19.50 17.20 13.97
Total non-conununist 809.50 100.00 123.10 100.00
countries
a Actual figures, remainder estimates.
Source: Barber (1971: 132, 144).
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TABLE 3.4: PRODUCTION OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY BY TYPE, NON-COMMUNIST
COUNTRIES, 1961-70
(Million units)
Other Seeders CombineYear Ploughs r.I'illage Threshers Milking Tractors
Equipment Planters Harvesters Machines over 10 hp.
1961 0.85 1.39 0.20 0.10 0.35 0.17 0.60
1962 0.91 1.21 0.20 0.11 0.34 0.15 0.61
1963 0.78 1.23 0.25 0.12 0.35 0.13 0.63
1964 0.77 1.28 0.32 0.14 0.36 0.14 0.66
1965 0.85 1.25 0.40 0.15 0.40 0.14 0.67
1966 0.91 1.35 0.40 0.17 0.42 0.12 0.73
1967 0.90 1.39 0.44 0.15 0.44 0.12 0.67
1968 0.66 1.22 0.51 0.13 0.44 0.11 0.69
1969 0.67 1.35 0.66 0.12 0.35 0.10 0.72
1970 0.65 1.25 0.70 0.15 0.26 0.09 0.73
Source: The Growth of World Industry 1970 Edition [Volume 2, Comrrlodity
Production Data 1961-70], Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
united Nations, New York, 1972, pp. 375-82.
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resulted in a drive for operating efficiencies which impinged on
Australia even before the immediate rural crisis.
The struggle for economies of scale
Significant economies of scale attend the manufacture of most
classes of agricultural machinery and form an distinct barrier to
13 d' 1 .. 14 d hentry . A recent Cana lan Roya CommlSSlon reveale t at, as
volume in a specialised plant climbs from twenty to ninety thousand
tractors per year, unit production costs fall by nineteen per cent;
header supply offers comparable savings as a factory's output rises
from five to twenty thousand deliveries. In both cases, return on
investment is greater in the more sizeable operation (Barber, 1971:
85-107). Thus, from the Canadian evidence, larger installations appear
to maximise efficiency. In theory, only nine establishments would
have been necessary to make the 809,500 tractors required'by the
non-communist regions in 1966 assuming that all the available scale
economies were utilised (Table 3.2). However, not even the largest
concern (Massey Ferguson) had a works of the supposedly-optimal ninety
thousand unit annual throughput. Only five firms achieved the twenty
thousand level which the Commission held to be the lower limit for
a plant of 'efficient' size. Header manufacturing afforded even more
scope for rationalisation. In 1966, the German Claas enterprise alone
reached the twenty thousand annual unit output determined as the
minimum for 'efficiency' (Schwartzman; 1970: 83). Hence, in both these
major product areas, substantial worldwide economies were realisable,
but were precluded by excess capacity, prevailing competition and lack
· · d d 15of- expanslon ln eman .
In this dilemma, three courses were open to participating
corporations, depending upon their structure, needs and age (cf. Steed,
1971c: 55).
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(i) Functional diversification. As an example of the many
organisations which adopted a conglomerate disposition,
Massey Ferguson increased its participation in industrial
and construction lines from ten to fourteen per cent of
aggregate sales turnover in the ten years after 1957
(Martinusen and Barry, 1970: 9; see also Mautz, 1968).
(ii) Manufacturing and administrative rationalisation. During the
1960s, centralisation of production was required as much by
a proliferation of models and options as by the move for
economies of scale -- it simply became infeasible to
duplicate all product varieties at every plant. Control in
the industry was also focused by a series of takeovers such
as that of Oliver (1960), Cockshutt (1962), and Minneapolis-
Moline (1963) by the White Motor Corporation (Barber, 1971:
46). In addition, co-operative distribution arrangements
were established by non-competing firms in certain countries.
(iii) Geographical expansion. Through this policy, enterprises
acquired a multi-national role (cf. Steed, 1971d: 90). Local
operations-units thus became responsible for domestic
production and marketing but were subject to head-office
co-ordination in other matters. The search for new outlets
made Massey Ferguson and its peers the foremost influences
in machinery supply in both North America and Europe and
also in most other non-communist areas.
All these strategies reflected the weight of scale factors in an
over-subscribed market. Yet, postwar Australian supply was most affec~ed
by the third (geographical expansion) r since an influx of. overseas
corporations between 1955 and 1965 changed the nature of competition
and paved the way for some of the more drastic repercussions of the
rural setback. These impacts are examined after consideration of
pertinent features of the domestic situation prior to 1967.
THE AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY:
A TALE OF DIVERSITY
Wide variations in the corporate and geographical characteristics of
equipment suppliers at the beginning of the recession can be ultimately
traced to the industry's antecedents among the blacksmiths and
wheelwrights of a pioneer economy (cf. Wheelhouse, 1966). Three main
chronological phases distinguish the foundation and spatial decision-
making of the major manufacturers of farm machinery -- one of the
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country's oldest forms of secondary production (Bernasek and Kubinski,
1963: 463).
The first stage was one of initial expansion and lasted until
about 1900. Through innovative adaptation to large scale and, often,
rugged conditions, Victorian and South Australian entrepreneurs
engineered the rise of several prominent factories. In response to
a location offering ready access to the expanding Mallee cereal-growing
areas, the industry gravitated towards Victoria. By 1910, the State
was delivering nearly half the nation's value of machinery output.
The interwar period, constituting the se~ond era, was marked by
consolidation and expansion within the existing framework (Table 3.5).
Despite the economic turbulence of the time, significant policies
which virtually determined postwar patterns of heavy manufacturing were
made. Tariff variations prompted the merger of Massey Harris with
H.V. McKay of Melbourne in 1930, thus linking a Canadian giant with
Australia's largest seller (Neufeld, 1969: 148). Further, the
completion of the International Harvester works at G~elong (Victoria)
in 1939 allowed the first integrated production of tractors in
Australia.
Following the Second World War, excess demand for machinery
stimulated the entry of small manufacturers and repairers whose
sporadic location and subsequent growth compounded such diversity as
already existed. Together with the spate of distributorships negotiated
by international concerns, they caused a proliferation of establishments
which became the hallmark of the industry's third phase of development
16(Table 3.5) . In the mid-1950s and early 1960s, the lull in the
world market, Australia's benign political climate and favourable
long-term sales prospects encouraged foreign corporations to convert
these outlets into branches. Most new entrants took up light
industrial operations and assumed administrative control from former
TABLE 3.5: GROWTH ON SELECTED PARAMETERS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY,
AUSTRALIA, 1910-68
Value of
Year Factoriesa Employees Value of Production CommentaryEnding Output [Value
June Added]
(number) ($A million, non-deflated series)
1910 150 4868 3.12 1.64
1915 153 3606 2.60 1.27
1920 141 3116 2.56 1.39
1925 153 5535 6.57 3.28
1930 140 4463 4.79 2.82 General depression
1935 139 4202 3.94 2.07
1940 108 6379 5.67 2.52 Wartime production
1945 146 9149 13.18 7.17
1950 208 10454 28.37 13.97 Postwar sales boom
1955 308 12182 57.65 29.11
1960 404 11359 70.35 33.69
1961 450 11307 69.86 33.74
1962 497 11317 74.34 36.32
1963 533 11785 80.18 39.63
1964 566 13786 102.93 49.62 IShort-term boom117.37 59.17 in rural1965 615 15582 industry
1966 671 15069 105.08 56.02
1967 725 15280 126.93 69.66
1968 764 15759 131.81 69.41
a See Footnote Sixteen.
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Sources: (i) Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics,
Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australi~, various
issues, 1910-68.
(ii) Unpublished data for 1962-68 supplied by the Manufacturing
Industries Division, Co~nonwea1th Bureau of Census and Statistics,
Canberra.
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assembler/distributors. Leyland (formerly Nuffield), Case, Allis
Chalmers, David Brown and Fiat selected head-office sites in Sydney.
By contrast, John Deere and New Holland chose Melbourne -- the latter
acquiring a substantial fabricating plant at Dandenong.
Aftermath of the influx
Australian machinery demand is deceptively small by world
standards, despite this country's vast areal expanse. Although
overseas products had been on sale since the end of the Second World
War, the insurgence of actively-competing organisations caused
· d f k f · 17a substantlal egree 0 mar et ragmentatl0n • In the late 1950s,
three contestants -- Ferguson, Ford and International Harvester --
were dominant. By 1966, companies less than fifteen years old accounted
for well over one quarter of tractor turnover and enjoyed appreciable
success in haymaking and harvesting deliveries.
In all sectors of the industry, returns were generally low over
the 1960s apart from the peak year of 1963-64 (Table 3.6). Given
their poor profit record, the tenacity of fledgling subsidiaries
could be explained in three ways.
(i) To large corporations, marginal results were insignificant
and could be offset against anticipated long-term
profitability and the advantages of entry into
a politically-safe market in the face of declining world
demand (cf. Hunter, 1963: 15).
(ii) Import prices were so adjusted as to create factory profits
in areas with more favourable taxation. (Several other
intra-organisational reasons could have contributed to
a decision to limit returns to Australian operations.)
(iii) Many new businesses perform badly until the overheads of
establishment are taken up in sales volume.
Whatever the reason -- and, probably, the first had strong relevance
in a majority of cases -- the addition of two more distributorships
and absence of any notable amalgamations between 1963 and 196818
TABLE 3.6: SELECTED INDICATORS OF FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY AND AGGREGATE MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1964-65 TO 1966-67a
Median of Seventeen Large Aggregate
Agricultural Machinery Manufacturing
Measure Manufacturers Industry
1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67
Operating profit/
funds employed 10.10 9.10 12.10 11.50 10.20 10.60
(per cent)
Sales/funds
employed 1.25 1.09 1.30 1.50 1.45 1.35
(ratio)
a The only period during the 1960s for which this type of data is available.
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Sources: (i) Agricultural machinery industry:
Australia [Tariff Boar~ (1970: 80-81).
(ii) Aggregate manufacturing industry:
Australia [Tariff Board] (1972: 14).
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pushed the number of available international tractor brands to
fifteen. Twelve header lines were actively promoted. As sales of
each product in 1967 were 17,871 and 4,424 units respectivelyl9, it
is obvious that the supply/demand equation was precariously balanced
even before the recession. Thus, through a combination of short and
long-term causes, global excess capacity began to pressure inventory
into the constrained Australian market and created an explosive
situation in which certain companies were finally overwhelmed.
The broad impact of market recession
The agricultural equipment industry is going
through the biggest discounting period in its
history, as manufacturers and distributors seek
to maintain their share of a shrinking market
... there are no signs of an early resumption to
more normal production levels (The Australian
Financial Review, 17 September 1970)
Before analysing the corporate behaviour of selected organisations,
the overall effects of the farm crisis on the agricultural equipment
industry should be summarised.
(i) Tractor and machinery imports (f.o.b. port of shipment) into
Australia peaked at $A72.43 million in 1968, suggesting
a high level of inventory formation before the recession.
Over the next three years, the value of overs~8s receipts
tumbled sixty-one per cent to $A28.02 million . Only
a marginal recovery occurred as conditions improved in 1972.
(ii) Wholesale machinery deliveries, on a unit count, fell by an
average of forty-five per cent in every major class between
1967 and 1112 (Table 3.7). Sectoral effects assumed greatimportance . In accordance with the income elasticity
hypothesis, higher-value items such as seeding and grain-
harvesting machines were the hardest hit. Tillage needs
declined in concert with the total fall but haymaking lines,
in response to diversification into livestock, performed
relatively well.
(iii) Machinery stocks, though perhaps a less reliable indicator
of change than deliveries, show a decisive pattern over the
study period (Table 3.8). Maximum inventory was attained
before 1970; minimum holdings were recorded in 1972. The
lag in movements in 1969-70 shows that a certain amount of
hedging as to the outcome of the downturn took place -- as
TABLE 3.7: DELIVERIES OF NEW AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY, UNITS BY YEAR,
AUSTRALIA, 1967-72
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Type of Product Year Ending June Simple
Equipment Percentage
Change
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1967-72
Tillage Disc ploughs 4878 5279 4798 2169 1773 1867 -63.66b
Rippers a 1810 1505 1431 1091 1123 -39.73
Chisel ploughs 1123 a 823 676 498 490 -55.56
Mouldboard ploughs 827 957 771 694 650 416 -21 .. 41
Tine harrows 63322 62645 50115 22541 20598 30805 -67.47
(sections)
-30.01bDisc and other harrows a 5532 4269 4610 3872 3992
Tine cultivators 8060 7886 7355 4054 3677 4597 -54.38
Rotary cultivators 4181 4094 4038 3578 3435 4351 -17.85
Average
-43.77
tillage
Seeding Drills (all types) 5341 6223 5091 2197 1353 1877 -74.67b
Fertilizer spreaders a 4514 3834 3507 2695 3306 -40.30
Average
-57.49
seeding
Haymaking Pick-up balers 2907 2075 2354 1828 1080 1088 -62.85
Forage harvesters 742 620 382 490 316 188 -57.41
Mowers (rotary) 4855 4532 3666 4912 4621 5190 -4.82
Mowers (other) a 3279 3425 2363 1766 1269 -46.44
Hay rakes 3689 2336 2744 2201 1817 a -50.75b
Windrowers a 80 a a 59 25 -26.25 b
Bale loaders a 1369 a 1448 1155 922 -15.63b
Bale elevators a 918 1388 922 797 541 -13.18
Average
-34.67
haymaking
Harvesting Headers (auto) 1873 2156 2028 812 461 531 -75.39
Headers (drawn) 2552 a 1964 675 382 538 -85.03
Average
-80.21
harvesting
Cane harvesters 248 242 315 218 216
b
Other a -12.10 b
Grain augers a 4630 4920 5459 1585 2069 -65.77
posthole diggers 2773 2481 2173 1924 1180 1180 -57.48
Hanuner mills 1410 1240 1010 1066 910 970 -35.46
Average
-42.69
other
All
-44.73
machinery
a Not available in original data.
b 1968-72 change.
Source: Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, New Agricultural
Machinery Statistics, [Ref. 12.1], various issues, 1967-72.
TABLE 3.8: STOCKS OF NEW AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY, UNITS BY YEAR o
AUSTRALIA~ 1967-72
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'rype of
Equipment
Product Year Ending June Simple
Percentage
I---r---.------,----,,..------,,..------l Change
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1967-72
Tillage
Average
tillage
Disc ploughs
Rippers
Chisel ploughs
Mouldboard ploughs
Tine harrows
(sect:ions)
Disc and other harrows
Tine cultivators
Ro-tary cultivators
2516
a
a
651
6157
a
4724
1606
2<5-133
403 i
a
708
7965
a
4201
2086
1921 1841
236 415
a a
533 450
8695 20299
a a
3661 3777
2173 1611
1504
326
a
314
9768
a
2613
1139
630
218
a
151
1839
a
1577
1371
-40.23b
-19.11
n.a.
-51.77
-36.97
n.a"
-44.69
-29.08
-36.98
_--------:--_.---------------+----+---+---1------1-----1-----1------
Seeding
Average
seedin9
Drills (all types)
Fertilizer spreaders
475 a a a
a 1733 1484 1049
a
646
a
a
n.a.
n .. a.
n.a.
___._.~-- ~--_-_-.---__--_+--_+--_+--_+_---+----+----f---_--
Haymaking
Average
haymaking
Pick-~up balers
Forage harvesters
Mowe~rs (rotary)
Mowers (other)
Hay rakes
WindTowers
Bale loaders
Bale elevators
713
161
541
a
885
a
a
a
812
264
1908
2412
1683
61
367
272
680
159
2901
1995
1378
66
151
214
760
134
1601
1344
1112
88
273
374
478
69
1271
1264
724
64
138
138
244
41
1008
671
a
50
a
94
-32.96
-57.14
+134.93b
-47.60
-18.19+O.05~
-62.40b
-49.26
-16.57
Harvesting Headers (auto)
I-leaders (drawn)
Average
harvesting
400
261
744
415
549
593
905
636
65.5
421
322
174
+63.75
+61.99
+62.87
Other
Average
other
Cane harvesters
Grain augers
Posthole diggers
Hammer mills
a a
a 1230
385 545
393 342
31
1400
338
369
13
626
430
179
a
5BO
397
103
a
303
147
112
n.a·· b
-52.85
+0.03
-73.80
-42.20
______-+-_. ._._~----'----....L-----L--_..L--_..&.....---.a.-..-----
a Not available in original data.
b 1968-72 change.
Source: Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, New Agricultural
Machinery Statistics, [Ref. 12.1], various issues, 1967-72.
A full-scale hearing on this segment
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distinct f2~m the normal long cycle of production
scheduling • Nevertheless, stock run-down by 1972 was
considerable.
While the above measures point out difficulties in the machinery sector,
they say little of the tractor market. Here, optimism appears to have
been the keynote. Just after the 1964 boom, W.F. Baillie, writing in
The Australian Financial Review (12 February 1965), had predicted
agricultural requirements of twenty thousand units per annum in
a total market of twenty-four thousand with a three per cent growth
rate. Simultaneously, International Harvester had estimated that,
subject to 'normal' economic circumstances, demand would climb from
twenty to twenty-six thousand units by 1969-7023 • Such hopes were
dashed as sales failed to recover from the 1967-68 drought and, over
the following two years, crashed thirty-one per cent to their lowest
since 1956 (Figure 3.2). The severity of the situation warranted
a doubling of the 1966 bounty rate on domestic farm tractor production
by the Commonwealth Government as an 'urgent short-term measure in the
f .. ,24ace of overseas competltlon •
of industry was conducted in May 1971, in which grim forecasts of the
25future of local suppliers were made • Ford's predictions indicate
the general gloom of the period (Figure 3.2). The halcyon days of
1963-64 were long past as some companies came into dire financial
straits, with forced closure of wholesale facilities and atrophy in
dealer networks commonplace. In this manner, the incipient crisis
began to impinge on spatial decision-making, as shown in the later
analysis of the recession's ramifications on sample firms selected in
Chapter Four.
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FIGURE 3.2: Tractor market, actual and
estimated, Australia, 1960-75.
Sources: (i) Austra~ia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and
Statistics, Receipts, Sales and Stocks of New
Tractors, [Ref: 12.18], various issues, 1960-73.
(ii) Ford data from The Australian Financial Review,
21 May 1971.
~ ~
RESUME
A rural market contraction in the late 19608 prompted this study of
the Australian agricultural machinery industry. Product franchising
is well ensconced as a shield against the vagaries of the demand
function. In manufacturing, producers have diversified their ranges
to smooth seasonal and cyclical influences. This long-held strategy
has been largely responsible for the conglomerate, oligopolistic
nature of world supply, within which a number of major corporations
dominate the trade of most countries. By the mid-1960s, the global
market for farm equipment had been static or declining for some time.
Many new enterprises saw good sales possibilities in Australia and
established branches throughout the period 1955-65. Within the local
69
industry, demand was over-estimated and the resulting excess capacity,
fragmentation, and stock accumulation left an open flank for the
economic attack. An account of the effects on company distribution
policy and practice must await the necessary grouping of chosen
combatants in Chapter Four.
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CHAPTER THREE FOOTNOTES
1. Newspaper articles are drawn upon heavily in this Chapter.
Often, they are the only reference source available. They also
influenced much producer and consumer decision-making during the
recession era. See also Campbell (1969, 1971); Committee for the
Economic Development of Australia (1971); Davidson (1971); Australia
[Bureau of Agricultural Economics] (1973a, 1973b).
2. For more information on the wheat industry, see Campbell (1969).
There is also a prophetic series of fortnightly articles by E.J. Donath
in The Australian Financial Review, commencing 2 October 1964. Annual
reports of the Australian Wheat Board advance further information.
3. Campbell (1971: 72); Irwin (1971: 31).
4. In 1971, the rural gross debt/liquid asset ratio reached 2.51
(Table 3.1). Trading banks, pastoral houses ~nd other financiers
became concerned at the number of farmers who could not service their
debts, let alone repay the principal. They reacted by applying
stringent conditions on loan applications. See The Australian
Financial Review, 22 July 1970; also Australia [Bureau of Agricultural
Economics] (1972).
5. As shown in various issues of Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of
Census and Statistics, Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of
Australia, the area under wheat in Australia had climbed from 4.93
million hectares in 1959-60 to 8.43 million in 1966-67. Following
further moves into climatically-marginal regions and intensification
of landuse on existing farms, it rocketed to 10.85 million hectares
in 1968-69, only to be cut to 6.48 million by the rural crisis of
1970-71. Pushed by the wheat expansion, aggregate areas under crop
exhibited a similar movement -- froin lO.57-million hectares in 1959....60,
to 16.02 and 18.99 million in 1966-67 and 1968-69 respectively, and
then back to 15.96 million in 1970-71.
6. The concern of farmers culminated in a ten thousand strong
protest march in Melbourne. See The Sun [Melbourne], 24 March 1970;
The Sydney Morning Herald, 24 March 1970.
7. About a dozen major studies of the recent Canadian RoyaZ Commission
on Farm Machinery are referenced in Barber (1971). Several theses are
available -- Shearer (1951); Eckles (1953); Schwartz (1966); Wadley
(1970). Published works include those of Phillips (1956), Wheelhouse
(1966) and Neufeld (1969). Significant articles have been prepared
by Zimmermann (1951: 156-75); Conant (1953); Phillips (1958);
Whitney (1958: 227-56); Slater (1960); Bernasek and Kubinski (1963);
Phillips (1966); Staiger (1970). A report by Pothecary (1970) offers
an interesting outside view on the Australian market during the
recession. Finally, papers by Lier (1971) and McLean (1973) reflect
a growing concern with agricultural mechanisation.
8. A search was conducted nationally through the rural press for old
franchise agreements. It was unsuccessful and most material in this
section was compiled from documents in company archives. Assistance in
historical research prof£eredby Mr C. Crennan of John Crennan and Co.
of Henty, New South Wales, and by Mr O.M. Gainger of International
Harvester is particularly appreciated.
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9. See Industrial Marketing Committee Review Board (1954); Wilson
(1965,1968: 12-14).
10. Cromarty (1959); Griliches (1960); Heady and Tweeten (1963) ;
Rayner and Cowling (1967,1968). See also a resume in Wadley (1970:
18-27).
11. See Shearer (1951); Eckles (1953); Schwartz (1966).
12. For the merger of Massey Harris, see Neufeld (1969: 19); that of
International Harvester is described in united States of America
[Department of Commerce and Labor] (1913: 39-93); Eckles (1952:
97-109); Barber (1971: 38).
13. Bain (1954, 1956); Whitney (1958: 238-39).
14. See the reference in Footnote Seven.
15. Australia's domestic production of tractors and headers is highly
fragmented. Tractor manufacturing, with an output of less than five
thousand units per year, is a high-cost operation despite its
horizontal integration with other lines. Its viability depends on
a government bounty which approximates five to fifteen per cent of the
retail value of the average product. Concerning headers, an enquiry
in 1970 noted:
manufacture of [self-propelled] headers involves
considerable investment in plant and large
expenditure on research and development. The
level of output ... achieved by local producers •..
is small in relation to that ...of most overseas
manufacturers ...The limited scale of local
production constitutes the greatest basic
disability facing local manufacturers (Australia
[Tariff Board], 1970: 11).
16. The 'factory' statistics portrayed in Table 3.5 include both
manufacturers and repairers of agricultural machinery (including
tractors). It could be assumed that about two-thirds of these entries
were of minor production importance. In 1968-69, statistical
collection was undertaken with the new Census of Economic Activity for
the first time. A.S.I.C. category 3331 -- 'establishments mainly
engaged in manufacturing agricultural machinery or equipment including
tractors for agricultural purposes (except crawler tractors)' --
covered only 267 facilities at 30 June 1969. This break in the
statistical series is unfortunate but unavoidable. See Australia,
Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Classification and
Classified List of Industries, Canberra, 1966; Australian Standard
Industrial Classification (Preliminary Edition), Canberra, 1969; also,
Manufacturing Establishments: Details of Operations by Industry Class,
Australia, Economic Censuses 1968-69, [Ref. 12.29], Canberra, 1973.
17. See The Australian Financial Review, 21 November 1968.
18. In 1968, Thiess Equipment Distributors took over the Oliver and
Minneapolis-Moline lines from another firm and imported SAME tractors
and Arbos headers from Italy; in the same year, Australian Motor
Industries began distribution of the Czechoslovakian Zetor and British
Muir-Hill tractor ranges.
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19. See Figure 3.2; Table 3.7.
20. Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Overseas
Trade, Major Groups of Countries, [Ref. 8.14], Canberra, (various
years, 1967-72).
21. See The Australian Financial Review, 11 December 1969.
22. See The Australian Financial Review, 12 May 1970.
23. See The Australian, 30 June 1965.
24. See The Australian Financial Review, 17 September 1970. Subject
to certain qualifying conditions, the manufacturer of a locally-
sourced agricultural tractor over twenty horsepower could claim between
$Al,040 and $Al,600, (or about twenty per cent of the retail value of
the product) as bounty reimbursement under the Agricultural Tractors
Bounty Act 1970 [No. 86, 1970]. More information about the bounty and
its recipients is detailed in Chapter Five.
25. Australia [Tariff Board] (1972).
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CHAPTER FOUR
SELECTION AND CLASSIFICATION OF FIRMS IN
A HETEROGENEOUS INDUSTRY
In 1967, the 725 listed farm equipment establishments in Australial
engaged over fifteen thousand workers (Table 4.1). Though still more
labour-intensive than the secondary sector as a whole, the industry
had seen its ratio of employees per factory fall from sixty-three in
1945 to twenty-one at the beginning of the study period (cf. Table
3.5). To compensate, capitalisation had risen sharply and the average
plant was able to deliver goods to the value of $AO.18 million.
Nonetheless, an aggregate output of $A126.93 million left machinery
merchants a distinctly small segment of national manufacturing --
their contribution on this measure represented only about 0.08 per cent
of the total.
This broad picture, however, conceals the high degree of
heterogeneity which characterised the major suppliers. Indeed, any
attempt to consider the part of company structural attributes
expressed through channel management capacities in affecting the spatial
representation and market and financial performance of franchising
corporations in recession must first overcome this obstacle. The
course adopted here restricts the enquiry to a sample of nineteen
firms, which are allocated into 'large' and 'small' sets using
computer-based techniques. Then, in a commentary on the classifications'
results, a brief background to each group is given in preparation for
the. forthcoming analyses of their behaviour between 1967 and 1972.
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A COUNTER TO THE HETEROGENEITY PROBLEM
On the eve of the rural crisis, machinery production in Australia
displayed an unusual degree of concentration and dispersion. In one
sense, it was manifested in the inter and intra-regional distribution
of factories. On a count of fixed assets, Victoria was the premier
state with an investment double that of its nearest rival, New South
Wales (Table 4.1). But a few large metropolitan organisations were
pre-eminent in both regions. Queensland, whose sizeable concerns
served lucrative opportunities in the sugar fields, ranked third while
South Australia, in which three leading brand-names predominated, was
in fourth place (see Kelly, 1962: 124-29). Further localisation was
prescribed in Western Australia, where one supplier -- Chamberlain --
accounted for more than half the output.
A parallel to these physical differentials lay in the
oligopo1istic structure of manufacturing. As a consequence of initial
advantage and the stimulus of foreign capital, three per cent of
establishments engaged fifty-six per cent of the industry's workforce
and delivered almost fifty-nine per cent of the value of both
production and output (Table 4.2). Such concentration, slightly more
exaggerated than in the rest of Australian secondary production, was
itself a prime cause of heterogeneity; yet, it was, abetted by the
widespread horizontal integration through which major companies
accommodated unreliable demand schedules. Although no formal statistics
on the multi-faceted interests of the 725 member firms are available,
interview discussions and empirical observation revealed that many large
sellers, like their counterparts overseas, had assumed conglomerate
status. Thus, at first sight, the marketing of farm equipment in 1967
affords a somewhat bewildering situation.
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Since the bulk of an oligopoly's deliveries is handled by a few
principal marketers, the core of its experience in an economic
contraction can be distilled among a small sample of its high-echelon
members. The procedure's inherent bias can be overlooked in this
instance because the concern here is not with representing the
agricultural machinery industry per se; the topic constitutes a test
case set within a framework of product franchising in order to
spotlight processes and relationships of business spatial decision-
making. Selectivity is not only a pragmatic course given present
constraints; it also tackles heterogeneity 'from the outset by
reducing the chances of variance among companies under review.
Operational sampling
conventional sampling procedures could not be employed in this
study because it is impossible to identify, let alone obtain
individual information on the producers which the Commonwealth Bureau
of Census and Statistics claimed to constitute the equipment sector.
Moreover, published data would not indicate which employed franchising
as their main form of marketing. The circumstances called for a more
practical approach the recognition of nineteen firms which,
according to industry intelligence, collectively sold the majority of
2
output (Table 4.3). The threshold for inclusion of any organisation
into the sample was that it:
(a) acted within a recognisable corporate structure;
(b) purported to be a franchisor or adhered to a definable
product franchising system;
(c) was represented in at least New South Wales, Victoria and
South Australia (the intensive retail study area);
(d) had average annual machinery sales of $AO.50 million or more;
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(e) ran the risk of being affected in some way by the market
recession.
Yet, the nineteen chosen enterprises epitomised the prevailing
complexity. Though all were market leaders, their product
specialisations and ranges varied considerably; many had undertaken
such extensive functional expansion that agricultural equipment formed
only a small part of their ambit. Aggregate turnover from Australian
operations varied from $A2 million to over $A200 million; the
international sales of some members ran into billions of dollars. More
specific attributes such as longevity, head-office location, country
of ownership and level of manufacturing integration could only be
described as fissiparous. In this dilemma, classification helped
overcome the impediment of diversity and provided a means for testing
the structural hypothesis outlined in Chapter Two. Discussion of
firms en masse breeds circularity of argument; in contrast, an
alignment of the field on various criteria at the start of the
recession offers a useful baseline against which subsequent economic
and spatial changes in policy can be gauged.
A STRUCTURAL CLASSIFICATION
The importance of geographical aspects in the current problem precludes
the use of earlier qualitative, uni-dimensional, economic
classifications of the machinery industry3
argument, a grouping of firms should ideally consider structural,
operational, and a range of financial elements. But scale factors in
measurement complicate the issue. Since conglomerates rarely provide
much detail of single products, their interests cannot be related
easily to those of more specialised suppliers; the application of
aggregate balance sheet and profit and loss data merely obfuscates the
picture of competition in a specific industry4. Obviously, as a first
80
step, a bridge must be found between a corporation's total size (which
can influence the behaviour of individual divisions) and that of its
farm equipment trading.
Input
Such a link is provided by sales turnover, often the only parameter
computed in similar ways in both sectoral and consolidated accounts.
It is probably a quite satisfactory indicator of business stature
since, according to Samuels and Smyth (1966: 3) and Sheridan (1974: 81),
most company size attributes are inter-correlated. Sales are not only
highly apposite in a marketing project, but their selection avoids
many known dangers in industrial analysis promoted by the exclusive
use of employment statistics (Townroe, 1972: 265). Moreover, the
reliability of revenue figures is naturally improved by including other
variables in a multi-dimensional matrix. As Fisher et al. (1967: 576)
point out, the intrinsic subjectivity of grouping procedures for
particular purposes can be offset by the infusion of qualitative and
multi-state data. Much information of this type is interrelated and
so broadens the basis of classification. Selection for this study
sought parameters which, while emphasizing participation in the
agricultural machinery industry, also reflected a company's overall
pattern of activities.
The input for the present grouping can be seen in terms of the
two types of statistics involved (Table 4.4).
(i) Ouantitative. The first data employed were 1967 consolidated
and farm machinery sales which, in concert, indicate the
place of equipment in a firm's repertoire and its relative
corporate standing vis-a-vis that of other competitors.
Equipment volume broken down by product lines exemplifies
size, structural, and functional criteria by showing areas of
specialisation. The attack was augmented by figures on
companies' estimated workforce in agricultural operations and
the longevity of any form of machinery distribution in
Australia. Employment is primarily a size measure, whereas
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the length of market representation probably subsumes a wide
range of correlates (see Mueller, 1972).
(ii) Qualitative. The first two items, head-office location and
country of ownership, are structural characteristics oriented
to the spatial postulate of the central hypothesis. Two
other multi-state variables, degree of manufacturing
integration and extent of corporate product line, concern
both functional and size-based facets of behaviour. To
represent the latter, it was considered unnecessary to engage
more than presence/absence recording.
Classification techniques
A simultaneous evaluation of all the above elements with equal
weighting requires a computer technique which can give useful solutions
in a reasonable time. .Because. the available methods create 'general-
purpose classifications, no unique grouping should be assumed; rather,
the value of any sorting strategy lies in its applicability to immediate
ends. A number of pilot runs were therefore conducted with varying
forms and combinations of data until one emerged which was judged
suitable for the needs of the investigation.
The programmes used are derived from a battery of grouping and
diagnostic routines first designed by ecologists5 • The same or related
approaches have since been engaged in general geographic situations6
7
and, more specifically, in urban/industrial research. The particular
set involved are as follows 8 .
(i) MULTBET, through a centroid strategy, produces a polythetic,
agglomerative, hierarchical classification. Similarity
measures are advanced in the form of non-factorial information
s,tatistics.
(ii) GROUPER, dissects the relationships between the groups
generated by MULTBET and states for each comparison the
variable means and contributions to the similarity measure
employed.
(iii) GOWER, an ordinatio~ sub-routine, undertakes a principal
components analysis on data from the similarity matrix
advanced by MULTBET and offers latent roots and vectors.
Yet, in the development of a computer taxonomy, three basic decisions
are presumed to determine a suitable methodology.
83
(i) The type of programmes. The package selected was considered
most appropriate given the variety of data. MULTBET
proposes a discrete grouping of hierarchical sets and GROUPER
(which, in essence, puts forward a continuous classification)
indicates the grounds for the allocation of sample members.
Opportunities for both classification and ordination are
provided.
(ii) Use of classification or ordination. The former procedures
assume that the material submitted is discontinuous and are
geared to find the most informative arrangement of groups.
Ordination, in contrast, presupposes a discontinuous series
and attempts to plot the configuration efficiently in
Euclidean space. This enquiry, having a small number of
observations, followed accepted practice and worked through
both avenues to explore the structure of the data fully.
Each returned useful results.
(iii) Intensity of clustering in classification. A specification
of four groups in the MULTBET computation was aligned to
the restricted sample and intuitive suppositions about the
nature of the data.
Ordination
In order to research rigorously for patterns and relationships
between sets of companies and attributes, the principal components
analysis (GOWER) was applied to compress the seventeen original
variables into a few primary factors which, it was hoped, would account
for a high degree of the noted variance. In fact, only 21.99 per cent
was explained by the first eigenvalue and 60.15 per cent by the first
five, thus suggesting substantial disaggregation among the selected
producers. This expected, though disappointing, outcome allowed
identification of only two components on loading plots obtained from
GOWER (Figures 4.1 and 4.2) .
(i) The first vector, differentiating large and small machinery
interests, segregated firms with a full product line from
more specialised ones which deliver only a limited range.
The diversified concerns had adopted more vertical integration
in their manufacturing. Massey Ferguson and International
Harvester were clearly in front with respect to machinery
sales size and other issues covered by the first component.
Examples of 'small' organisations appearing on the opposite
pole are Thiess Equipment Distributors and Australian Motor
Industries.
09 Horwood Bagshaw
Ralph McK.ay 14 0
o 17 John Shearer
Vector 2
o 16 David Shearer
Chamberlain 5 A
o 6 Connor Shea
Vector 1
Massey 13 D..
Ferguson
o 15 New Holland
I:::. 11 International
Harvester
A 8 Ford
Vector 2
• 7 Fiat
.4 Case
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Subsequently classified:
D.. 'full-line'
... 'long-line'
• 'short-line tractor'
o 'short-line implement'
FIGURE 4.1:
• 2 Alils Chalmers
Howard Rotovator 10 •• '12 Leyland
Australian Motor Industries 3 •
• 18 Thiess Equiprnent Distributors
Alfarm Distributors 1 0
Vector 1
Principal components analysis (GOWER)
Vectors One and Two.
Source: Author's computations.
h. 13 Massey
Ferguson
Vector 3
International 11 I:J.
Harvester
Connor Shea 6 0
Vector 1
o 9 Horwood Bagshaw
Chamberlain 5 ...
17 c John Shearer
o 15 New Holland
.7 Fiat
• 4 Case
Ford 8 ...
o 14 Ralph McKay
Vector 3
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David Shearer 16 0
Leyland 12 •
Australian Motor Industries 3.
• 2 Allis Chalmers
• 10 Howard Rotovator
A 'full-line'
Vector 1 ... 'long-line'
• 'short-line tractor'
o 'short-line implement'
o 1 Alfarm
Distributors
• 18 Thiess Equipment Distributors Subsequently classified:
FIGURE 4.2: Principal components analysis (GOWER)
Vectors One and Three.
Source: Author's computations.
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(ii) The second component, concentrating on corporate product
mix, distinguished uni-functional and conglomerate
businesses. The former, which specialised in the production
and distribution of implements and machinery, included
predominantly Australian-owned undertakings such as Horwood
Bagshaw, John Shearer and Connor Shea. In comparison, those
in the multi-functional area were strongly represented in
the tractor market and were mostly foreign-controlled. Since
they included the largest and smallest merchants, the second
component does not suggest any size scaling of ei,ther
corporate or agricultural machinery revenue.
The analysis was terminated at this point because the remaining three
eigenvalues contributed only 23.64 per cent of the variance among the
observations and were not susceptible to meaningful interpretation.
The plot around the third principal component permits no definition
of the dimension involved (Figure 4.2). Rather than obtain rotated
solutions, hierarchical grouping techniques were called upon to bring
some order into this most unstandardised sample.
The discrete classification
Scaling by the information statistic, MULTBET allocated the
agricultural machinery enterprises among four classes (A,B,C,D) which,
at a higher level of aggregation, were fused into pairs (AB,CD). The
two divisions thus represented consisted of four large and fourteen
small firms respectively (Table 4.5). With the aid of the diagnostic
programme GROUPER, the basis of the various categories became clear
and they were named after reference to the terminology of previous
classifications.
(i) Class A consisted of full-line companies engaging in all
forms of agricultural machinery production.
(ii) Class B, with two members, offered a more restricted range
which straddled the tractor and equipment markets. Hence,
they were called long-line firms.
(iii) Class C, the first 'small' group, was comprised of short-line
tractor suppliers engaged in the importation and assembly of
tractors within a highly diversified corporate functional
structure.
(iv) Class D denoted short-line implement manufacturers,
specialising in the tillage, seeding, haymaking and harvesting
fields.
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DIFFERENTIATION AMONG SAMPLE FIRMS
Fuller description of the various classes -- a necessary background
-to the coming account of structural factors in corporate behaviour --
ensues from a comparison of firm characteristics within and between
the major divisions (A-B, AB-CD, c-n). In the evaluation, relevant
points of differentiation are extracted from GROUPER's ranking of the
seventeen company attributes according to their contribution to
inter-group fusion (i.e. by descending order in the value of the
information statistic) .
Full versus long-line firms (A-B)
Class A companies were termed 'full-line' in acknowledgement of
their response to all areas of farm machinery demand. They diverged
from the long-line firms on the basis of their comparative tractor
sales, amplified by performance in the seeding, haymaking, harvesting,
and general agricultural equipment markets (Table 4.6). Although
disparity in the tractor turnover of both groups was not pronounced,
they varied widely on other indicators. For example, whereas the
former sold substantial volumes of harvesting, general, and specialised
products, the latter distributed virtually none at all. Further
discrepancies become apparent by considering in more detail the
situation of individual members in 1967.
The two fuZZ-line suppliers were Melbourne-based, North American
corporations established an average of seventy-three years in Australia.
Both maintained complete manufacturing facilities but preferred to
receive certain items from overseas. International Harvester was
already active in industrial and construction equipment, while Massey
Ferguson had a minor but growing pe~etration. The first recorded
farm machinery sales of $A2l.84 million in a total budget of $A83.77
TABLE 4.6: RANKING OF FIRST TEN ATTRIBUTES ON WHICH GROUPER
DISTINGUISHED FULL-LINE (A) FROM LONG-LINE (B) SAMPLE FIRMS,
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967
89
Ranked
Attributes
Agricultural tractor sales
Seeding equipment sales
Haymaking_equipment sales
Harvesting machinery sales
General equipment sales
Specialised equipment
sales
Components sales
Spare parts sales
Total agricultural
machinery sales
Aggregate corporate sales
Ratio of the Average Value of
Full-line Firms (A)/Average Value
of Long-line Firms (B~ on Ranked
Attribute
1.28
4.11
5.40
b
15.62
b
7.07
4.94
2.54
0.56
a This format used to maintain confidentiality.
b Long-line firms did not participate in this market.
Source: Author's computations.'
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million composed mainly of trucks, vehicles and engines lO by
comparison, Massey Ferguson's smaller total revenue "($A42.65 million) 11
was far more specialised, making it the leader in the subject industry.
For the Zong-Zine firms, an emphasis on tractors, backed by
limited supplementary goods, produced turnovers of $AlO-20 million,
th f h · 11'· 12well above at 0 t e most promlnent sma partlclpants .
Chamberlain, an Australian-owned, fully-integrated Perth maker of
tractors and tillage ranges, was founded in 1947 and thereafter
received significant government assistance (Hutton, 1966: 252). Ford,
the largest corporation in the equipment industry, entered the
Australian market in 1925 and became the principal assembler/importer.
Its coverage included tractors and sub-contracted machines and
implements. In contrast to all other major concerns, the company was
purely a marketing force and required relatively few employees in its
Melbourne-focused operations. Its uniqueness accentuated the many
differences which existed among large sellers. Yet, as a group, they
stood out quite clearly from the short-line sample.
Large versus small firms (AB-CD)
At the start of the recession, relative sales of tractors, the
most important single product category in the Australian market
(Bernasek and Kubinski, 1963: 460), were the chief point of distinction
of large and small suppliers (Table 4.7). The former, as the key
tractor distributors, enjoyed a premier role throughout the industry.
Their dominance in several fields -- spare parts, seeding, general,
tillage and harvesting -- coincided not only with longevity but also
with a headcount in farm machinery production nearly six times that of
smaller organisations. Whereas they averaged equipment sales of
$A22.21 million in a corporate account of $A87.75 million, their
counterparts achieved only $A3.89 million within $A8.49 million
TABLE 4.7: RANKING OF FIRST TEN ATTRIBUTES ON WHICH GROUPER DISTINGUISHED
LARGE (AB) FROM SMALL (CD) SAMPLE FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY,
AUSTRALIA, 1967
possible States Possible States
Attributes Ranked Measure or Average for or Average forLarge Firms Small Firms
(AB) (CD)
Agricultural tractor sales $A thousand 10846 842
Spare parts sales $A thousand 2675 372
Total agricultural $A thousand 22213 3889
machinery sales
Seeding equipment sales $A thousand 1001 259
General equipment sales $A thousand 532 61
Employment in agricultural number 1714 303
machinery operations
Tillage equipment sales $A thousand 1591 669
Head office location n.a. Melbourne/Perth sydney/Melbourne
Adelaide/Other
Harvesting machinery sales $A thousand 3500 661
Longevity years 53 40
Source: Author's computations.
/
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respectively. There were few sub-markets in which any large
contestant was topped by small competitors. Yet, the latter, offering
one machine or a restricted range, performed a valuable economic task
by attaining levels of specialisation barred to their opposition and
by mitigating against oligopolistic collusion and cartel practices.
Beside these positive contributions must be weighed their disadvantages
in research and development, product distribution, and a higher level
13
of establishment change , all potential sources of instability. For
this reason, short-line suppliers warrant specific attention in an·
enquiry into the impact of recession.
Small tractor versus implement firms (C-D)
The categorisation of small firms devolves upon whether the
corporate product line is uni-functional or diversified (Table 4.8).
This primary, GROUPER-inspired distinction can then be expanded to
separate tractor organisations, on one hand, from implement and
machinery makers on the other. The former had integrated horizontally
to such an extent that only $A2.64 million of their average $AI3.68
million output accrued from agricultural machinery. Their volume
consisted mainly of tractor sales ($Al.60 million) -- a strange case
of product specialisation within a conglomerate structure. In contrast,
the implement producers' mean corporate turnover of $A5.53 million was
composed almost entirely of equipment revenue (ninety-three per cent)
and a far wider range of goods was offered. This situation can be
explored more adequately in independent examinations of group
characteristics.
In 1967, the average tractor distributor had been established
twenty-four years in either a Sydney or Melbourne location. Since it
acted essentially as an importer, assembler and wholesaler, it required
only a restricted workforce of one hundred employees. Machinery
93
TABLE 4.8: RANKING OF FIRST TEN ATTRIBUTES· ON WHICH: GROUPER DISTINGUISHED
SHORT-LINE TRACTOR (C) FROM SHORT-LINE IMPLEMENT, (D) SAMPLE FIRMS" AGRICU:D.'TIURAL
MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967>
Attributes Ranked
PossilbJJe States car I[ Possible States or
Measure Average: for Short.... Average for Short-
: line' Tractor F~rms line Implement Firms
! (C) (D)
Corporate product line
Head-office location
Employment in agricultural
machinery operations
Tillage equipment sales
seeding equipment sales
Degree of manufacturing
integration
Country of ownership
Longevity
Harvesting equipment sales
Agricultural tractor sales
n.a.
number
$A thousand
n.a.
years
$A thousand
7 possible statesa
Sydney/Melbourne
100
248
Fabrication/
assembly
Australia/U.S.A./
U.K./Italy
24
501
1597
5 possible statesb
Melbourne/Adelaide/
Other
448
1092
518
All degrees
Australia/U.S.A.
56
822
87
a Farm machinery wholesaling, industrial equipment, construction machinery, trucks,
automobiles, engines, engineering.
b Farm machinery wholesaling, industrial equipment, engines, engineering, farm
machinery dealing.
Source: Author's computations.
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operations in the range of $AI-S million were generally an adjunct to
high corporate sales of .up to $AIOe million in the automotive
(Australian Motor Industries, Fiat, Leyland) or construction and
equipment industries (Allis Chalmers, Case, Thiess Equipment
Distributors). Most of the tractor firms were overseas-owned.
By comparison, the typical impZement company was either an old,
Australian specialist producer situated in Melbourne or Adelaide or
a more recent importer of haymaking and harvesting aids. Since few
had outside interests, total and agricultural machinery turnover were
fairly synonomous within the range $A2-10 million. Though these
organisations were the smallest in the sample, they showed extensive
vertical integration and required over four times the labour force of
the small tractor group. As a result, they were somewhat more exposed
during the rural setback.
..- .,IJ
RESUME
A variety of techniques was employed to broach the intrinsic
heterogeneity of the agricultural machinery industry. The investigation
was narrowed to nineteen major corporations, from which seventeen key
functional, size, and structural attributes were elicited. The
attempt to stratify the sample first employed ordination procedures;
finally, a more successful discrete classification was performed. The
resulting fourfold grouping and, in particular, tpe dichotomy of large
and small machinery companies, provides the necessary tools for Part
Three's examination of the role of structural factors in the economic
and spatial repercussions of market recession on franchising
enterprises.
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CHAPTER FOUR FOOTNOTES
1. See Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics,
Manufacturing Industry [Bulletin No. 4, 1966-67], Canberra, 1969, for
details of the various statistics quoted here. It must be noted that
they suffer the same disabilities as those referred to in Chapter
Three. Principally, they include sundry machinery repairers. For
comparative purposes, the 1968-69 Census of Economic Activity shows
the 267 farm equipment establishments in Australia as employing 13,858
workers and achieving a total turnover of $A16l.48 million. See
Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Manufacturing
Establishments: Details of Operations by Industry Class, Australia,
[Economic Censuses, 1968-69], Canberra, 1973.
2. Combined equipment sales of the nineteen sellers in 1967
approximated $A145 million. Although this figure cannot be related
satisfactorily to any data collected by the Commonwealth Bureau of
Census and Statistics, it is estimated that the subject firms accounted
for between sixty and eighty per cent of the industry's total turnover.
Their amalgamated corporate revenue appeared in the range $A550-600
million or about two and a half per cent of Australia's gross national
product of $A22.76 billion (Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census
and Statistics, Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia,
58 (1972), p. 473).
3. Bernasek and Kubinski (1963: 479); Barber (1971: 43-55).
4. It is not entirely satisfactory to make inter-company asset
comparisons; holdings might not.be valued properly, the bases of
valuations can vary and some firms are more capital intensive than
others.
5. See, for example, Lance and Williams (1966); Williams et aZ. (1966);
Webb et aZ. (1967). There is also a discussion by Rimmer (1969: 162-70).
6. Scott and Austin (1971).
7. Rimmer (1969, 1972); Townroe (1972).
8. More details on the Canberra taxonomic programmes can be obtained
from the Division of Computing Research, Commonwealth Scientific and
Industrial Research Organisation, Canberra. Present runs were conducted
on their CDC 3600 computer.
9. Principal components analysis is used to determine the minimum
number of independent dimensions needed to account for most of the
variance in a set of variables. Its basic task is to establish, first,
an axis in m-dimensional space along which the variance is at a maximum;
then a second axis, orthogonal to the first which covers as much of the
remaining variance as possible; next, a third axis orthogonal to the
first two, and so on. Each new axis handles a smaller proportion of
the original variance. Further details of the technique and
mathematics involved can be found in Cooley and Lohnes (1962: 151-85).
10. Annual Report 1967, International Harvester Company of Australia
Pty Ltd, Melbourne, 1967, p. 2.
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11. Annual Report and Notice of Meeting 1967, Massey Ferguson
Holdings (Australia) Ltd, Melbourne, 1967, p. 1.
12. For supplementary information, see Annual Report and Financial
statements 1968, [Review of the Chairman of Directors], Chamberlain
Holdings Ltd, Perth, 1968; Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd,
[Company Review F69], Research and Statistical Bureau, The Sydney Stock
Exchange Ltd, Sydney, 1971, p. 3.
13. Bernasek and Kubinski (1963: 479); Barber (1971: 49).
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
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As a means of highlighting divergences in spatial decision-making
between the enterprise and entrepreneur, this project centred on the
role of scale effects, establishment mobility and policy substitution
in the processes and relationships of corporate behaviour. A focus on
marketing in conditions of recession maximised oppartunitiesfor
observation of geographical change and yielded an 'applied problem:
to determine the economic and locational response of leading businesses
to depressed demand within a product franchise system. It was then
argued that, under such circumstances, company structural attributes
representing competitive powers should assist larger and stronger
franchisors to more comprehensive network authority. This advantage
would allow the selection of market representation courses which would
maintain or enhance their relative market position and thus permit
more satisfactory financial adaptation to adversity. In order to test
these contentions, nineteen selected farm machinery producers were
classified into 'large' and 'small' divisions.
Part Three seeks evidence of channel control differentials in
the distribution policy and practice of these firms. Chapter Five
examines the constitution and implementation of franchise contracts
the marketing code of producers. Next, Chapters Six and Seven distil
relative network capacities of major and minor suppliers respectively
through an emphasis on tactical alterations among administrative,
production, wholesale and retail facilities. The results of their
varying strategies are integrated in Chapter Eight's assessment of the
spatial and financial postulates of the main argument. Interpretation
of the situation of the equipment industry and performance of the
franchise system in a depression enables Part Four to forge conclusions
on the queried aspects of businesspoliey-formation.
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CHAPTER FIVE
NETWORK CONTROL THROUGH DISTRIBUTION POLICY: FRANCHISE
AGREEMENTS OF LARGE AND SMALL FIRMS
This study's first analysis deals with variations in large and small
machinery franchisors' network control as exhibited in their marketing
policies over the recession. The topic is tackled after reviewing
the trading situation of each group in 1967. As a preliminary,
however, it is necessary to give a critique of the source material
used in this and later discussion.
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS IN SPATIAL APPLICATIONS
Geographical surveys of single-plant firms seldom need probe the
intricacies of their internal documents. In contrast, corporate
decision-making, relying on pecuniary factors and codified procedures,
demands a distinct orientation to company ledgers, agreements,
statistical returns and the administration manual. The approach is
facilitated by consideration of accounting statements which, while
revealing much about the goals and strategies of selected businesses
in the light of their ensuing economic performance, also entail
difficulties of accuracy, standardisation, disclosure and diversified
reporting.
Despite eclectic successes, financial appraisal is frequently
criticised on grounds of accuracy. Of principal concern is the lack
of adjustment in annual reports for price level changes, the influence
of extraordinary items or holding losses and gains in distorting net
income over a period, and inconsistencies attending estimates of
future provisions (Beaver, 1970: 5/10). Many commentators have argued
further that fixed asset and depreciation charges should reflect
100
current replacement rather. than historical cost.
Insufficient standardisation in compilation techniques compounds
these problems and complicates inter-firm comparison of issues such as
inventory valuation (e.g. FIFO versus LIFO), or the correct assessment
of net worth (cf. Graham et al., 1962: 234). For example, on the
question of income determination, Standish (1972: 148) comments that
in practice, given the many asset and liability
valuation methods used, measurement of profit
or loss is the result of a set of procedures
probably individual to each company.
Computation debates devolve on the concept of 'true' economic returns
(i.e. changes in wealth position). Yet, empirically, even on an ex-post
basis, it is impossible to specify the 'real' unearned increment -- or
the error in its estimation. Therefore, the establishment of accuracy
criteria now centres on the predictive ability of indicators employed.
Monetary statistics substitute for parameters of decision models and
measurement verisimiltude refers to the precision with which such
information depicts elements in the policy-making process.
Since corporate structuring can vary, with divisional status
being resolved on a product or organisational basis, it is often
infeasible to interrelate figures on large firms' component interests.
While Mautz (1968: 150-51) has found some executives unwilling to
disclose disaggregated data because certain factors cannot be reliably
allocated within the conglomerate, some non-American enterprises have
been observed to prefer secrecy by apparently capitalising on haphazard
international disclosure codes (Arpan, 1971: 67-70). A third
criticism of this type of analysis is therefore that total company
measures conceal a concern's participation in different industries and
the contributions of its various segments to aggregate activity (cf.
Cramer and Iwand, 1968: 49-50).
Given the divergences in modern accounting opinion, a particular
methodology can scarcely expect to accommodate all viewpoints. The
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present avenue was first to allot all income and balance sheet details
from the nineteen selected organisations' 1967-71 annual reports to
standardised categories in a computer-based, time-series matrix.
Published amounts were altered as little as possible. Among the
profit and loss declarations, biases arising from appropriations,
extraordinary adjustments and capital movements were identified and
substantially overcome. Notably, fixed asset sales were excluded from
trading results; stock writedowns, assumed a direct effect of the
recession, were treated not as an abnormal (below the line) fluctuation
as would usually obtain, but as part of a company's operating
performance. A complicated situation arose with regard to income from
institutional sources. Under the Agricultural Tractors Bounty Act
1966-72, substantial governmental assistance was afforded manufacturers
of farm tractors which exceeded fifty-five per cent local content. The
principal beneficiaries among the chosen sample were two large members
(Table 5.1). As observed before, the bounty rate was doubled in 1970
and, despite reduced output, payments spiralled in 1971. Although
reimbursements were neither universally-received nor constant over the
recession, they were available to any entrepreneur prepared to
contemplate tractor fabrication in Australia. On these grounds, they
were included in subsequent calculations and bear quite noticeably on
profitability comparisons between the two machinery groups.
Although many of the nineteen firms' balance sheet entries could
be equated with relative ease, it was beyond the scope of this project
to draw fixed asset valuations to a single base year or to estimate
1
current worth. Evaluation of financial and trading condition through
asset accounts is therefore avoided. Alternative measures centred on
sales not only improve precision in inter-company comparisons but
assist once again in the problem of diversified reporting by allowing
an integration of corporate and sectoral results. Their main
application is in the following ratio computations.
TA
BL
E
5
.1
:
RE
TU
RN
S
UN
DE
R
TH
E
A
G
RI
CU
LT
U
RA
L
TR
A
CT
OR
S
BO
UN
TY
AC
T
19
66
-7
2,
CO
RP
OR
AT
E
N
ET
SA
LE
S
AN
D
PR
O
FI
T
(L
OS
S)
A
FT
ER
TA
X
,
SA
M
PL
E
FI
PM
S,
A
G
RI
CU
LT
U
RA
L
M
AC
HI
NE
RY
IN
D
U
ST
RY
,
A
U
ST
RA
LI
A
,
19
67
-7
2
($
A
th
ou
sa
nd
)
F
ir
m
Y
ea
r
C
ha
m
be
rl
ai
n
In
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l
H
ar
v
es
te
r
E
nd
in
g
Ju
ne
R
et
u
rn
s
C
o
rp
o
ra
te
n
e
t
C
o
rp
o
ra
te
n
e
t
C
o
rp
o
ra
te
R
et
u
rn
s
u
n
de
r
C
o
rp
o
ra
te
u
n
de
r
bo
un
ty
n
e
t
s
a
le
s
p
ro
fi
t
a
ft
e
r
bo
un
ty
a
c
t
n
e
t
s
a
le
s
p
ro
fi
t
a
ft
e
r
a
c
t
ta
x
ta
x
19
67
11
98
15
77
4
59
0
II
10
23
83
77
0
38
82
19
68
16
62
18
14
0
81
5
81
8
85
16
7
31
13
19
69
16
02
19
30
1
58
7
64
8
88
17
7
32
57
19
70
92
2
10
93
9
(7
00
)
76
4
90
27
8
20
61
19
71
16
31
15
55
7
31
9
J
11
19
84
54
7
12
01
i
19
72
21
81
24
66
5
75
7
97
9
82
38
7
(2
73
6)
S
o
u
rc
es
:
P
u
b
li
sh
ed
a
n
n
u
a
l
a
c
c
o
u
n
ts
o
f
b
o
th
fi
rm
s
a
n
d
A
u
st
ra
li
a
,
P
ar
li
am
en
t,
A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
ra
l
T
ra
ct
o
rs
B
ou
nt
y
A
ct
19
66
-7
2,
R
et
u
rn
s
to
P
ar
li
am
en
t
(y
ea
rs
19
66
-6
7
to
1
97
1-
72
).
l-B o N
103
Accounting ratio analysis
Since their inception in the 1890s, ratios have become
indispensable in profitability and solvency determination (Horrigan,
1968: 285). Here, as a means of examining the economic position over
time of merchants with widely-differing strengths, interests and sizes,
the most appropriate quotients are those tapping liquidity within the
balance sheets and the comparative levels of net returns in the profit
and loss accounts (cf. van Horne, 1968: 507-26). Liquidity~ the
degree to which assets represent or can be converted to ready money
without appreciable loss of value, represents the extent of
agricultural machinery franchsors' short-term solvency over the
recession. As a gross indicator, the current ratio (current assets/
current liabilities) shows the ability of a business to meet its
immediate commitments. Though a quotient of 2:1 has been classically
regarded as safe, a healthier position is now favoured in many
businesses (Graham et aZ.~ 1962: 218). Yet, this ratio has recently
drawn criticism for its failure to acknowledge the relative
convertability of holdings. A finer tool, the 'quick' ratio (current
assets less stock/current liabilities), compares direct monetary
equivalents against existing obligations (Graham et aZ.~ 1962: 219,
fn. 11). Ordinarily, a firm's current assets less inventory should
equal or exceed its immenent debts. However, since agricultural
equipment is rather .slow-moving and heavily-financed with the cost
being carried among current liabilities, ratios of less than unity are
not uncommon.
Among many potential income ratios (return on net worth, total
tangible assets and so forth), net profit after tax over consolidated
net sales is used most extensively in later inter-firm comparisons.
This quotient relates directly to the elements of machinery trading and
is applicable to analyses over short periods (Sheridan, 1974: 83).
The approach facilitates an enquiry
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Returns of about five per cent have characterised many Australian
industries during the 1960s and 1970s, depending on their value of
sales, capital employed, inventory and receivables turnover (see
Sanzo, 1970: 11-12; Australia [Tariff Board], 1972: 14).
To foster valid inter-group comparisons, the ratio investigations
must focus on specialists. Only suppliers averaging over seventy-five
per cent of their aggregate annual sales volume in tractors and
implements during the years 1967-71 were taken for this purpose
(Table 5.2). Massey Ferguson and Chamberlain represent each class of
Division AB, while nine competitors in Division CD combine to form
a synthetic 'small' company2
into the role of structural influences in moderating the downturn's
impact, concentrating first on the competitive situation in 1967.
THE ONSET OF THE RECESSION, 1967-68
The Australian agricultural equipment market of the late 1960s
deteriorated rapidly in relation to extenuated lead times attending
the manufacture and procurement of major product lines 3 . Though
movements in sales usually postdate those of rural income by several
4
months , the lag was absent on this occasion. Indeed, Massey
5Ferguson's annual report of 1969 recorded that
it was not possible to predict the extent and
dramatic suddenness of the market contraction.
The setback therefore highlighted the importance of a producer's
initial economic standing in governing his attainment of network control
through franchise and spatial policy and, hence, in partly determining
his viability after 1967.
TABLE 5. 2 : SAMPLE FIRMS USED IN CALCULATION OE' FINANCIAL RATIOS
(THE SPECIALIST RATIO SAMPLES)
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967-71
Division Class Firms
A Massey Ferguson
Large
B Chamberlain
'C Howard Rotovator
Alfarm Distributors
Connor Shea
Small Horwood Bagshaw
Ralph McKay
D Mobilco
New Holland
David Shearer
John Shearer
Source: Corporate and agricultural machinery dollar sales of
sample firms, 1967-71.
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The large and small firm in 1967~68
A cross-sectional, inter-firm analysis of key ratios reveals
that in 1967-68 the typical large machinery distributor was in
a somewhat better situation than its small counterpart (Table 5.3).
Liquidity (averaged between the current and quiek ratios) waS' higher,
trade receivables were being turned over more quickly and inventory
was proportionately lower in relation to net working capital. Record
corporate turnover enjoyed by Massey Ferguson, Chamberlain and
· 1 6. t d t .. 11 t"Internatlona Harvester aSS1S e an up urn ln lncome; on a ra lOS
but net return on sales, major organisations eclipsed their opposition.
Despite localised operating difficulties, their directors' reports
optimistically mirrored the health of their accounts.
In contrast to this fairly homogeneous, above-average status,
small suppliers spanned a wide range of financial contingency. At
least three 7 exhibited such exemplary soundness that, in terms of the
structural hypothesis, their management policies would have been
expected to approximate those of bigger concerns (Table 5.4). Apart
from this trio, most others displayed only a poor-to-average position
because of the endemic droughts of 1965-67 and malaise in horizontally-
related industries. Many entered the recession in unfavourable straits
which generally persisted for the next six years and, in some instances,
led to withdrawal. This early background polarised the nature of
corporate goals primary forces in economic and spatial action (c£.
stern, 1966) -- between large and small manufacturers.
Corporate goal-formation under uncertainty
The aims of small enterprises varied both among firms and over
time. At first, new entrants sought expansion to build up product
populations, spare parts and service demand. Several stressed,
diversified members were more concerned to maintain the viability of
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Shielded by their overall size and contemporary
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their machinery trading by stabilisation or reduction of operations.
Certain specialised equipment marketers were attempting to recover
from setbacks of previous years. Finally, the more robust suppliers
could overlook immediate financial considerations to some extent and
concentrate on their trading performance. Yet, as circumstances
worsened in 1969-70, initial disadvantage and lack of resources forced
many of the minor competitors8 to preserve their liquidity by all
available means, a necessity underscored by several failures.
The leading organisations, on the other hand, apparently
recognised their ability to remain in the machinery market throughout
1 .. 9the rura crlS1S •
prosperity from its immediate exigencies, their problem was rather to
anticipate its duration and severity and adjust accordingly. The task
was confounded by long-term planning needs and the inflexibilities of
heavy overhead commitments:
[Prior to January 1969], there were men"" .recommen.ding
caution, but they weren't heard. One of the things
we must take into account in any management decision
•.• is that .•. it's very easy to criticise and project
[action] on the possibility of a falling market. But
a manager also has to estimate the opportunity cost
of not meeting a potentially-higher market. This can
be very expensive on a long-term marketing budget for
a company like this (large Melbourne supplier" 8 May
1972) .
The risks of not 'meeting the market' seemingly exceeded the dislocation
of short-term losses. The main organisations had always attached great
significance to any attrition of penetration, appreciating that
market share can be dropped almost overnight. The
road to recovery is a long and arduous one (The
Australian, 2 January 1971) •
A slip in competitive position would not only prejudice turnover of
spare parts and service during the projected life of all 'lost'
machinery sales, but also destroy future brand loyalty and replacement
demand. Further, the few outstanding retailers available would only
110
accept and operate franchises on the strength of local volume
d 8 d h 11 h f h f h 8 10potentials erlve from t e overa s are 0 t e ranc lsor •
Unwilling to handicap themselves in a subsequent upturn, large
corporations predicated -- or perpetuated -- their strategy mainly on
the issue of penetration. Their stance encouraged, first, a forceful
attitude to franchise policy and locational behaviour and, as will be
seen later, a stock accumulation which deflated their financial condit~on.
NETWORK CONTROL IN THE CONSTITUTION
OF FRANCHISE POLICY
Although farm equipment franchisors' printed contracts spell out
a formal modus operandi~ practical procedures may vary, particularly
under the duress of recession. Thus, even though dealer cancellation
rates between 1967 and 1972 were pronounced, many more outlets would
have been eliminated had manufacturers chosen to assert their: rights •.
Both the constitution and implementation of policy must be investigated
to portray the relative distribution control of various companies.
Analysis of the 1967 agreements of three large and thirteen small
producers ll derived four main topics from thirty-nine distinguishable
subject areas l2 (see Table 5.5 and Appendix Two) .
(i) Introductory clauses, apart from non-assignability of
contract, were rarely more than legal formalities.
(ii) General provisions offered the franchisor opportunities for
a high degree of vertical integration -- especially those
relating to design changes, sales restrictions, exclusivity
and definition of territory (cf. Milinowski, 1965).
(iii) Operating requirements also had significant ramifications.
If stated at all, the vendor's obligations concerned the
supply of technical and sales assistance and provision of
retail margins; in comparison, those of the vendee usually
appeared voluminous. Though they might have created
efficiencies, they again afforded the manufacturer
a substantial voice in aspects of retailers' housekeeping
and marketing.
(iv) Termination clauses allowed the franchisor to cancel the
franchisee for a variety of reasons. Frequent grounds
included the latter's death or disability, his insolvency or
TABLE 5.5: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS a OF FPANCHISE PROVISIONS, SIXTEEN SAHPLE FIRHS b ,
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967.
Provision Percentage of Firms
Exhibiting Provision
Number Type Content Network Large firms Small firms Total firms
control
potential
1 Introductory Purpose of agreement 66 38 44
2 Previous agreements cancelled 33 62 , 56
3 Interpretations 66 38 44
4 Jurisdiction stated 33 46 44
5 Products covered 66 54 56
6 Contract non-assignable 100 69 75
7 Franchise granted 66 46 50
8 General Design changes, product exclusions 100 46 56
9 Passing of title to goods 0 38 31
10 Non-agency franchise 100 77 81
11 Use of trade marKs 66 23 31
12 Defini tion of terri tory 100 100 100
13 Exclusivi ty of 66 100 94
14 Types of prohibited 33 85 75
15 Policy on sub-dealers 0 23 19
16 Instructions to dealers 33 38 38
17 Service of notices 66 38 44
18 Variations of contract 100 62 69
19 Policy on competing products 66 46 50
20 Powers of waiver 100 46 56
21 Operating Policy on acceptance of orders 33 31 31
22 'I'erms of payment 33 62 56
23 Used equipment dealing 33 31 31
24 Delivery and financial procedure 66 69 69
25 Non-fulfilment of orders 100 69 75
26 Consignment conditions 66 23 31
27 Retail pricing policy 100 85 88
28 Policy on wrl.. tten orders 100 62 69
29 Spare parts policy 100 69 75
30 Product insurance 66 31 38
31 Product alterations 66 23 31
32 Warranty 66 85 81
33 Collateral and set-off 33 38 38
34 Tenure of franchise 0 15 13
35 Dealer obligations 100 100 100
36 Company obligations 66 77 75
37 Termination Termination by notice 100 85 88
38 Termination by event 100 69 75
39 Obligations on termination 100 85 88
See also Appendix '!Wo.
b Three large, thirteen small firms.
High network control potential, text.
III
~: 1967 franchise agreements, sample firms.
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bankruptcy, assignment or hypothecation of contract,
unnotified changes in the legal structure of the dealership,
and inadequate sales performance. Some suppliers threatened
annulment for any breach; for most, however, payment, the
supply of collateral and securing of goods were the sensitive
areas. All large and several small firms withheld the
privilege of waiver, thus potentially introducing a measure
of arbitrariness into their administration.
Surprisingly, the network authority implicit in the sixteen franchise
agreements cannot be satisfactorily compared. Many feature exactly
the same wordingl3 because of an oligopolistic exchange scheme and
thus confound any presumptions of the structural hypothesis about the
composition of written policy in companies of different sizes. Even
though later atrophy in retail forces indicated otherwise, all
compe~itors apparently aspired to roughly the same quality of
co-ordination over the recession.
Coverage of the contracts offered more scope -- those of large
organisations averaged twenty-six of the thirty-nine topical areas,
whereas the mean for small producers was twenty-one. Nine of the
twelve key issues of channel management (marked with asterisks in Table
5.5) were specified more frequently by the former. Beyond these
observations, a structural differential in the constitution of franchise
documents cannot be pursued. Their degree of enforcement therefore
assumes great importance: corporate and machinery trading size,
economic power and managerial philosophies exercised a marked effect.
NETWORK CONTROL IN THE APPLICATION
OF FRANCHISE POLICY
Declining retail volumes forced many dealers into what, under normal
circumstances, would have been seen as infringements of marketing
I " 14po lCy • In particular, stockholding and sales performance clauses
15
were broken . Most enterprises reacted in low-key, recognising that
undue pressure would have merely exacerbated problems, eroded
113
co-operation and led to unwarranted closure; the industry entertained
a fairly universal exercise of waiver. Although over the 1960s minor
suppliers had never enjoyed as penetrating control as their
counterparts, some were now required to retreat further from printed
procedures into an administration of expediency. The extent to which
franchise practice was liberalised (or network administration weakened)
can be gauged best with respect to two issues, dealer assistance and
maintenance of competitive exclusivity.
Dealer assistance
A manufacturer's field services normally aim to augment his
distribution authority and sales, while simultaneously avoiding
exposure (cf. Chapter Two). Yet, the recession sometimes necessitated
extraordinary measures. Large companies maintained their wholesale
role and shepherded retailers to the limits of pre-recession criteria,
using managerial as opposed to monetary techniques. Credit extension
was prolific at all levels of supply as were raised or floating wholesale
discount margins, but these firms seldom offered direct aid in
consignment stock, customer invoicing or used equipment marketing.
Their seemingly conservative stand, reflecting an unwillingness to
dissipate the benefits of franchising or to compound existing
uncertainties with those of the retail sector, relied upon a close
association with well-established, high-volume and, mostly, viable
dealerships and also the ability of principal brands to attract scarce
new appointees if necessary.
Smaller and newer companies frequently fell into a circle of
network and policy decay. When their resellers -- mainly low-turnover
operations -- decreased their service and performance, they were
obliged to accept greater financial involvement or lose authority.
The application of internal liquidity to formal, ailing systems created
risky investments with inequitable short-term returns. On the other
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hand, Zaissez-faire marketing was equally unattractive. Some
competitors reacted by relegating dealers to spotter agents, paying
concomitantly lower discounts and undertaking limited corpora~e
distribution. Over the study period, several agreements served only
to cloak fairly unstructured arrangements, as reflected in the following
discussion of non-exclusive forms of franchising.
Competing and supplementary franchises
The average Australian country town supports only a few businesses
capable of handling any of the dozen or so makes of automobiles, trucks,
agricultural machinery and fuel available. Ideally, every equipment
producer would prefer exclusive representation (cf. Whitney, 1958:
241-42). In practice, fragmented markets determine that the majority
of retailers accept a number of non-competing brands in each product
field. Moreover, functional diversification is used to spread risk
and create sufficient total revenue to cover overheads from these
often minor interests. A fine balance therefore exists between
monopolistic advantage and the cost of sales and inventory; agents
must choose carefully to avoid over-commitment or the displeasure
of prejudiced franchisors. This critical arena of distribution
administration again differentiated the attitudes of machinery
corporations, of which the largest and strongest could alone exercise
any firm jurisdiction over cross-franchising. The whole industry's
bargaining power in relation to complementary lines reached a low ebb
during 1967-72.
Though large concerns universally opposed external influence in
their dealerships (cf. Barber, 1971: 251), full-line companies probably
demonstrated the greatest network control. Both were backed by leading
market shares and, additionally, International Harvester agencies had
viable_options in trucks and industrial equipment. In 1967, few
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retailers handled competing products and, hence, the issue of cross-
franchising was contained by a want of both precedent and rationale.
Supplementary merchandising was less equivocal since, in many depressed
areas, a sole machinery range was an inadequate trading base. With
16
apparent reluctance , full-line corporations permitted the adoption
of approved outside stock by their resellers as a cheaper and safer
means of preserving sales forces than horizontal manufacturing
integration. The strategy was also timely, given prolonged trends in
17
the rural service economy
The inability of long-line organisations to offer a complete array
of equipment or immediate avenues of diversification exposed their
sellers to overtures from small manufacturers seeking new replacement
18
outlets . The assumed capacity of competing or overlapping products
to offset risk and spread overheads created attractive incentives.
Further, long-line dealers feared trade-in battles and erosion of
penetration and trading margins if producers unable to find local
19
representation introduced corporate stores . With surprising success,
their suppliers spoke against extra franchising on the grounds that
the return from added lines did not justify the investment in goods,
parts and service; the purpose of a dealership was to promote one
trademark actively rather than adopting an air of impartiality between
competing models. They also pointed out that the annexation of
'unstable' short-line ranges would not only increa$6 their franehise
turnover but also curtail competition to a level unacceptable to the
20
consumer
Large and small firms negotiated from positions of different
economic power. In the absence of comparable 1967 and 1972 franchise
mix data21 , interview evidence suggests that the former accepted
restricted supplementary merchandising and resisted any proposed
cross-franchising with threats of termination. Such control eluded
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the majority of small enterprises which, in most retail establishments,
could not claim the main brand let alone an exclusive operation.
Complementary franchises were the norm in this sector and only the
more significant producers could oppose competing products, especially
in the bigger outlets (cf. Whitney, 1958: 244). Several manufacturers,
troubled with high dealer loss rates 22 and the restrained appeal of
their franchise, clearly stated a preference for shared facilities as
distinct from a complete lack of coverage. Their low market share
precluded much selectivity.
The erosion in small firms' limited authority gave retailers
greater economic and positional muscle in the sales relationship.
A number serving marginal participants apparently refused to be bound
by allegedly-onerous contracts. In a more extreme case involving an
unsuccessful attempt to clinch a new agent, a branch manager lamented.
to head office:
he had torn [our agreement] to pieces, had his
solicitors dissect it and has stated•..he does
not like the compilation of it. He refuses point
blank in having pressure applied to his business
in the manner of ..• [a large automobile franchisor]
... and will sign only when he is positive he will
be treated in a fair manner (records of a small
Sydney supplier~ letter dated late 1969).
To avoid such hostility and the frequent inequalities of conventional
bonds, one successful small franchisor from 1969 dispensed with the
usual lengthy list of provisions and instead substituted a succinct,
annually-updated, two-page joint agreement. Other less fortunate or
progressive companies were si~p1y forced to market through unaligned
agencies and thereby relinquished many securities of franchising23 .
Much of their recording and forecasting fell away, while their own bulk
or direct selling advanced hybridisation of distribution practice and
the dissolution of standard franchise policy with its low-cost market
control.
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Maintenance of franchise policy: summary
Apart from credit extension and the revision of trading margins,
principal firms were generally able to avoid extraordinary forms of
assistance in the maintenance of their original marketing codes during
the recession; they achieved satisfactory co-ordination mainly through
managerial techniques. In comparison, some minor businesses were forced
into (or continued) a more embracing financiaZ commitment to preserve
their wholesale role and the viability of dealer forces. Ones unable
or unwilling to meet these demands often had to turn to other expensive
selling methods, sometimes involving forward integration. Such results
support the predictions of the structural hypothesis.
A critical appraisal of issues in accounting prefaced an assessment
of the financial situation of the selected franchisors in 1967. Early
advantages and extensive corporate resources enabled large firms to
pursue more authoritative goals and marketing policy than short-line
competitors during the recession. Chapter Six now examines the
interaction of spatial strategy with the large corporation's network
control; contrasts are provided in a similar review of small concerns
in Chapter Seven. The analyses of both groups are fused in Chapter
Eight by an evaluation of the combined contributions of franchise and
geographical tactics to relative economic performance.
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CHAPTER FIVE FOOTNOTES
1. Some of the difficulties are attributable to the need to conduct
an ex-post analysis. Long-term ex-ante programmes (notably those of
the Australian Industries Assistance Commission.or the sophisticated
inter-firm comparisons of the Department of Secondary Industry) can
set up standardised reporting systems over a number of years and thus
derive such advantages as collecting asset figures on a non-published,
current valuation basis. It was considered more appropriate in this
work to adhere closely to published data which, in spite of their
inaccuracies are presumably important in any corporate decision-making.
Moreover, they are readily available and maintain the criterion of
reproducability.
2. The numerical bias of these comparisons, a function of
classification procedures, cannot be avoided.
3. 'Shaping the Future', transcripts of a long-term projection
conference held by Massey Ferguson on 30 May 1966, suggests that up
to seven years might be required for the research and development,
production and amortisation of investment in major new product lines.
Normal manufacturing is scheduled up to a year in advance because of
domestic supply restrictions in certain sections of steel. Depending
on the source and the goods involved, even importers must accommodate
three to twelve month indent cycles.
4. Phillips (1956: 93-97, 200); Bernasek and Kubinski (1963: 469).
5. Annual Report and Notice of Meeting 1969, Massey Ferguson Holdings
(Australia) Ltd, Melbourne, [December] 1969, p. 2. Other firms such
as Ford and Connor Shea also stated that, after the introduction of
wheat quotas on 30 April 1969, sales dropped dramatically.
6. See the 1967 and 1968 annual reports of all three firms.
7. Ralph McKay, New Holland and John Shearer. Also, Howard
Rotovator demonstrated strong finances throughout the recession.
8. Certainly, all suppliers with an aggpegate annual turnover of less
than $AlD.DO million could be construed in this class.
9. As explained in interviews.
10. Evidence on this point is derived from franchise advertisements
during the upswing of 1973. See, for example, Chamberlain-John Deere
in The Sun Herald [Sydney], 18 November 1973.
11. The other three agreements were unavailable.
12. Contracts analysis based on van Cise (1968: 325-46); Rosenfield
(1970: 67-130); Ozanne and Hunt, .(1971: 199-256).
13. Thus, the attraction of an agreement is derived not from its
content, or even the attached discount schedules which are fairly
similar throughout the industry but, rather, from a cost-based
translation of the market share of the franchisor into a local volume
potential.
119
14. Since many manufacturers enjoyed fairly informal relationships
with dealers, it would be erroneous to imply that a major crisis
in franchise policy overtook the equipment industry during the
recession. The more significant changes described here should be
regarded as a response not only to the immediate pressures of the
economic situation but also to longer-term forces in machinery
marketing over the 1960s.
15. With respect to some agreements, this infringement was not
surprising. Two of the most 'unilateral' statements were:
(i) Stockholding. [The Dealer will] maintain a stock of the
said products as considered adequate by the Company for the
sales requirements of his territory (franchise agreement of
a large Melbourne supplier) .
(ii) Sales performance. The Dealer shall be held responsible •..
for the selling of a reasonable percentage of the product
market in his territory. What constitutes a 'reasonable
percentage' shall be decided from time to time by the
Company (franchise agreement of a small Sydney supplier).
16. This reluctance was put in the comment of one executive:
A lot of our dealers have put on car franchises.
We don't like this ••. because, basically, we then
have to share his ... time. Except, you've got to
be realistic; sometimes they've needed this extra
volume to carry them and.•. the car really isn't
in conflict with our own equipment (large
Melbourne suppZier~ 12 July 1972).
17. One franchisor, recognising the complementary pressures of
numerical contraction among farm machinery outlets and the drive for
economies of scale throughout all retailing, saw in supplementary
franchising a pathway to the principal role in anticipated one-stop
farm supply supermarkets:
As a company, if we want to stay with this dealer
vertical franchising system as against the retail
vertical business [i.e. corporate distribution] ..•
it's going to be essential for us to tie up with
other franchising organisations .•. chemicals ...
£ertilisers •.. stock type companies (large
Melbourne supplier~ 8 May 1972).
18. With a range and, quite possibly, volume below that of a full-line
dealership, the undiversified long-line outlet would have had greater
incentive to expand its product fields over the recession. Such
pressures can occur at any level. For example, Massey Ferguson's
concern in 1963-64 at the attack on its franchise strength caused by
the lack of a large tractor ·was strong motivation for the company to
enter the high-horsepower sub-market.
19. Paraphrased from correspondence.
20. Paraphrased from interviews.
21. Within the industry, such complex and eXhaustive information
became a victim of recession cut-backs. However, many small companies
had never collected franchise mix data at all.
120
22. See Chapter Seven.
23. By the end of the setback, at least a quarter of the small firms
had reverted to informal (unsigned order basis) dealers or laissez-faire
methods of marketing (sales to any casual bidders). A study in the
United States some years ago noticed the greater reliance on such
channels of minor franchisors vis-a-vis larger competitors (Jessen
et al.~ 1951: 53-54). However, use of unaligned retailers by national
equipment suppliers has been less common in Australia, where more
extensive network control has been the norm.
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CHAPTER SIX
NETWORK CONTROL THROUGH DISTRIBUTION PRACTICE:
SPATIAL REPRESENTATION OF LARGE FRANCHISORS
I think a distribution policy is usually developed
by a need moreso than a want. If we feel, and we
have done this in the past, that there's a certain
problem developing, well, we just have to change.
But we're fairly loath to change (large Melbourne
supplier~ 12 July 1972).
The interaction of network control and corporate spatial decision-
making suggested by the structural hypothesis can be examined in the
distribution practice of recession-bound machinery enterprises. The
project's second main analytical thrust is undertaken by Chapters Six
and Seven which consider the incidence of locational change in the
selling networks of large and small franchisors respectively. At the
earliest channel levels -- central administration, production, and
wholesaling -- the emphasis is nation-wide, but in retailing only the
position in southeastern Australia is considered (Figure 6.1). This
restricted region both reduces the number of dealers under observation
to manageable proportions and also affords unique opportunities for
ascertaining inter-metropolitan alternatives in supply and the influence
of producers' positional power. Case histories are employed to overcome
the difficulties of confidentiality and disclosure, and those posed by
massive (but often incomplete) data banks. Inter-class comparisons
highlight establishment mobility, scale effects, and the substitutability
of geographical tactics. Integration of specific findings from major
and minor firms facilitates Chapter Eight's overall evaluation of the
structural viewpoint: company attributes representing competitive
powers are expressed as management potentialities in franchise conduct
and thus vary representation, and market and economic performance. The
enquiry commences with a review of the sales facilities for farm
equipment in 1967.
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FIGURE 6.1: Location diagram, southeastern Australia
a
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existed for most of the recession (i.e. 1967-70)~
Source: Author.
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GEOGRAPHY OF MACHINERY MARKETING IN 1967
In response to relatively small and highly-localised demand, the
Australian agricultural machinery industry in 1967 exhibited a fairly
simple marketing pattern. Older, North American-inspired regional
wholesale depots had all but disappeared in favour of a more direct
factory+branch or independent distributor+dealer arrangement (cf.
Appendix Three). Factories and corporate head-offices were normally
sited together so that processing, fabrication, assembly and initial
despatch occurred alongside general management functions such as
accounting, labor relations and research and development. Branches or
non-aligned distributors undertook final assembly to save intra-company
transport costs. Their responsibilities, confined mainly to selling,
included the collection of economic material, observation of
competition, logistics, local advertising and franchisee sales/
profitability analysis (see Butt, 1969: 46-47). Finally, dealers
handled the retail business of most firms although some relied as well
on a few corporate stores.
By the start of the recession, all large competitors had adapted
the above schema to individual States. Unlike some small counterparts,
they had long experience in domestic conditions and frequently
adjusted their behaviour to changing cycles. Extensive production and
distribution networks established since the Second World War gave solid
representation in all parts of Australia except Tasmania, where the
requirements were limited and evoked little interest (Table 6.1).
Of the leading makers, only Massey Ferguson fabricated at more than
a single location. Its experience offered the sale instance of spatial
change in the large sector's manufacturing and administrationl .
TABLE 6.1: CORPORATE REPRESENTATION, LARGE FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUS'l'RY g AUSTRALIA 0 1967
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Class Firm State Location Type of Facility Years of Operation
Full-linea International N.S.W. Sydney Wholesale administrationb 1953-67
Harvester Gunnedah Retail store 1964-67
Vic. Melbourne Head office, wholesaling 1939-67
Geelong Manufacturing, distribution 1939-67
Qld Brisbane Wholesaling 1966-67
Cairns Retail store 1967
S.A. Adelaide Wholesaling 1951-67
Port Adelaide Warehouse 1958-67
W.A. Perth Wholesaling 1956-67
Tas. Hobart Independent wholesaler 1965-67
Massey N.S.W. Sydney Wholesaling 1937-67
Ferguson Orange Retail store 1960-67
Vic. Melbourne Head-office, manufacturing 1930-67c
Ballarat Retail store 1958-67
Bendigo Manufacturing 1965-67
S.A. Port Adelaide Wholesaling 1959-67
W.A. Perth (May1ands) Wholesaling 1956-67
Pe:r;;th (Subiaco) Retail store 1964-67
-
Tas. Hobart Wholesaling 1963-67
Long-line Chamberlain N.S.W. Sydney Wholesaling 1965-67
Vic. Melbourne Wholesaling 1955-67
Q1d Brisbane Wholesaling 1959-67
S.A. Adelaide Wholesaling 1960-67
W.A. Perth (Welshpoo1) Head-office, manufacturing 1947-67
Perth (Guildford) Retai1 store 1960-67
Ford N.S.W. Sydney Wholesaling 1963-67
Vic. ~1elbourne Head-office, assembly 1967d
Q1d Brisbane Wholesaling 1951-67
S.A. l~delaide Independent wholesaler 1960-67
W.A. North Fremantle Wholesaling 1951-67
a Note the more numerous facilities of full-line firms.
b Administration only since 1965.
c Inception taken as the merger of H.V. McKay Pty Ltd with Massey Harris Ltd, 1930.
d Ford relocated in 1967 from North Coburg.
Sources: (i) Interviews and internal documents, sample firms.
(ii) [Index to Illustrated Tractor Specifications], Technical Annual, Power Farming in Australia
and New Zealand, various issues 1946-67.
125
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION AND PRODUCTION
Shifts in central facilities of subject franchisors signify the most
striking repercussions of the rural contraction because of the asset
fixity and heavy transference expenses involved. While several plant
closures and one massive relocation characterised short-line merchants,
action by the four major companies was light -- as supposed in the
elaboration of the structural argument. Certainly, they were
affected by the universal decline in the machinery trade. Workforce
downturns 2 in response to excess inventory and high overheads were
3
considerable, while curtailment of expansion plans was also
significant in regard to the industry's longer-term development.
However, the only physical alteration to existing patterns was the
shut-down of Massey Ferguson's spare parts operation at Bendigo
(Victoria). The decision to retrench most of the one hundred employees
and retract to Melbourne was announced after consideration of stock and
finance problems (The Australian, 3 December 1969). Later, the firm's
1970 annual report4 noted the disposal of the premises in order to
improve liquidity and profitability prospects. In 1972, further sales
were made of redundant land and buildings at the Melbourne factory
site (The Australian Financial Review, 26 May 1972). Similar property
realisation and centralisation also appeared in the next stage of the
main equipment suppliers' channels.
WHOLESALE REPRESENTATION
At the wholesale level, large producers reacted to both long-term
market forces of the 1960s and the more pressing demands of the rural
downswing by undertaking two primary representation policies,
rationalisation and stability. The backing provided by their firm
franchise code and constancy in the production sector permitted these
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courses to be pursued without significant loss of control. Yet,
a smooth transition to new strategies presumed ancillary change in
other areas of the distribution sub-mix which indicated the
interrelationships and potential substitutability of geographical
decisions in the corporate arena.
Market representation: rationalisation
positional power, asserted through the location of company outlets
and, especially, head-offices markedly varied the ability of machinery
enterprises to adapt their marketing structures to dynamic conditions
throughout Australia between 1967 and 1972. Its role among large
organisations was pronounced since, initially, rationalisation was
possible for only the three Melbourne-based concerns which enjoyed
a high degree of network control from a centre offering superior
accessibility (Table 6.2). As illustrated in Figure 6.2 for tractors
5
the most important and representative individual product category no
other Australian capital city afforded such concentrated demand within
a relatively confined area well served by transport connections.
As early as 1965, International Harvester ceased Sydney-based
distribution of spare parts and all equipment except direct imports.
Components supply accrued to the South Melbourne warehouse and Brisbane
branch, while whole machines were directed from the Geelong (Victoria)
6factory to most parts of New South Wales. In 1967-68, the Adelaide
branch and an old depot at Port Adelaide were closed for farm equipment
wholesaling. A comparable course was undertaken by Ford which, after
segregating its vehicle and tractor interests in 1965, removed the
latter from Sydney and Adelaide in 1967-68. In contrast to these moves
throughout the late 1960s, Massey Ferguson's cut-backs were inspired
more by the short-term pressures of the rural crisis. Only in 1970
did it relinquish its Sydney assembly plant; the Adelaide office was
TABLE 6.2: WHOLESALE REPRESENTATION STRATEGIES, LARGE FIRMS,
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1965-72
Impact on
Wholesale Participants Locational TotalRepercussions Distribution YearStrategy
Network
Rationalisation Ford Closure of wholesale
branches at:
Adelaide · a 1967MaJor
Sydney · a 1968MaJor
International Cessation of wholesale
Harvester operationsb at:
· aSydney MaJor 1968
Adelaide Majora 1968
Closure of warehouse
at:
Adelaide Minor 1970
Massey Closure of wholesale
Ferguson branches at:
a
Sydney Major 1970
· aAdelaide MaJor 1972
Stability Chamberlain Intrametropolitan re- Minor 1968
location of Melbourne
wholesale branch
a Operative factor in classification.
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b The branches continued to distribute trucks. See also Footnote Sixe
Source: Unpublished internal documents and interviews, sample firms.
1500
FIGURE 6~2: Distribution of agricultural tractor sales,
southeastern states and total Australia,
average for years 1967-70.
Source: Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics,
Receipts, Sales and Stocks of New Tractors, [Ref: 12.18],
various issues, 1967-70.
128
129
run down to handle parts and was finally sold in 19727 • Gains in the
firm's cost and asset accounts speak for the. tangible economic
benefits which rationalisation bestowed on its adherents (Table 6.3).
The strategy reversed wholesaling attitudes held by large (and
many smaller) machinery manufacturers since the Second World War. The
generally-accepted objective of corporate coverage in all mainland
States had conferred considerable prestige,· publicity, positional power
and overall control in an era when transport linkages were less
developed. Branches or independent State distributors were essential
to the speedy delivery of components and equipment. Their inventory-
holding enabled domestic manufacturers to use inexpensive coastal
shipping, while importers could receive goods into immediate markets
and thus avoid extra handling. However, since franchise agreements
made no stipulation about the complement or deployment of a supplier's
forwarding outlets (cf. Appendix Two), vendors were not legally
hindered in completely reassessing the efficiency of their arrangement
between 1965 and 1970. As evident in the temporal spread of closures,
both long and short-term forces started to attack their traditional
orientation.
As a result of the former, manifested in improvements in office
procedures, communications and travel, branches and distributors began
to duplicate administrative functions which could be handled more
expeditiously at head-offices. Centralisation gave top executives
access to a greater field of information and fostered economies in use
of valuable installations such as computers. Other factors also began
to challenge the depots' primary stockholding role. The increasing
reliability of freight forwarding services and expanded applicability
of overnight road and air cargo for emergency deliveries offered
manufacturers a chance to focus and contain inventory. Concurrently,
models of finished products were proliferating to such an extent that
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TABLE 6.3: EFFECTS OF WHOLESALE RATIONALISATION AND ASSOCIATED
REDUCTIONS ON COST AND ASSET ACCOUNTS, MASSEY FERGUSON
HOLDINGS (AUSTRALIA) LTD, 1965-73a
n
Cost Ratios (per cent) Asset Accounts ($A million)
Year Marketing admini- Marketing admini-
I
Profit aEnding
strative and b strative and b Net book value sale ofOctober general costs / of fixed assetgeneral costs /
consolidated net disposals capitaltotal expenses
sales assets
1965 9.13 8.21 0.04 -0.01
1966 8.48 7.87 0.05 0.01
1967 8.61 7.76 0.04 0.00
1968 8.08 7.38 0.05 0.10
1969 10.51 10.36 0.05 0.00
1970c 12.72 13.98 0.02 -0.08
1971c 9.97 10.32 0.15 -0.01
1972 8 .. 58 8.16 0.73 2.0Sd
1973 8.65 7.84 0.03 4.89
a Longer period taken to show extraordinary nature of asset realisations and
to counteract lag effect.
b Greater detail unavailable from published sources.
is sufficiently specialised for present purposes.
However, this measure
1970 and 1971 were years ofc Note the changed relationship of cost ratios.
corporate loss.
d Effects of asset realisation which commenced in 1970 become apparent.
Source: Consolidated profit and loss account, Annual Report and Notice of
Meeting, Massey Ferguson Holdings (Australia) Limited, Melbourne,
1965-73.
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it became infeasible to maintain either parts or machine-options in
every outlet (cf. Barber, 1971: 64-67). Concentration allowed better
warehousing and handling techniques to be applied to a reduced amount
of merchandise. Indeed, all three suppliers regarded their
post-rationalisation patterns as more 'efficient' on a cost service
basis.
The more acute incentives of the contraction added to these
pressures. Branches -- at considerable expense -- were fulfilling
a role rendered less relevant by falling sales volumes and altered
environmental and technological conditions. By the mid-1960s many of
the previous inducements of complete national representation had
dissipated and rationalisation emerged as a means of curbing current
expenditure and redeeming fixed assets to improve liquidity (Table
6.3). New advantages opened in supply from the factory or port of
original receipt. Yet, as will be shown among small firms, the
adoption of the policy was contingent upon market strength, positional
power and corporate situation. Indeed, the latter influences
prevented the fourth large concern, Chamberlain, from revising its
network in southeastern Australia until late 19738 .
Market representation: stability
Interstate distribution by Perth-based Chamberlain has been
reviewed at several Tariff Board hearings involving the Agricultural
Tractors Bounty. The 1971 case, for example, posited that
the company does not appear to have any significant
disadvantages accruing from its location in
Western Australia ... interstate delivery charges
... amount to only about two per cent of ... [the]
cost to make and sell (Australia [Tariff Board]
1973: 17).
However, in broader marketing terms, the site of the firm's head-office
and works appeared to lessen its flexibility over the recession. In
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eastern States, Ch.amberlain faced logistical difficulties comparable
with those of Adelaide manufacturers whose prospects for rationalisation
were limited until the forging of the Indian-Pacific rail link in
1970. This geographical impediment and the extra length of
communication lines coalesced with three other elements in forwarding
continuation of the company's pre-crisis coverage.
(i) Functional diversification. Reduced activity at branches
was offset by diversification into industrial lines (Australia
[Tariff Board] 1973: 7). Yet, this re-orientation furthered
existing distribution modes since most equipment was
purchased in capital cities.
(ii) Modern premises. Chamberlain operated up-to-date
facilities suited to farm machinery marketing. The Sydney
office, for example, had been acquired only in 1965, while
an intra-metropolitan relocation took place in Melbourne in
1968 (Table 6.2). Depots were well located for transport
and posed little cause for dissatisfaction.
(iii) Amalgamation. Chamberlain's merger with John Deere in
October 1970 raised some complex issues (The Australian
Financial Review, 30 September 1970). By 1972, the newly-
formed Chamberlain-John Deere pty Ltd had closed all former
Deere plants in preference for those of Chamberlain. Apart
from the substantial decision-making involved, the role-
change from a domestic manufacturer to an international
importer/manufacturer limited new marketing initiatives.
Despite these considerations, Chamberlain's 'stability' was transient
becau8e, in a long-planned move, the Sydney branch shut down in late
1973. Rationalisation therefore appears to be the wholesale strategy
characteristic of large businesses and accentuates the use of spatial
action towards specific corporate economic aims. Significantly, its
introduction was facilitated by further reassessment in parts of the
distribution sub-mix covering product supply boundaries, price-basing
structures and sales administration territories which helped forestall
any contrary effects of depot closure.
Ancillary wholesale action
For major Melbourne companies, rationalisation homogenised the
delivery of most product groups in southeastern Australia. Previously,
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high-value, bulky or heavy articles such as headers and large tractors
had been shipped direct from factory to dealer or client to avoid
double-handling while cheaper, non-seasonal items had been held at
branches for immediate despatch (Figure 6.3). Under the new
arrangements, product-based differentiation disappeared -- the majority
of all goods emanated from Melbourne with support being provided by
Brisbane offices. Former lines of demarcation in New South Wales were
replaced with a border which, depending on availability and the
urgency of the order, could vary latitudinally by up to three hundred
kilometres; South Australia and Victoria became continuous in
a corporate region which transcended political boundaries (cf. Krumme,
1970: 319; Wadley, 1970: 156). Despite the limited sources of supply,
control was still possible in the post-rationalisation phase through
distribution flexibility and improved road and rail connections.
Spatial price-basing policy9 was also used to ease in the new
arrangements. The general pre-1967 formula among large franchisors
f.o.b. capital city -- represented a partial freight equalisation
scheme designed to cover differentials of up to twenty per cent in the
f · 1 f' · h' · 10landed cost 0 varlOUS c asses 0 equlpment Wlt ln Australla
Strictly, the removal of branches and shifts in forwarding zones made
the quotation of these rates anachronistic. Yet, the unequivocal
application of Melbourne-based mill or ex-works pricingll would have
prejudiced parts of South Australia and central-western New South Wales
and so eroded sales authority and penetration. In spite of locational
alterations, two large firms therefore did not change their price
strategy and bore the transport costs to any dealers adversely
affected by branch closure, arguing:
[It is] an industry pattern manufacturing plants
are .•• in different cities so you [have] to keep
your prices reasonably competitive in those areas ..
Otherwise, you would tend to Zose your share in
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'Pre-rationalisation (1967)
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971 ~Obdrl
FIGURE 6.3: Pre and post-rationalisation product
distribution boundaries l large Melbourne firms,
agricultural machinery industry, southeastern
Australia, 1967-72.
Source: Fieldwork.
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areas you pulled out of [italics added], (large
Melbourne supplier~ 20 April 1972).
The dilemma of a third firm illuminated the role of inter-divisional
negotiation in corporate spatial decision-making insofar as its desire
to bring most products from an ex-capital city to ex-works
specification generated conflict between finance and marketing
personnel. The former recommended the new proposal for its simplicity
and diminution of direct variable costs, while the latter favoured
freight equalisation for the reasons outlined above. The upshot was
that, although the printed ex-works statement was widely recognised
by clients and those dealers who benefited from the change, freight
subsidisation to disadvantaged retailers continued for many months
after depots were shut down. The case indicates not only the
heterogeneity of the actors in an enterprise's locational policy-
formation and their modifying influence on tactics taken, but also the
coercive impetus of industry practice in the pursuit of market control.
Hence, by one means or another, all large firms adapted their price-
basing to offset the negative points of rationalisation.
Similar moderation was apparent in factory-to-dealer field
representation. The four companies were reluctant to retrench
travellers because of the need for ongoing high-level network
administration and the difficulty of recruiting reliable and experienced
territory staff. A typical instance in which coverage zones were
simply re-defined to compensate for market declines in cereal-growing
areas suggests that the principal enterprises were prepared to
sacrifice little of this most direct form of co-ordination during the
recession (Figure 6.4). Each in fact retained ten to fifteen zone
managers throughout southeastern Australia.
r--'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-)
i i-·-
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i
Pre-crisis (1967)
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FIGURE 6.4: Pre and post-crisis arrangement of sales
representatives' territories, sample large firm,
agricultural machinery industry, southeastern
Australiaa , 1967-72.
a Data for South Australia unavailable.
Source: Fieldwork.
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Evaluation of wholesale representation
Principal agricultural machinery merchants drew on initial economic
resources, substantial equipment and corporate turnover, franchise
integrity, established dealer forces and positional power to attempt
wholesale rationalisation between 1967 and 1972. Borne of ongoing
changes in supply relationships and, in one case, the strictures of
the rural blight, the course uplifted internal finances and was
considered to augment all-round efficiency. Unlike some other forms
of contraction, it was pursued. without serious dislocation. Related
actions in wholesaling and decisive retail policies, discussed in the
next section, enabled participants to attain the cost advantages of
reduced coverage without suffering excessively from losses of channel
authority. To this extent, rationalisation appears to be a highly
adaptive course in the face of a market downturn.
RETAIL REPRESENTATION
Decreasing sales and the overhead burden forced most equipment suppliers
to review their retail representation between 1967 and 1972. From the
outset, management problems arose in the range of market conditions
over space and also from year to year. The extent of these spatial
and temporal uncertainties must be appreciated to facilitate analysis
of the strategies and dealer change of large versus small franchisors
as reflections of their relative control. Spatial sporadicity can be
demonstrated in a simple measure of throughput movements at retail
outlets -- the ratio of mean annual equipment volume in the 1969-71
crisis, divided by average revenue in the two previous years 1967-68
(subtracted from one hundred per cent and expressed as a sales
12increase or decrease ). Temporal oscillations, a function of delay
over wheat quotas and gloomy rural forecasts, can be ascertained in
the coefficient of variation13 of 1967-71 turnover by dealer point.
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The statistic, a fairly common tool of marketing analysis (cf. Greene,
1968: 50), is applied as the standard deviation over the mean of sales
at each outlet over the five-year period (see Freund, 1967: 69-70).
When mapped, these two quotients encapsulate the contraction from
the suppliers' viewpoint by affording a total perspective on revenue
disparities and fluctuations over the intensive retail study area of
New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia. The analysis was
operationalised with information from two large firms (A and B)14
whose product range and market coverage spanned most possible
contingencies within the industry. Data from 359 dealers were included
. . 15ln the computatlons
The recession's impact on retail sales
Spatial contrasts in retail activity for the two subject
franchisors are portrayed in Figures 6.5 and 6.6.
(i) Machinery sales growth, achieved by an average of only
thirteen per cent of dealers in each firm, enhanced parts of
the Adelaide and southern Central and Murray~Mallee zones of
South Australia and the West Central Division of Victoria.
While Company A performed well around Melbourne and in the
southeast of New South Wales, Company B stood out in
Victoria's Wimmera, Mallee and North ¥gstern Divisions and
along the New South Wales North Coast .
(ii) Machinery sales losses of up to sixty per cent predominated
across southeastern Australia. Areas lightly touched by
the setback included the Adelaide-Renmark strip in South
Australia, Victoria's eastern Wimmera and sections of the
New South Wales tablelands and coast.
(iii) Machinery sales losses of sixty to one hundred per cent
were frequently associated with low-volume outlets, but also
debilitated other well-constituted businesses in. scattered
districts of South Australia and Victoria and, in particular,
central and northern New South Wales.
Apart from these widespread revenue losses and the prevaricating
influences of local market conditions and individual dealer motivation,
the formulation of consistent representation policy among vendors was
also hampered by turnover fluctuations during the period under
review. The experience of Companies A and B is displayed in terms of
\ 1.
-.
-.
--
-'
-'
-
\ \ \
13
40 -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
S.
A.
.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
.
_
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
C
O
M
PA
N
Y
A
R
ET
AI
L
M
AC
HI
NE
RY
SA
LE
S
M
O
VE
M
EN
TS
)~ ;
':~
-I
N.
S.
W
.
Sa
le
s
gr
ow
th
,
-
r
_
(a
ny
a
m
o
u
n
t)
~
~
Sa
le
s
de
cl
in
e
0-
60
%
Sa
le
s
de
cl
in
e
61
-1
00
%
0%
-
2
0
%
-
4
0
%
-
60
%
-
80
%
-
10
0%
"
~
29
0
3~
O
40
0
Kl
lol
'11
eir
es
'
FI
G
U
RE
6
.5
:
R
e
ta
il
m
a
c
hi
ne
ry
s
a
le
s
m
o
v
e
m
e
n
ts
,
la
rg
e
fi
rm
A
,
a
g
ri
c
u
lt
u
ra
l
m
a
c
hi
ne
ry
in
d
u
st
ry
,
s
o
u
th
ea
st
er
n
A
u
st
ra
li
aa
,
19
67
-7
1.
a
Sh
ad
~n
g
ba
se
d
o
n
e
s
ti
m
at
ed
d
ea
le
r
tr
a
d
e
a
r
e
a
s
to
th
e
a
pp
ro
xi
m
at
e
m
a
rg
in
s
o
f
a
g
ri
c
u
lt
u
ra
l
a
c
ti
v
it
y
.
S
ou
rc
e:
U
np
ub
li
sh
ed
s
a
le
s
a
c
c
o
u
n
ts
,
s
a
m
pl
e
fi
rm
,
19
67
-7
1.
J-
i
W \0
\
~~
~.
_.
_.
_.
_.
_1
_.
-.
_.
_.
:
\ \ \ \
\
S.
A.
r-
-\
~
\I
~_
~
-
-
~
l
I I I I I .-
-
-
.
-
.
-
.
-
-
-
.
_
-
-
-
-
I I I I
N.
S.
W
.
I I I 1
30
'
C
O
M
PA
N
Y
B
gt
&
"
~
:
:
.
~:q
]S:
RE
TA
IL
M
AC
HI
NE
RY
SA
LE
S
M
O
VE
M
EN
TS
-
10
0%
1"
--
_
o
10
0
20
C)
30
0
AO
O
.
,
,
,
,
ki
lo
m
et
re
s
v
Sa
le
s
gr
ow
th
(a
ny
a
m
o
u
n
t)
0%
Sa
le
s
de
cl
in
e
~
-
20
%
0-
60
%
-
4
0
%
Sa~,s1d
~g~neJ
g:j:::
:j)j:::
,:jlij)j
:!:l
~:::
FI
G
UR
E
6
.6
:
R
et
a
il
m
a
c
h
in
er
y
s
a
le
s
m
o
v
e
m
e
n
ts
,
la
rg
e
fi
rm
B
,
a
g
ri
cu
lt
u
ra
l
m
a
c
h
in
er
y
in
d
u
st
ry
,
s
o
u
th
ea
st
er
n
A
u
st
ra
li
a
a
,
19
67
-7
1.
a
Sh
ad
in
g
b
as
ed
o
n
e
s
ti
m
at
ed
d
ea
le
r
tr
a
d
e
a
r
e
a
s
to
th
e
a
p
p
ro
xi
m
at
e
m
a
r
gi
ns
o
f
a
g
ri
cu
lt
u
ra
l
a
c
ti
v
it
y
.
So
ur
ce
:
U
n
p
u
b
li
sh
ed
s
a
le
s
a
c
c
o
u
n
ts
,
s
a
m
p
le
fi
rm
,
19
67
-7
1.
J-
i
~ o
141
the coefficient of variability in Figures 6.7 and 6.8.
(i) Extreme variability (coefficients of over eighty per cent)
beset the Eyre and Northern Divisions of South Australia,
Victoria's Wimmera and central/northern New South Wales.
Although these high quotients were often related to low
equipment turnover, many sizeable dealers were also gravely
affected.
(ii) Moderate to high variability (coefficients of forty to
eighty per cent) was characteristic of both organisations
throughout most of southeastern Australia.
(iii) Low to moderate variability (coefficients of up to forty
per cent) favoured only limited areas in the Mount Lofty and
Murray Divisions of South Australia, the Western, Melbourne,
East Central and North Central Divisions of Victoria and the
New South Wales coastline.
Spearman rank correlation was applied to test the relationship of
sales movements and oscillations for the 359 dealer points17 (Siegel,
1956: 202-13). High positive results of 0.68 and 0.61 for Companies
A and B probably reflect some autocorrelation but, given the total
context, could also imply that overall declines were teamed with
annual variability in revenue at the average dealership. Agents'
consequent management problems invariably became those of the franchisor
-- the uncertainty in trading returns was frequently sufficient to
elicit franchise movement within selling forces.
The concept of franchise movement
Ozanne and Hunt (1971: 34-36; 92-98) enter a strong cri de coeur
for refinement of the concept of franchise movement. The possible ways
in which change may appear in the retail sector are presented in
Figure 6.9. Over a certain period, a system can incorporate three
possible conditions producing:
(a) a maintenance rate based on stability of outlets;
(b) a cancellation rate, involving the termination of franchises;
(c) an addition rate, derived from the placement of new
dealerships in towns not previously represented.
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FIGURE 6~9: The concept of franchise movement and derivation
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Source: Author.
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In recession, cancellation assumes critical importance and can occur
in either of two guises:
(a) the replacement rate results from alterations in
representation within the same town;
(b) the deletion rate refers to the termination and
non-replacement of franchisees.
Next, as part of network performance, the rationale of cancellation
must be considered. It can occur for entrepreneurial reasons, such
as the dealer's ill-health, death, voluntary sale of business, or
dissolution of partnership. On the other hand, it is also instigated
by market-based causes -- lack of local sales potential or achievement,
failure to pay accounts, liquidation, insolvency, or breaches of
marketing code. For the franchisor, the prevalence of the latter form
of cancellation (whether or not replacement subsequently ensues) can
be termed a faiZupe pate l8 since it negates the acquisition of local
market authority and sales volume increases -- his· original aims in
appointing the franchisee. Finally, the net effect over time of
maintenance, cancellation and addition produces a closing-period
petention pate.
This schema is applied best with reference to the initial retail
disposition, objectives and financial condition of subject companies
since coverage policies of one might be quite inappropriate for
another member of the same class. Relative levels of channel control
can be inferred only after detailed consideration of strategies and
the magnitude of the various dealer change ratios listed above within
a given span of time. Two, however, provide especially cogent
indicators. Because all suppliers should disdain the inherent loss
of revenue and profits and extra risk involved in financially-inspired
cancellation, the degree of failure becomes a primary benchmark in
evaluating the retail performance of machinery concerns. Second, the
maintenance rate is a significant reflector of the expense and
146
inconvenience incurred by a producer in pursuing distributioni it
also portrays a vendee's chances of continuation under franchise19
during the study period. The structural hypothesis would argue that
greater economic power should aid large franchisors to lower failure
and to' attain higher maintenance than small competitors during
a business contraction.
Retail strategies of large firms
Many differences pervaded the market presence of the main
organisations in 1967 (Table 6.4). Though full-line companies had
reduced their outlet numbers over the 1960s, both still retained most
comprehensive networks. Although Massey Ferguson dealers usually
handled a greater equipment turnover, those of International
Harvester, with their diversified interests, were the larger business
ventures. Agencies of long-line enterprises were somewhat less
prolific. Ford's representation was spread throughout the mixed-farming
regions but Chamberlain, with more specialised, large-capacity
machinery, confined itself to the cereal-growing areas in a localisation
unique among the leading firms.
Two overriding strategies, rationalisation and stability,
characterised those large competitors for which requisite material was
accessible (Table 6.5). The former, signified by moderate cancellation
and failure, relatively high deletion, low addition and middling
~etention rates, was undertaken in a fairly passive manner by two
producers. By 1972, their forces had fallen by an average of eighteen
per cent -- a rather mild outcome compared to the definitive actions of
smaller corporations adopting this course (cf. Appendix Three). The
spatial impact of rationalisation is detailed by a case study in Figure
6.10. Over the recession, the dealer force of the subject competitor
fell by twenty-two and sixteen per cent in New South Wales and Victoria
TABLE 6.4: NUMBER OF RETAIL OUTLETS, LARGE FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL
MACHINERY INDUS~RY, SOUTHEASTERN AUSTRALIA, 1962-72
Year
Class Firm State
1962-63 1966-67 1971-72
Full-line N.S.W. 95 95 87
C Vic. 90 74 64
S.A. 63 50 44
Total 248 219 195
N.S.W. 74 92 72
Vic. 86 75 63
D S.A. 54 49a 50
Total 214 216 185
Long-line N.S.W. n.a. 33 29
Vic. n.a. 25 16
E S.A. 31 23n.a.
Total l50a 89 68
N.S.W. n.a. 65a 58
Vic. n.a. 35a 26
F 35a 29S.A. n.a.
Total 200a l35a 113
a Estimate.
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Sources:· (i) Unpublished internal documents and interviews, sample firms.
(ii) Tractor and Implement Guides, Australian Country Magazine,
various issues, 1968-71.
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respectively. Terminations, generally centred in cereal-growing
areas, arose mainly from sales declines and variability in central
and north-western New South Wales and Victoria; in other districts,
entrepreneurial causes were more pronounced. In the most depressed
regions, dissolution prevailed over replacement, the north of New
South Wales in fact experiencing serious gaps in representation as
a result of financial difficulties in five chains. By contrast,
deletion in the South Western Slopes and Riverina Divisions and
Victoria's Mallee was caused by retirement among the proprietors of
several old, marginal outlets. An alternative to such passive
rationalisation occurred in Victoria's highly-competitive Western
Division where swift moves were made to replace unsatisfactory
operators. In comparison, the Gippsland, and Southern Tablelands and
South Coast of New South Wales were places of relative quiescence.
In sum, the patterns of franchise change strongly resembled those of
sales movements and oscillations.
StabiZity, indicated by high maintenance, low cancellation,
deletion, failure and addition rates, was displayed among vendees of
the third and, probably, fourth firms. A maintenance rate of seventy-
nine per cent, combined with a remarkably low number of additions,
produced a net decrease in numbers of eleven per cent by 1972.
Geographical manifestations of the policy are shown in Figure 6.11.
The subject concern's resellers in broadacre areas -- particularly the
turbulent north-west of New South Wales -- showed surprisingly little
movement. Most market closure took place in central/northern Victoria
and foreshadowed a trend of dissolution. Several managers also
retired in these districts. In general, the majority of alterations
were seen in areas featuring turnover losses of more than fifty per
cent and, elsewhere, dealers struggled through the crisis.
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Consonant with wider trends in the rural service economy, the
relationship of franchise change to town size was similar in each of
the retail representation strategies undertaken by large producers
(Table 6.6). Replacement was generally necessitated in bigger centres,
whereas deletion characterised the less significant agglomerations.
Though new additions among the major firms were few in number, they
were usually situated in somewhat more populous foci than those in
which deletion occurred. The recession typically favoured economies
of scale and, in this respect, hastened the by-passing of villages in
the growing push towards higher-order settlements in country regions.
The results also suggest that economic forces were trimming excess
capacity and marginality by raising thresholds in machinery
distribution.
Despite such pressures, the solidarity of large franchisors'
channel authority was underlined by their avoidance of greater
involvement in corporate marketing between 1967 and 1972 (Table 6.7).
As heralded in Chapter Five, they were reluctant to risk exposure to
the vagaries of retailing. While existing stores were sometimes used
to force markets and shift inventory, new outlets were not established
solely for this reason (as may have been the case among several
smaller firms). Rather, the facilities positioned during the study
period usually pointed up an inability to find adequate replacement
dealers in important localities or dissatisfaction with the performance
of current franchisees. Overall, the infrequency of new activity
mirrored the economic power of the principal organisation and the
resilience of franchise systems operating with high output levels;
thus, it accords with both the spatial and financial postulates of the
structural argument.
TABLE 6.6: POPULATION OF RURAL TOWNS EXPERIENCING DEALER CHANGE,
LARGE FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY,
SOUTHEASTERN AUSTRALIA, 1967-72
Average (1971) Town Population by Type
Retail strategy Firm State of Dealer Change
Replacement Deletion Addi.tion
Rationalisation G N.S.W. 10257 1653 2069
Vic. 6982 4491 6681
S.A .. n.a .. n.a. n.a.
H N.S .. W. 4235 9739 971
Vic. 7080 3156 560
S.A .. 3692 1113 1122
Stability I N.S.W. 8574 1827 20901
Vic .. 14722 2499 16827
S.A. 7544 2462
-
Sources: (i) Unpublished dealer lists, sample firms.
(ii) Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Census
of Population and Housing, 30 June 1971~ Field Count Statements
Nos 3, 4, 6; Canberra, 1971. Also, unpUblished data on
unbounded localities and bounded localities under two hundred
population supplied by the Australian Bureau of Statistics,
Canberra, January 1974.
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TABLE 6. 7 : ESTABLISHMENT OF CORPORATE RETAIL OUTLETS,
LARGE FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY,
AUSTRALIA, 1967-72
Division Firm Location Date
Full-line International Horsham (Vic. ) 1968
Harvester (N. S.w. )Dubbo 1969
Massey Northam (W .A. ) 1968
Ferguson Shepparton (Vic. ) 1968
Long-line Chamberlain Innisfail (Qld) 1971
Mackay (Q1d) 1971
Ford - -
154
Source: Unpublished internal documents and interviews, sample firms.
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Evaluation of retail representation
Among the three large corpo+ations for which data were available,
325 of the original complement of 475 retailers emerged from the
recession, indicating a 68:32 probability of continuation during the
phase under discussion (Table 6.8). An estimated eighty-five of the
150 cancellations were market-induced, such that the failure rate
over the full six years ran at eighteen per cent. Fifty-seven
terminated outlets were replaced and, since new additions were scarce,
the strength of the three forces had decreased by sixteen per cent by
1972. The major equipment houses' movement statistics reflect their
ability to maintain distribution control. Indeed, the downturn
scarcely accelerated the adjustive long-term contraction which they
had experienced during the 1960s (Table 6.4). As the farming malaise
lifted, executives were unanimous in their support of product
franchising as a means of marketing because, with intensive throughput,
it had shown its capacity to spread risk and handle sudden declines
in sales volume.
~ ~
RESUME
Channel authority advantages inherent in decisive franchise policy
were compounded by those attending the spatial representation of the
leading machinery merchants. General stability in production and
administration allowed controlled rationalisation in the wholesale
sector. Strongly dependent on the influence of positional power, this
course brought extensive savings and was apparently accomplished without
undue loss of network or market authority. As a consequence of both
long and short-term trends in supply conditions, it occasioned substantial
establishment mobility within distribution forces and afforded a case
study in the substitution of spatial action for broader corporate ends.
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At the retail level, further rationalisation and stability was
evinced, admitting high maintenance and retention rates and only a low
incidence of failure. In sum, the behaviour of the leading merchants
corresponds with the hypothesized situation. Chapter Seven contrasts
the present results with those of small enterprises to permit an
assessment of the two groups' capacities in sales management and their
spatial tactics. The fusion of both sets of findings in Chapter Eight
allows an interpretation of the performance of a product franchise
system under recession and, in Part Four, leads to conclusions about
the processes of corporate decision-making.
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CHAPTER SIX FOOTNOTES
1. No other firm had ancillary production units which could be
closed.
2. For example, it is estimated that in International Harvester and
Massey Ferguson, direct farm machinery employment dropped by about
fifty per cent. Annual reports reveal that the total workforce for
the latter during the six years after 1967 ran: 2,338; 2,472;
2,512; 2,060; 1,457; 1,504. Huge lay-offs in the latter half of
1970 shook both the industry and the press. See The Age [Melbourne],
22 August 1970,12 October 1970; The Herald [Melbourne], 11 December
1970; The Sun [Melbourne], 12 December 1970.
3. In 1966, International Harvester had purchased a forty-two
hectare site for a farm machinery factory at Werribee, Victoria. Plans
were shelved by the recession. See History and Development of the
International Harvester Company of Australia Pty Ltd, Company
Publication, Melbourne, n.d., p. 8.
4. Annual Report and Notice of Meeting 1970, Massey Ferguson
Holdings (Australia) Ltd, Melbourne, 1970, p. 4.
5. Bernasek and Kubinski (1963: 461).
6. International Harvester's Sydney branch a truck service and
retailing depot -- continued the administration of wholesale machinery
distribution throughout New South Wales. Apart from minor difficulties
in parts supply, the company perceived its post-rationalisation
arrangements as more satisfactory. See also Appendix Three.
7. Larger machinery throughput probably perpetuated these branch
functions longer in Massey Ferguson than in the case of International
Harvester or Ford. Awareness of service obligations and the
difficulties of transport connections in the Eyre and Yorke peninsulas
influenced Massey Ferguson's slow withdrawal from South Australia.
See also Appendix Three.
8. For a discussion of Chamberlain's history, see Hutton (1966:
251-52).
9. A useful background to aspects of pricing behaviour may be found
in Guthrie (1950), Alton (1962), Gould and Preston (1966) and Knox
(1966) .
10. As observed in freight rate books and differentials in interstate
price lists among the chosen companies.
11. For commentary on locational implications of other forms of
price-basing, see Greenhut (1964: 179-84).
12. The appropriate equation could be written:
_
- 100 _UMean sales (1969-71)JPercentage sales movement 1967-71 Mean sales (1967-68)
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13. Use of this statistic was determined by its ability to abstract
from raw data and thereby accord with disclosure provisos. Its
formula can be expressed:
Standard deviation of 1967-71 sales
-------------------%Mean of 1967-71 sales .
r~ 1 (nEx2- [Ex] 2)
1001'" n(n-1)
L E:
14. To preserve confidentiality in detailed discussions of individual
companies' strategies, letters are adopted in the text of Chapters
Six and Seven and in Tables 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 7.7, and 7.10. Allocation
of letters and ordering of firms' appearances in the tabulations was
randomised.
15. The figure of 359 dealers is incompatible with any combination
listed in Table 6.4 because it includes only outlets for which adequate
data was available for the period 1967-71. Nonetheless, over ninety
per cent of the two firms' 1967 retail complement was covered.
16. All Statistical Divisions mentioned are those construed under
the old Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics nomenclature
which pertained until 1970. This terminology was selected because
it applied throughout a longer phase of the recession. Some changes
were made by the Bureau in 1971.
17. Values of the percentage of sales movement were cor~elated with
those of the coefficient of variation with the individual dealer point
as the unit of observation.
18. In this sense, the definition of failure is probably more
stringent than would appear in other franchise literature.
19. The maintenance rate does not portray the dealer's probability
of 'survival' in the recession, since most outlets have a number of
supplementary lines.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
NETWORK CONTROL THROUGH DISTRIBUTION PRACTICE:
SPATIAL REPRESENTATION OF SMALL FRANCHISORS
The differing backgrounds of small equipment franchisors infused
marked diversity into their representation over the recession. Some
had scant assurance of survival and were mainly concerned with
improving their short-term economic condition. Others apparently made
little adjustment to networks despite unfavourable financial straits.
Finally, competitive power enabled stronger members to emulate
strategies previously discussed. Such heterogeneity is confusing,
since synthetic examples and case studies cannot be used to good
effect. Yet, a counter is available in inter and intra-class
comparisons, for which the original grouping is well-equipped. Based
on these distinctions, this Chapter again examines spatial developments
at the manufacturing and administrative wholesale and retail levels and
tests the structural contention that minor firms should have experienced
greater difficulty in maintaining proper channel authority between 1967
and 1972. The parameters of recession -- sales losses and variability
-- can be assumed from Chapter Six; the incidence of failure,
breakdown of wholesaling and atrophy of dealer forces now become more
pertinent indicators of the ramifications of the rural crisis.
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION AND PRODUCTION
variation to the short-line pattern of administration and production
occurred in isolated instances of centralisation and through closure
occasioned by takeover or failure. Though, in all, only five companies
were concerned, they exhibited a high level of activity vis-a-vis that
of large counterparts and so accorded with the predictions of the main
161
hypothesis. Operational upheaval generated by the change not only
reflected more stringent repercussions of the setback, but also
underlined the mobility of corporate facilities.
Manufacturing centralisation
Two out of three minor machinery suppliers which manufactured at
more than a single plant in 1967-68 made locational alterations (Table
7.1). Case's situation demanded the complete withdrawal of equipment
fabrication from a recently-opened factory at Murray Bridge (South
Australia) to the focal Sydney assembly point. Horwood Bagshaw,
however, combined new centrifugal planning with a programme of asset
disposals in order to upgrade its liquidity. By 1969, it had
concentrated the functions of three Melbourne businesses acquired
since the late 1950s l on one premises at West Footscray (Melbourne).
The economic malaise prompted further contraction -- at a cost of $AO.18
million to keep the Adelaide head-office factory in top gear. The
expense of the move, completed in 1971, was offset by plant sales in
Victoria and the redemption of a sizeable Adelaide site once intended
for expansion. In 1971 and 1972, recoveries on surplus property
benefited Horwood Bagshaw's cash flow -- and loss position -- by nearly
$ .. 2Al.OO mllllon . Spatially, the case highlighted three issues:
(a) the intimate relationship of geographical action to commercial
goals;
(b) the possibility that major locational investment or
disinvestment decisions are taken as a last resort in the
face of extreme financial pressure;
(c) the potential role of high movement costs in inhibiting
industrial relocation and promoting inertia.
The intensity of Horwood Bagshaw's adjustment was paralleled by the
outcome of takeover or failure in the administration of other minor
sellers.
TABLE 7.1: CHANGES IN CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION AND PRODUCTION,
SMALL FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY,
AUSTRALIA, 1967-72
Class Firm Event Locations CorporateAffected Impact Date
Small Allis Chalmers Cessation of Newcastle Major 1968
tractor machinery (N.S.W.)
production
Case Cessation of Murray Bridge Minor 1970
machinery (S.A.)
production
Thiess Cessation of Sydney Major 1970-72
Equipment machinery
Distributors importing and
assembly
Small Horwood Cessation of Melbourne/ Major 1971
implement Bagshaw machinery Adelaide
production,
centralisa-
tion
Ralph McKay Product-line Melbourne/ Minor 1970-71
manufacturing Adelaide
shifts
David Shearer Insolvency; Mannum (S.A.) Major 1972
acquisition
by Horwood
Bagshaw
Source: Unpublished internal documents and interviews, sample firms; various
press clippings supplied by the Tractor and Machinery Association of
Australia, Melbourne.
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Takeover and failure
Though the only takeover between small enterprises -- David Brown
by Case inmid-1972 3 -- followed expansion among huge international
parent conglomerates not even directly concerned with the agricultural
machinery industry, the consequences bear comparison to those of the
Chamberlain-John Deere merger mentioned before. In contrast to
Chamberlain's immediate divestiture of facilities, Case retained all its
acquisitions including several highly-competitive retail stores. These
new outlets were used for machinery marketing while Case, enjoying
improved sales conditions of 1973 and a fortified internal situation,
deployed its own offices to handle buoyant industrial ranges. The
dissimilarity of the two results shows the importance of demand,
environmental and intra-firm factors in shaping spatial policy-making
in corporate management, as presupposed in Stern's (1966: 13)
distribution planning model (cf. Chapter One) .
Three failures also abetted significant development in the physical
arrangement of short-line suppliers. The first, arising from David
Shearer's announcement of insolvency in August 1972 (The Advertiser
[Adelaide], 9 August 1972), caused a situation resembling takeover.
Horwood Bagshaw purchased the company's assets and converted the Mannum
(South Australia) factory into a division of its own organisation (see
Appendix Three). Wholesale branches were likewise incorporated or sold
during 1973, demonstrating some extended implications of the contraction.
The transaction reflected not only the widespread financial movements
characterising the agricultural equipment industry between 1967 and
1972, but also the recession's removal of excess supply capacity. The
exit of two other enterprises accentuated this role. Allis Chalmers
ceased importing in 1969, leading to the closure of its Newcastle (New
South Wales) warehouse. Domestic manufacturing was simultaneously
4phased out at a nearby factory. Financially-disarrayed Thiess
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Equipment Distributors similarly disposed of all its inventory by
mid-1972 5 in an intense programme of heavily-discounted sales.
Sydney assembly space reverted to its parent body and interstate
branches were shut down.
The three competitors which terminated their machinery interests
had among the smallest turnovers in their respective classes and had
all suffered acute losses with subsequent deterioration of liquidity
6
early in the downturn. They were hampered by product line difficulties
which frequently predetermined an emphasis on the most depressed
7
sub-markets and their positional power was low. Hence, the
preconditions and incidence of withdrawal from the farm machinery
industry appear to reinforce the claims of the main hypothesis. While
failure and the pressures of the slump brought turbulence to the
highest channel levels of small suppliers, a diversity of behaviour
suggests that corresponding conditions prevailed elsewhere in their
distribution.
WHOLESALE REPRESENTATION
Wholesale representation policy varied distinctly between tractor and
implement companies throughout the study era. Networks of the former
remained essentially static or collapsed into forms of forward
integration involving direct and bulk selling. By contrast, their
implement counterparts displayed several different reactions
rationalisation and restructuring for sounder members, stability or
retraction for the smaller or weaker competitors. In this arena,
inter-class comparisons provide the best approach for assessing the
structural position.
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Tractor firms: stability and retraction
Sales volumes of all short-line manufacturers were generally
insufficient to warrant the extensive corporate facilities of large
organisations. For example, in 1967-68, only two of the tractor
concerns controlled wholesaling in more than two States and a reliance
on independent middlemen was most common (Table 7.2). It restricted
the choice of action open to management from the outset (cf. Little,
1970: 34); distilled by the relative size of machinery operations,
longevity and financial status, such dependence produced stability and
retraction (Table 7 . .3).
Three competitors, enjoying equipment revenue comparable with
most small enterprises but significant penetration in their respective
specialities, avoided change. They entered the recession in an average
to favourable economic situation, evincing healthy accounts, weighty
overseas backing, or wide interests in fields unaffected by decline.
The only significant alterations were Case's takeover from a non-aligned
agency in Western Australia and Howard Rotovator's entry into and
subsequent retreat from company marketing in Victoria between 1968 and
1971 (Table 7.3).
Retraction was employed by a second group of four tractor firms
which, despite their sizeable total standing, were of limited
importance as equipment producers. For each one, annual penetration
in any year between 1967 and 1972 was less than three per cent and
other machinery lines were, similarly, of minor note. Since
agricultural ranges were peripheral to their corporate thrust,
distribution was frequently conducted in an autonomous fashion by a
small division using its own facilities or those of outside agencies.
Application of economic power in the form of greater investment could
almost certainly have negated many of these networks' disabilities but,
in three out of four concerns, liquidity was tight and aggregate
TABLE 7.2: WHOLESALE REPRESENTATION, SMALL TRACTOR FIRMS,
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967-68
Wholesale Distribution Facilities within States
Firm Company Independent Total Australian
branches distributors facilities
Allis Chalmers 1 1 2
Australian Motor 1 5 6
Industries
Case 3 2 5
Fiat 2 4 6
Howard Rotovator 2 4 6
Leyland 2 3 5
Thiess Equipment 4 1 5
Distributors
Source: Unpublished internal documents and interviews, sample firms; and Power
Farming, Technical Ai1nual 1967-68, [25th ed.l, The Sydney and Melbourne
Publishing Co. Pty Ltd, Sydney, 1967, pp. 11-12.
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8profitability low. During the interval under consideration, returns
on tractors varied from break-even to cascading losses and so
executives were eager to cut costs, concentrate on other lines and
curtail deficits. Retraction was therefore associated with either
forward integration or termination of representation (Table 7.3).
Different styles of integration were achieved by the important
vehicle corporations with limited exposure in the equipment industry.
Leyland amalgamated its tractor supply with that of trucks and buses
to eliminate two state distributors which could no longer be supported;
Australian Motor Industries was forced to supplant its formal state-
based wholesaling arrangements with regional assembler/distributors,
leaving itself primarily a low-stocked importer/concessionaire.
Terminal retraction, by comparison, saw two smaller, weaker enterprises
close down various branches prior to quitting the machinery trade.
Both negotiated huge bulk sales to former dealers who afterwards
assumed direct importation of the respective brands (cf. Table 7.4).
Allis Chalmers, never a major contestant in Australia, had gradually
downgraded its operations over the late 1960s but the collapse of
Thiess Equipment Distributors signified the most serious instance of
decay over the recession.
The implications of retraction vis-a-vis those of stability were
clearly observable in ancillary facets of wholesale action. As formal
supply organisation foundered, adherents of the former policies had
to abandon set product forwarding boundaries over southeastern
Australia and, consequently, often bore uneconomical transport costs
through continuing freight absorption or inflated discount margins.
Further, in contrast to stable producers, the four enterprises
dispensed with defined representatives' territories and either employed
roving staff at higher expense or sent factory personnel on service
calls on an ad hoc basis. All these changes reflected a breakdown in
TABLE 7.4: UNIT MACHINERY SALES BY MARKETING MODE,
SMALL RETRACTING FIRM, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY
INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1968-71
(Percentages)
Year
Market
1968 1969 1970 1971
Franchised dealers a 97 81 82 68
(Australia)
Direct sales 3 19 18 8
Bulk sales - - - 24
Total sales 100 100 100 100
a If 'agents' who did not sign franchise agreements had been segregated
from this category, percentage sales of 'franchised'dealers would
have shown an even greater decline.
Source: Unpublished sales accounts, sample firm, 1968-71.
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the cheap, co-operative arrangements outlined by the printed 1967
franchise contracts.
As a group, tractor suppliers lacked the turnover or general
economic and positional power to apply definitive, cost-cutting
strategies such as rationalisation. Their stability might have
averted risk but was probably also an expensive option. The experience
o£ marginal participants, however, became the most critical issue in
differentiating wholesale administration potentialities across the
entire company size spectrum. It pointed up that risks of outlet
atrophy, loss of functional independence, and downgrading of coverage
were imminent within the machinery industry over the crisis
they were sometimes obfuscated in the complexities of divergent
even if
business backgrounds and resulting actions, as was the case among the
other class of small merchandisers.
Implement firms: a varied response
Longevity had assisted implement businesses to attain a greater
complement of company branches than the tractor sample by the start of
the downturn (Table 7.5). The majority ran depots in all three
southeastern states and only one had not yet expanded nationwide.
Relatively ,high levels of exposure, combined with functional
specialisation, stimulated a significant amount of spatial readjustment
in policies of rationalisation, reorientation, stability and forward
integration (Table 7.6).
(i) Rationalisation adopted by three contestants ranged from the
closure of Adelaide and Sydney branches by New Holland in
1970 to the deletion of a s~sidiary distributor by
Melbourne-based Ralph McKay .
(ii) ReorientationlO , undertaken by two South Australian firms,
involved downgrading or elimination of Victorian
representation, offset by expansion of corporate facilities
into Western Australia.
TABLE 7. 5 : WHOLESALE REPRESENTATION, SMALL IMPLEMENT FIRMS,
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967
Wholesale Distribution Facilities within States
Firm Company Independent Total Australian
branches distributors facilities
Alfarm Distributors 2 - 2
Connor Shea 2 4 6
Horwood Bagshaw 5 I 6
Ralph McKay 3 2 5
Mobilco 3 3 6
New Holland 5 1 6
David Shearer 2 4 6
John Shearer 4 2 6
Source: Unpublished internal documents and interviews, sample firms.
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(iii) stability was founded on extensive use of independent
distributors and incorporated only minor alterations to
wholesale coverage.
(iv) Forward integration was forced upon one of the smallest
suppliers in the total sample by inadequate sales volumes
and the unwillingness of dealers to accept the risk of
high-value harvesting iines.
Several undercurrents, therefore, characterise the approach of the
implement set. Larger and more viable members accepted the
competitive uncertainties of rationalisation, whereas smaller ones
remained stable or were pressed into a retractive forward integration.
positional power increased the flexibility of Adelaide and, especially,
Melbourne merchants. High degrees of corporate coverage prompted
locational change for asset realisation and cost reduction, as
evinced in the examples of Horwood Bagshaw, John Shearer and Mobilco.
Despite a contrast in the implement sample's range of strategies as
opposed to the relatively homogeneous behaviour of tractor producers,
the wholesale action of all short-line companies corresponds with
a major structural dimension.
Evaluation of wholesale representation
From the outset, economic standing appeared a chief factor in
prescribing the choice of tactics in the small sector. Rationalisation
characterised robust marketers with higher machinery sales volumes;
the gradation through stability to retraction related to decreasing
equipment volume and a deteriorating corporate trading situation.
A spectrum of decay was also mirrored in allied activity such as the
definition of product supply boundaries. The effects of different
courses on control potentialities were exemplified in the cleft between
the experiences of rationalising and retracting enterprises. The
former were able to enjoy cost reductions but still maintain their
distribution arrangement along 1967 lines; contraction of outlets
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among the latter eventually necessitated expensive forms of direct
intervention and promoted withdrawal. In sum, the situation provides
tangible support for the relationship of economic power, channel
authority capacities and spatial conduct proposed in the central
hypothesis. Evidence from the next channel level seconds this
viewpoint.
RETAIL REPRESENTATION
The prominence of between and within-group variations in small
suppliers' wholesaling was repeated at retail. Here, from this study's
stance, problems of heterogeneity were compounded by inadequacies of
the available records. For instance, primary trade debtor analysis
was sometimes necessary to complete a set of annual sales statistics
by dealer point and scrutiny of invoices was even required on occasions.
Often, disjointed marketing information could not be related
satisfactorily to other accounts. Although such shortcomings,
exacerbated by losses, discontinuation of series and personnel
retrenchments, somewhat limit the following enquiry, minor tractor and
implement sellers' strategies and franchise movement emerge with
sufficient clarity to allow comparison with those of bigger enterprises
in Chapter Eight.
Retail strategies of tractor firms
Widely differing patterns of retail coverage obtained among
tractor concerns in 1967. The three more sizeable participants had
predominantly active networks, consisting either of a restricted
number of outlets localised by product applicability (Case) or a greater
population spread throughout mixed-farming regions (Fiat and Howard
Rotovator). By comparison, the structures of the remaining companies
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included a significant complement of non-effective franchisees ll . For
the two vehicle builders, a few specialists were greatly outnumbered
by automobile vendees little interested in tractor sales or service.
similarly, the sales organisation of Thiess Equipment Distributors
was inflated by many old, inert resellers taken over in 1967-68. The
bearing of all four marginal franchisors was distinctly weighted to
the state of head-office location.
Differences in the initial constitution of dealerships thus
presupposed varying courses for the two groups (Table 7.7). StabiZity~
the keynote of policy among the first subset, was maintained through
such techniques as expanded retail margins and credit, selected use
of consignment stock, infusions of managerial acumen and a relaxation
of franchise provisions. Compared to the 'stability' of principal
machinery corporations, it involved the option of Zow maintenance and
a far greater influx of additions to keep organisations at original
strength. Despite the costliness of incessant turnover and high
failure rates, participants successfully controlled their operations
along 1967 lines such that no fundamental distribution changes were
necessitated. The spatial dynamics of the policy are portrayed by
a case study in Figure 7.1. Similar numbers of market-induced and
entrepreneurial cancellations were widely scattered throughout
southe'astern Australia with a slight concentration in cereal-growing
areas. Deletion outweighted replacement but was balanced by an energetic
search for new appointees, focused on coastal and tablelands districts.
Hence, the selected vendor apparently diversified geographically away
from areas worst affected by the rural problems.
Unwillingness to invest more heavily in machinery left the marginal
tractor producers without the means to exercise effective control among
over-large networks and, thus, prompted retraction. The tactic's chief
characteristics were low maintenance, high deletion and failure rates
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and a significant proportion of additions. These agencies, often
unsatisfactory, were acquired by the two new entrants during their
early expansion phases to bolster flagging representation and improve
market share. The terrestrial manifestations of retraction are
depicted in Figure 7.2. The chosen case shows that deletions,
emphasized above all other aspects of franchise movement, were most
prolific in the cereal-growing regions of New South Wales and Victoria.
Though appointments were again directed towards more temperate zones,
many subsequently failed because the franchisor's goods were of
limited application. By 1972, very few dealers were still operative.
Two different orientations were displayed among the retracting
suppliers. For Australian Motor Industries .and Leyland, the object
was to contain and continue machinery marketing whereas Alli$
Chalmers and Thiess Equipment Distributors ultimately discontinued
their participation (Table 7.7). Both avenues, however, frequently
involved the dissolution of formal franchise procedures as dealers
uncommitted to principal brands diversified functionally or shifted
their emphasis to better-known lines of machinery. Retreat from
selective and orderly distribution was accentuated by heavy discounting
and bulk and direct selling, especially among the terminating firms
12
after 1969 . When appended to the costs of servicing largely moribund
agencies, these methods boosted the expense of selling substantially.
Yet, despite the introduction of hybridisations of franchising and
even forms of laissez-faire merchandising, corporate stores were not
contemplated (Table 7.8). Indeed, none of the sampled tractor firms
made strong moves into the field, probably because of the equipment
operation's secondary position and restrictions on capital availability.
For this class of company, the state of dealer forces in 1967,
longevity, the application of economic power and size of farm equipment
turnover appeared central to subsequent network authority. While
o
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TABLE 7.8: CORPORATE RETAIL OUTLET MOVEMENTS, SMALL TRACTOR FIRMS,
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967-72
Acquisitions Disposals
Firm
Location Year Location Year
Allis Chalmers - - - -
Australian Motor Industries - - - -
Case Cairns (Qld) 1967 - -
Moree 1969
- -
(N. S. W.)
Fiat
- - - -
Howard Rotovator Dandenon~ 1968 Dandenon~ 1971
(Vic. ) (Vic. )
Leyland
- - - -
Thiess Equipment
- - - -Distributors
a Combined wholesale/retail facility.
Source: Unpublished internal documents and interviews, sample firms.
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patterns of movement in relation to town size approximated those of
bigger organisations and suggested a common industry trend to the
disadvantage of minor nodes (Table 7.9) 1 certain problems among the
tractor group stand out sharply from those of other competitors. Risks
of inactivity and attrition among retailers were high and, though Case,
Fiat and Howard Rotovator retained the status quo through a programme
of recruitment, the marginal contestants were less successful. In
order to offset massive outlet loss and remain in the market, they were
required to diverge from low-cost franchising into largely-untried,
integrative forms of retailing. The inability of their low-throughput
systems to maintain their original constitution because of raised
entry barriers supports the tenets of the structural argument.
Retail strategies of implement firms
In 1967, every implement firm except one controlled about two
hundred cross or multiple-franchised dealers in southeastern Australia.
These vast networks had been accumulated partly as a function of
longevity, but also as a reaction to the concentrated pressure of
full and long-line suppliers and the dangers of extreme manufacturing
specialisation. While some franchisees were multifunctional and
resilient, many others were weak and rather archaic businesses
ill-equipped to handle the incipient contraction in rural supply
markets. This subject group's retail strategies parallelled the
diversity in their wholesale behaviour and four overriding approaches
may be discerned (Table 7.10). Definitive rationaZisation was
undertaken by the financially-strong New Holland and John Shearer.
Backed by significant penetration in their respective product fields,
they stressed performance criteria and eliminated many marginal or
unstable dealerships over the recession. Again, a retreat from lesser
settlements was evident in the association of franchise movement to the
TABLE 7.9: POPULATION OF RURAL TOWNS EXPERIENCING DEALER CHANGE,
SMALL TRACTOR FIRMSa , AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY,
SOUTHEASTERN AUSTRALIA, 1967-72
Retail Average (1971) Town PopulationFirm State by Type of Dealer Change
strategy Replacement Deletion Addition
Stability Case N.S.W. 13440 12996 13941
Vic. 7693 5790 7883
S.A. 704 - 4426
Fiat N.S.W. 8638 3989 5220
Vic. 11611 3422 3706
S.A. 5390 1853 834
Retraction Allis N.S.W. 11426 3249 4637
Chalmers Vic. 19409 4642 8219
S.A. - - -
Australia.n N.S.W. 25430 6360 7792
Motor Vic. 9048 4657 5693
Industries S.A. - 725 -
Thiess N.S.W. 13830 4740 4519
Equipment Vic. - - 3508
Distri- S.A. - - 17867
butors
a Data. for Howard Rotovator and Leyland unavailable.
182
Sources: (i) Unpublished dealer lists, sample firms.
(it) Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Census
of Population and Housing, 30 June 1971, Field Count Statements
Nos 3, 4, 6; Canberra, 1971. Also, unpublished data on
unbounded localities and bounded localities under two hundred
population supplied by the Australian Bureau of Statistics,
Canberra, January 1974.
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population of supporting urban nodes (Table 7.11). Though deletion
and failure rates were relatively high, few new additions were made
and, by 1972,each firm had reduced its force by an average of twenty-
three per cent (Table 7.10). The spatial implications of active
rationalisation vis-a-vis the large manufacturer's more passive
orientation can be seen by comparing Figures 6.11 and 7.3. The latter
shows the short-line franchisor acting decisively in the Western and
Wimmera Divisions of Victoria and in northern and western areas of
settled South Australia. Elsewhere in the three States, patterns of
change more closely resemble the sporadic repercussions of the less
intensive rationalisation. New appointees were scattered in a rather
random manner to accord with the exigencies of local demand.
Interpretation of several small implement marketers' actions is
complicated by insufficient information for 1967. However, contingent
upon their wholesale moves, two producers appear to have reorganised
their coverage considerably through administrative alterations in
Victoria. David Shearer took over the sales organisation of an
" d" °b 13 h"l 1 h 'h .1ndependent 1str1 utor W 1 e Ra p McKay s sout ern resellers,
"1 bl lb b "d" 14 " " hprev10us y accounta e to a Me ourne su Sl 1ary ,Jo1ned a t ree-
State force run by the Adelaide-based Port Implements Division. Moreover,
company stores established in the late 1960s were closed for reasons
of economy (Table 7.12). Given other franchise movement effected by
these two concerns, it is unlikely that 'reorganisation' greatly varied
15dealer numbers . Each force probably contracted by about ten per cent
between 1967 and 1972. On the other hand, lack of competitive power
and recalcitrant product lines forced David Shearer into a more active
role to counteract its outlets' declining capacity to stock and trade
high-value items. Its participation paralleled that required of
another harvesting equipment seller, Alfarm Distributors.
TABLE 7.11: POPULATION OF RURAL TOWNS EXPERIENCING DEALER CHANGE,
SIv1ALL IMPLEMENT FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY,
SOUTHEASTERN AUSTRALIA, 1967-72
Average (1971) Town Population
Retail Firm State by Type of Dealer ChangeStrategy
Replacement Deletion Addition
Rationalisation New Holland N.S.W. 15262 3079 3121
Vic. 9615 7027 1083
S.A. 4760 634 1208
John Shearer N.S.W. 5337 1156 9465
Vic. 8628 2633 2000
S.A. 1347 601 1473
Reorganisation David N.S.W. 4769 1118 4375
Shearer Vic. 11049 1660 11950
S.A. 1532 508 316
Stability Connor Shea N.S.W. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Vic. 8489 1015 2621
S.A. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Forward Alfarm N.S.W. 17913 3121 8108
integration Distribu- vic. 27088 - 18721
tors S.A. - - -
Sources: As for Tables 6.6 and 7.9.
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'l'ABLE 7 .12 : CORPORATE RETAIL OUTLET MOVEMENTS, SMALL IMPLEMENT FIRMS,
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967-72
Acquisitions Disposals
Firm
Location Year Location Year
Alfarm Toowoomba (Qld) 1970
-
-Distributors
- - -Connor Shea -
Horwood Bagshaw Orange (N.S.W.) 1967 Orange (N.S.W.) 1970
Naracoorte (S.A.) 1967 Albury (N.S.W.) 1970
Maitland (S.A.) n.a.
Ralph McKay Warrnambool (Vic.) 1967 Warrnambool (Vic.) 1970
Ballarat. (Vic.) 1968 Ballarat (Vic. ) 1970
Dandenong (Vic.) 1969 Dandenong (Vic. ) 1970
Mobi1co - - Parramatta (N.S.W. ) 1970
New Holland - - - -
David Shearer - - - -
John Shearer - - Temora (N .S.W.) 1970
a Combined wholesale/retail facility.
Source: Unpublished internal documents and interviews, sample firms.
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By comparison,
188
In the absence of 'hard' data, interviews suggested that stability
prevailed in the representation of Connor Shea, Horwood Bagshaw and
Mobilco. In any event, each still listed over two hundred points
serving southeastern Australia in 1972. In conjunction with its
wholesale rationalisation, Horwood Bagshaw realised on two less-
advantageously positioned stores and confined its corporate coverage
to more immediate markets (Table 7.12). In this company and Connor
Shea, the nature of output probably determined a slight decrease in
dealer numbers and a degree of forward integration16
Mobilco's involvement in lower-value ranges largely unaffected by the
setback facilitated control and the acquisition of new retailers.
Finally, the concentration and forwapd integration practised by
Alfarm Distributors saw sales of the larger and more viable resellers
supplemented by direct retailing, while a restricted number of well-
established small agents continued to act in a service and spotter
capacity. Like other minor makers, the company reduced its area of
operations and provided more assistance to franchisees. This
constrained and highly-mobile form of marketing, backed by fluid
franchise policy and experience as a machinery dealership at Albury
(New South Wales), appeared somewhat more successful than formulae
which involved extensive sales organisations used by other members of
17
the lower size echelons .
Against the background of the structural hypothesis, small
implement houses lack the clear differentiation lent to the tractor
sample by the criterion of atrophy. Yet, a dimension relating to the
prominence of forward integration permeates their various strategies.
Larger and economically more powerful organisations such as New Holland
and John Shearer enforced distinctive actions and retained their
wholesale role. Others, especially those selling expensive equipment
189
involving great risk to dealers, became directly concerned with the
uncertainties of retailing.
Evaluation of retail representation
An overview of the various policies of short-line merchandisers
is afforded by a comparison of aggregated statistics on franchise
movement (Table 7.13). Among tractor producers, sixty per cent of the
329 dealers existing in 1967 had been disenfranchised by mid-1972
indicating a rather inequitable 40:60 probability of continuation.
In contrast, the 62:38 ratio among their counterparts approximated
that of large businesses. An estimated 132 tractor dealers were
cancelled for lack of performance or other market-based reasons, such
that the recession years exacted a forty per cent failure rate.
Implement suppliers fared somewhat better with a twenty-seven per cent
loss.
During the recession, tractor merchants recorded the high
increment rate of thirty per cent. Although this host of new appointees
boosted their retention to eighty-one per cent, many of the final
complement were only 'nominal' outlets. Indeed, if the withdrawal
of Allis Chalmers and Thiess Equipment Distributors in late 1972 had
been assimilated in these statistics, minor tractor suppliers'
retention would have dropped to sixty-one per cent. The ~oncomitant
erosion o£ network and market control not only points up the negative
implications of retraction and the difficulties faced by marginal
competitors, but also the applicability of the structural hypothesis'
predictions to the retail context.
The combined results of the tractor and implement samples produce
a maintenance rate of fifty-five per cent among small companies'
dealerships. Replacement occurred at fifteen per cent of original foci,
though deletion was twice as prevalent. The total failure rate of
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minor franchisors reached thirty-one per cent but its repercussion on
channel stability was alleviated by a moderate level of additions
fourteen per cent. Thus, by 1972, sales organisations stood at
eighty-three per cent of their initial 1967 strength. Seen against
their respective trends in retail coverage oyer the 1960s, the
seventeen per cent decrease among short-line enterprises indicated
a more striking metamorphosis than the nearly-equivalent fall in the
dealer numbers of large corporations. More detailed comparisons are
employed as indicators of relative co-ordination capacities in the
following Chapter.
~ ~
RESUME
As in franchise policy, the marketing practice of large and small
producers diverged sharply. The most pronounced change in the latter's
administration and man~facturing was the forced exit of three
enterprises. Wholesale policy varied noticeably with a company's size,
stage of specialisation and, to a lesser extent, positional power.
The most crucial consequences of the setback were the collapse of two
networks and the dissolution of formal franchise procedures in several
others. These results highlight the dilemma encountered by the
smallest sellers. In the retail sector, their problems created
sufficient outlet atrophy and loss of authority to necessitate greater
degrees of forward integration. Again, the principles of low-cost
franchising were often relinquished.
Of all the evidence from minor businesses, the decline among
marginal participants offers the most substantial advocacy of the
central hypothesis. Chapter Eight now evaluates the performance of
large and small machinery merchants together to summarise the support
for a relationship between structural power, consequent network control
192
potentialities and spatial policies during a business contraction in the
sampled industry. The discussion broadens to examine the effect of
these factors on market and trading performance as a test of the
financial postulate of the main argument. Next, a solution to the
applied problem concerning the economic and spatial response of
franchising corporations to recession is proposed, finally leading to
generalisations about the processes and parameters of an enterprise's
spatial decision-making.
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CHAPTER SEVEN FOOTNOTES
1. The three small Melbourne equipment manufacturers were Mitchell
and Co. Pty Ltd (West Footscray, 1958), Daniel Harvey Pty Ltd
(Nunawading, 1963), and Baltic Simplex Machinery Co. Ltd (Spotswood,
1964).
2. All Horwood Bagshaw statistics in this paragraph are taken from
Annual Reports, Horwood Bagshaw Ltd, Adelaide, 1970-72.
3. See The Weekly Times [Melbourne], 19 July 1972.
4. The warehouse was located at Bennetts Green, the factory at
Carrington, Newcastle, New South Wales.
5. See The Australian Financial Review, 24 March 1972.
6. See The Australian Financial Review, 23 March 1970; The Advertiser
[Adelaide], 30 September 1970j The Age [Melbourne], 4 November 1970.
7. Given the apparent advantages of a Melbourne location in the farm
equipment industry, all three companies which failed could be considered
peripheral. Certainly, Allis Chalmers' Newcastle (New South Wales)
situation was determined more by engineering than machinery interests.
In South Australia, David Shearer operated from a decentralised
location at Mannum, about eighty kilometres east of Adelaide. With
a headcount of over four hundred, it completely dominated the economic
life of the town, whose population in 1971 Census Field Counts appears
as only 2,036. The company thus faced extraordinary pressures to
maintain its workforce and, finally, governmental intervention was
necessitated. See The News [Adelaide], 19 September 1969, 11 December
1969; The Advertiser [Adelaide], 6 December 1969,10 December 1969,
3 April 1970, 25 November 1970, 5 February 1971; The Murray Valley
Standard [Murray Bridge, South Australia], 25 September 1969, 11 March
1971.
8. See The Age [Melbourne], 4 November 1970; The Australian Financial
Review, 10 August 1971, 19 May 1972 for reference to these claims.
9. Ralph McKay's moves were part of a complete corporate reappraisal
which involved the integration of two newly-acquired and other existing
subsidiaries as company divisions. See The Courier Mail [Brisbane],
14 July 1970; The Advertiser [Adelaide], 30 July 1970; The News
[Adelaide], 30 September 1970. Also, Annual Report 1970, Ralph McKay
Ltd, Melbourne, 1970.
10. Barring the Western Australian moves, reorientation can be
considered almost analagous to rationalisation.
11. The nominal size of retail forces serving small tractor firms in
southeastern Australia in 1967 varied from about thirty to one hundred
and fifty.
12. See The Australian Financial Review, 17 September 1970; The
Weekly Times [Melbourne], 14 July 1971. For an example of Thiess
Equipment Distributors' aggressive, price-oriented advertising, see
The Land [Sydney], 18 February 1971 (p. 42).
13. The Buckeye Harvester Co. of Richmond, Melbourne.
14. Welch Perrin pty Ltd.
15. Because of data inadequacies, it is not possible to portray the
spatial effects of a policy of reorganisation.
16. Lack of 1967 information precludes mapping the pattern of
'stability' among small implement firms.
17. For reasons of confidentiality, the geography of concentration
and forward integration cannot be mapped.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
PRODUCT FRANCHISING UNDER RECESSION: THE STRUCTURAL
DIMENSION IN CORPORATE STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE
This enquiry has contended that company structural attributes
representing two forms of competitive power vary relative channel
authority among selected franchisors. A geographical application of
the argument predicted that large organisations should follow
locational policies which would maintain or augment their existing
franchise management capacities. In an economic sphere, it was
anticipated that they would benefit from greater network control to
secure better market and general accounting results. Support for these
views emerged in the analyses of distribution policies and practices
in Chapters Five to Seven. Now, it is appropriate to advance an
overall assessment of the central hypothesis, the spatial postulate
of which is tested by integrating and comparing foregoing results
from both large and small machinery suppliers. Next, the financial
variant is evaluated with data from the specialist ratio s,amples to
expedite interpretation of the reaction of franchising enterprises to
depressed demand. Conclusions about processes and relationships of
corporate spatial decision-making follow in Part Four.
THE SPATIAL POSTULATE: STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES IN
DISTRIBUTION POLICY AND PRACTICE
Large manufacturers, with higher liquidity and net return ratios,
entered the rural crisis in a slightly more favourable state than most
small counterparts. Although inter-divisional differences in the
constitution of marketing agreements were not pronounced, the
implementation of policy varied. Leading producers' unequivocal
stance on key questions of dealer assistance (involving monetary
196
measures and forward integration) and competing products was matched
by only the soundest small enterprises. Other members of this
division were unable to retain complete control and witnessed the
partial collapse of their sales forces. Such atrophy introduced
hybridisations of franchising or, in more extreme cases, laissez-faire
techniques featuring direct or bulk selling. Although all subject
firms aspired to similar authority in their 1967 contracts, a clear
distinction based on structural features had occurred by 1972. It
paved the way for further divergence in administration and production,
and wholesale and retail strategy.
Central administration and production
The principal difference in the administration and production of
farm equipment merchandisers between 1967 and 1972 lay in the incidence
of failure. Whereas no large organisation closed down, three short-
line participants did. For this trio, deficits in economic and
positional power produced inadequate network control and declines in
market position. Finally, their finances became so strained as to
necessitate withdrawal. Hence, in the manufacturing and management
sector, the impact of the recession was circumscribed in the manner
forecast by the central argument.
Wholesale representation
At the wholesale level, the spatial variant of the hypothesis is
supported by study of the preconditions and outcomes of individual
strategies. In total, five courses -- rationalisation, reorientation,
stability, forward integration and retraction -- were employed by
franchisors in varying economic situations (Table 8.1). Rationalisation
was indeed the approach of the largest. As foreshadowed in Chapter
Seven, a turnover gradient cut through the stable and reorienting
197
TABLE 8.1: WHOLESALE REPRESENTATION STRATEGY BY EQUIPMENT SALES SIZE,
SAMPLE FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967-71
($A million)
Equipment Sales of Participant Firms
Wholesale
strategy
Rationalisation
Stability
Reorientation
Retraction and
forward integrationa
Five-year average
15.71
5.79
3.76
0.96
A . bpproXlmate range
5.00 - 35.00
2.00 - 12.00
2.00 - 5.00
0.50 - 2.00
a For reasons of confidentiality, results from policies of
retraction and forward integration have been combined.
b Generalised for confidentiality.
Source: Unpublished internal documents and interviews, sample firms.
198
enterprises. Retraction was undertaken by only the smallest sellers
-- the ones which, from a marketing viewpoint, could least afford
such action.
Other differentials also characterised the adoption of each
policy. Rationalisation and reorientation, the distinctive and
perhaps riskier options which alone offered prospects of reducing
costs without necessarily sacrificing channel power, were entertained
exclusively by businesses in a more robust income and liquidity
condition at the start of the recession (Table 8.2). Such firms, whose
mean age exceeded that of all others, were probably corporately over-
represented relative to the rest of the industry and needed to reduce
their exposure. Thus, they drew on the positional advantages afforded
by a Melbourne or Adelaide head-office location to withdraw
strategically-redundant facilities (Table 8.3). Well-established
dealer networks permitted continued high-level distribution control so
that, by the end of the crisis, rationalising corporations still
enjoyed their foremost status on key economic measures (Table 8.2).
In any event, no participants reverted to old patterns after 1972 --
partly because they had pre-empted long-term supply movements in the
equipment trade. Such results contrasted with those attending marginal
producers' retraction. As shown in Table 8.2, the course conferred
little financial incentive or advancement to its users. It was
associated with significant loss of penetration, the use of costly
marketing alternatives and intensification of existing retail problems.
Moreover, retraction was perceived as an unsatisfactory and temporary
step to be rectified when conditions allowed. In two instances,
however, it instead heralded an exit from the industry.
Despite complications arising from data inadequacies and often-
intangible expenses and benefits, the ramifications of alternative
wholesale strategies correspond substantially with prior spatial
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TABLE 8.3: WHOLESALE REPRESENTATION STRATEGY BY LONGEVITY
AND HEAD-OFFICE LOCATION, SAMPLE FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL
MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967-72
Wholesale Head-office Location Average (1967)Irotal Age of Partici-Strategy Sydney Melbourne Adelaide Perth Other pant Firms (year
Reorientation - - 2 - - 2 90
Rationalisation - 5 1 - - 6 65
Stability 3 2 - 1 - 6 27
Forward - - - - 1 1 12
integration
Retraction 3 1 - - - 4 10
Total 6 8 3 1 1 19 41(or average)
--,--_.- --f.--..
Source: Unpublished internal documents and int.erviews, sample firms.
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predictions. Although no policies averted economic contraction,
large firms' attempts to maintain coverage and avoid forward
integration without undue cost penalty upheld initial advantages and
probably optimised the economics of network control under the
circumstances (cf. Table 8.2). Further evidence that their structural
background assisted better channel management through geographical
representation tactics is found in the retail sector. Here, the
hypothesis may be tested by reviewing various approaches' precursors
and repercussions and by comparing consequent franchise movement between
both groups of vendors.
Retail representation
Although many companies apparently adopted a unified locational
policy in marketing, the hegemony of factors prescribing wholesale
activity did not necessarily apply in the retail area (Table 8.4).
Rather, economic conditi~n, size of machinery turnover, functional
specialisation and extent of dealer forces appeared primary determinants
of a producer's choice among five distribution solutions --
rationalisation, reorganisation, stability, retraction and forward
integration. Rationalising merchants were all specialised and recorded
substantial equipment volumes through extensive market coverage. In
1967 they exhibited healthy finances and retained their primacy during
the recession (Table 8.5). Their stand emphasized the elimination of
marginal outlets as a cost-saving measure and, since it attracted only
moderate maintenance and failure rates, significant channel control
was still feasible.
The situation of rationalising companies contrasted with
difficulties experienced by most small organisations but accentuated
among retracting producers. From the outset, members of this set had
limited machinery interests and little jurisdiction in their outlets'
TABLE 8.4: WHOLESALE AND RErrAIL REPRESENTATION STRArrEGY,
SAMPLE FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY,
AUSTRALIA, 1967-72
(Number of firms)
202
Retail Strategya
Wholesale Total
Strategy Rationalisation Reorganisation stability Retraction Forwardintegration
Rationalisation 2 1 2 - - Sb
Reorientation 1 1 - - - 2
Stability 1 - 5 - - 6
Retraction
- - -
4 - 4
Forward - - - - 1 1
integration
Total 4 2 7 4 1 lSb
a Southeastern Australia only.
b Retail data for one firm inaccessible.
Source: Unpublished internal documents and interviews, sample firms.
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management. Often, they found supplementary lines monopolising
retailers' working capital or excluding their stock from the floor.
The restricted penetration, scattered product populations and coverage
prescribed by recent market entry hampered publicity efforts and
dissipated farmers' confidence; heavy advertising and price
discounting became the only solution to the dilemma. Finance companies
were wary of extending consumer credit on equipment considered high-
risk. Further, since established brand loyalties determined pro·d~ct
choice in about seventy per cent of sales, the chances of breaking the
vicious circle without massive investment were slight (Wadley, 1970:
144). As in wholesaling, marginal suppliers were beset with the
breakdown of formal franchising and network atrophy. In some instances,
the need for bulk and direct selling added further expense to that
connected with servicing largely-inactive dealer forces; inability to
attain satisfactory ongoing marketing arrangements finally contributed
to the withdrawal of two retracting participants. Seen in aggregate,
the preconditions and outcomes of different retail planning thus lend
more weight to the structural claims on the relationship of economic
and positional power, channel authority capacities, and spatial
behaviour.
Subject companies' franchise movement over the rural crisis is
amalgamated in Table 8.6. Assuming that the data is derived from
a random sample, inter-divisional variation in change rates can be
dissected through a large-sample proportion-testing technique based on
the standard normal distribution (Freund, 1967: 285-87).
(i) The maintenance rate of major firms was significantly higher
(p <0.001) than that of small competitors. Between 1967 and
1972, the former were able to offer dealers a 68:32
probability of continuation, whereas short-line franchisors
could only promote a 55:45 ratio.
(ii) The replacement rate of both groups showed no significant
difference.
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(iii) The deletion rate of leading corporations, significantly
lower (p <0.001) than that of their opposition, was a major
contributor to the disparity in maintenance levels.
(iv) The addition rate of large producers, who were able to
maintain their networks principally by replacement,
significantly underscored (p <0.001) that of their
counterparts who were forced to seek more distantly for
retailers in new locations.
(v) The retention rate of the two samples did not vary
significantly.
The parity of the retention rates necessitates analysis of other
measures to evaluate whether large producers in fact demonstrated
the firmer channel management capacity. Indeed, their high
maintenance teamed with low replacement, deletion and addition
contrasted prominently with the low maintenance and replacement and
high deletion and addition of smaller competitors. Restricted
replacement and addition suggests that the retail control among the
former was not seriously impaired over the recession. Conversely, the
preservation of minor sellers' forces apparently needed substantial
effort. Their concentration on new appointments reflected not only
the difficulties of retaining existing sales organisations but also
a dispersion of goodwill and external economies; they probably faced
greater uncertainty than their large counterparts. Compared with
replacement, additions characterised less populous towns throughout
southeastern Australia, implying that sundry pressures were gradually
forcing the short-line manufacturer from primary entrepots (Tables 6.6
and 7.11). In view of many villages' and hamlets' blight during the
crisis and centrifugal tendencies in the rural economy, the
ramifications of this displacement were important in both the short and
long-term.
Failure rates command special attention as indicators of
distribution control capacity. Small producers' market-induced
cancellation was easily the greater; low sales volumes, untried goods
207
or newly-introduced ranges left their dealers without the service
and parts market critical to viability in a depressed sales period.
For little-known franchises, outside commercial wholesale finance l
and services offered by leading machinery companies such as floor-
planning, staff training, goodwill, national advertising and buy-back
protection on faulty parts ordering were frequently unavailable and
so minor firms' retailers more commonly succumbed to high degrees of
competitive exposure. In essence, the nature of retail strategy and
franchise movement endorses the structural viewpoint concerning the
effects of franchisors' relative channel capacities on distribution.
Evaluation of the spatial postulate
Both policy and practical facets of marketing in the Australian
agricultural machinery industry over the recession indicate principal
sellers' anticipated primacy in network control. From the outset,
they stood more firmly on their established marketing agreements and,
in both wholesaling and retailing, were able to employ geographical
policies which cut costs while still maintaining adequate authority.
The financially-stronger small companies were similarly favoured but,
in contrast, marginal machinery suppliers saw their sales forces
recoil under demand declines. Their Iocational strategy was frequently
determined by necessity, atrophy was common and in some cases
contributed to failure. The disparity points up the applicability of
the spatial postulate to the chosen context. Following sections now
question whether major firms' more comprehensive distribution
management and their representation action should have assisted better
market and financial performance as predicted in Chapter Two. This
enquiry permits a thorough review of the structural hypothesis'
contribution to an understanding of business behaviour in a depressed
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franchise system and expedites conclusions about corporate decision-
making in Chapter Nine.
THE FINANCIAL POSTULATE: MARKET AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
An assessment of machinery producers' competitive standing is hampered
by data limitations. As sales penetration information is elusive,
turnover figures are used to gauge market status (cf. Bernasek and
Kubinski, 1963: 480). At best, they approximate a vendor's relative
position over time; thus, three measures -- farm equipment and
aggregate corporate dollar volumes, and extent of functional
diversification -- are examined to improve the analysis' accuracy.
Relevant economic parameters represent income relationships and short-
term operating condition, as expressed in liquidity. Profit and loss
account and balance sheet ratios are again employed.
Sales performance estimate of market control
During the rural setback, large and small suppliers' net machinery
2
sales declined in roughly equivalent proportion (Table 8.7) • Both
groups were equally depressed until the 1969-70 collapse in which the
former's turnover fell more heavily. Subsequently, it recovered
faster than that of short-line manufaeturers· who experi.enced another
reversal in 1971. However, equipment's importance to the two divisions
varied considerably since large organisations were less dependent on
machinery as a source of revenue. In 1967, it accounted for fifty-one
per cent and, by 1971, only forty-two per cent of their total turnover
(Table 8.7). In contrast, the small corporation's concentration
retreated from seventy-nine to, still, seventy-one per cent over the
same period. The continuing emphasis on depressed lines deflated its
overall sales and profit performance.
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The advantages of size and conglomerate status in combating
moribund markets were strikingly apparent on the corporate plane. The
aggregate volume of larger enterprises with limited machinery
interests (such as the vehicle builders) scarcely betrayed any adverse
effects of the downturn (Table 8.7). Major equipment producers and
their opposition suffered similar contraction in 1970; whereas the
former recovered a year later, the latter underwent a further reversal.
As a result, their average 1967-71 index lags behind that of the
" · 1 f" 3prlnclpa lrms.
With respect to the relationship of network and market control,
present results are optimistic but inconclusive. Further testing is
required with penetration data for key product groups between 1967 and
1973; even the addition of 1972-73 sales statistics would allow
a more satisfactory evaluation. On the other hand, the above
information highlights the importance of corporate stature and
diversification in dealing with localised demand declines. Coming
investigation of financial performance offers further support to the
large organisation's implicit resilience.
Financial performance: profitability
standardised corporate net income figures reveal that small
merchandisers suffered scattered losses between 1967 and 1969 (Table
8.8). After 1970, the majority joined two large producers,
Chamberlain and Massey Ferguson, in heavy deficits. Such unsatisfactory
returns, the first since inception for many companies, arose from
excess competition in the agricultural equipment industry which
promoted lower accommodation of overheads. In 1971, improved revenue
assisted major suppliers to a marginal improvement while their
counterparts descended further into depression.
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Inter-firm comparisons can be pursued better through consideration
of the net margin (net profit after tax/consolidated net sales) and the
net return on equity (net profit after tax/shareholders' funds and
reserves). Both show a similar interrelationship among specialist
machinery sellers and total Australian manufacturing (Table 8.9).
From 1966-67 to 1970-71, the net margin of the nation's secondary
sector averaged 4.34 per cent. By comparison, the large equipment
supplier recorded a 0.60 per cent return and his opposition -0.30 per
cent. The performance of leading businesses was assisted by an upturn
in 1971 whereas, in the same year, the minor companies slipped again.
This inequality in recovery rates, also reflected in the net return on
equity, provides a key distinction between the divisions (Table 8.9).
Yet, although these profitability figures appear to uphold the
structural predictions, the major company's income record did not
necessarily extend to its economic condition.
Financial condition
Principal suppliers, with a mean 1967-71 current ratio of 2.39,
manifested more satisfactory' gross liquidity than small contestants
over the rural setback, but their initially-high working capital
diminished after 1970 because of heavy overheads (Table 8.l0):
we had a commitment on production -- for one, to
keep the factory open, for two, if we didn't
produce the goods into a finished unit ..•we'd
have the same amount of collateral in unfinished
units, so all we really did was increase our
investment, in man-hours labour (large Melbourne
supplier~ 12 July 1972).
Extensive manufacturing obligations, combined with the stock
accumulation of 1968-69 (cf. Table 3.8), created an inventory imbalance
within current assets. Additionally, the ramifications of the large
group's long-term trading goals introduced an element of hesitancy into
supply management during 1969-70:
TABLE 8.9: NET PROFITABILITY, SPECIALIST RATIO SAMPLES,
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AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY AND AGGREGATE
MANUFACTURING, AUSTRALIA, 1967-71
Per Cent Net Profit After Tax Over:
Consolidated net sales Shareholders' funds and reserves
Company (net margin on sales) (net return on net worth)
Financial Aggregate Machinery firms Aggregate Machinery firmsYears Australian Australian
manufacturing Large Small manufacturing Large Small
1967 4.00 5.00 5.50 7.00 13.50 14.50
1968 4.20 4.50 3.62 7.70 14.00 7.00
1969 4.70 2.00 3.38 9.50 6.00 6.55
1970 4.50 -7.50 -6.50 9.60 -16.00 -7.67
1971 4.30 -1.00 -7.50 9.60 -2.00 -10.67
Average 4.34 0.60 -0.30 8.68 3.10 1.94
1967-71
Source: Annual accounts and unpublished internal documents, agricultural
machinery industry ratio sample, and Australia ~ariff Boar~ (1972: 14).
TABLE 8.10: FINANCIAL CONDITION, SELECTED MEASURES o
SPECIALIST PATIO SAMPLES, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY,
AUSTRALIA, 1967-71
...-._--
Liquidity Measures
1---
Company Current ratio Quick ratioFin(incial
Years Large firms Small firms firms Small firmsLarge
._.._"
---
1967 2.48 2.05 0.76 0.76
1968 2.52 1.98 0.57 0.65
1969 2.52 2.05 0.71 0.85
1970 2.45 1.97 0.34 0.51
1971 2.00 2.16 0.65 0.63
..
Average 1967-71 2.39 2.04 0.61 0.68
Source: Annual accounts and unpublished internal documents, agricultural
machinery industry ratio sample.
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by April 1969 ••. [we] suggested we should be
cutting all our forecasts by about sixty per
cent... unfortunately, this wasn't executed
until about November/December of that year.
And, in the next year ..• forecast levels were
set around an industry level of fifteen
thousand tractors and weren't reduced until
March 1970 to more or less ten thousand units
(large Melbourne suppZier~ 8 May 1972).
By mid-1970, hedging behaviour and an almost universal excess
· d· d·· 4capaclty perpetrate an ln ustry crlS1S the inventory/consolidated
net sales ratio of large and small producers was seventy-one and
fifty per cent respectively, compared with twenty per cent for
5
aggregate manufacturing (Australia [Tariff Board], 1972: 14) . Amidst
6
significant balance sheet movements in the large sector , one company
appealed to its dealers to deliver additional machines and make
settlements within thirty days to ease:
[a] liquidity problem [whichl has developed
because of the high inventories, both with us
and on a floor plan basis with dealers and
distributors, plus inventories of parts to
build machines that we know will not be used
for some time. Our liquidity is also greatly
affected as cash collections planned for this
year have not been forthcoming (confidential
letter to dealers~ large supplier~ source
suppressed~ 27 July 1970).
Such acute stock difficulties found expression in the quick ratio,
which excludes frozen short-term assets and compares cash equivalents
against current liabilities (Graham et al, 1962: 219 [fn. 11]). In
1970, large manufacturers' quotient fell to 0.34 as opposed to 0.51
elsewhere in the industry: it reduced their average 1967-71 quick
liquidity slightly below that of short-line counterparts. This acid
test of financial well-being therefore points strongly to advantages
of flexibility accruing from the minor operation. It also suggests
that large merchandisers traded hard to achieve their market objectives
and, in the short-term, sacrificed some internal strength. Such
circumstances crystallise the rationale of their wholesale and retail
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policies: spatial strategy was substituted to improve finances and
became a powerful device in achieving corporate aims.
Evaluation of the financial postulate
The available evidence from machinery firms can afford limited
backing to the structural argument. The relationship of network and
market control appears viable but is clouded by data shortcomings.
While net income statistics seem at first to correlate business size
with profitability, an incongruence to previous findings demands more
intensive review (cf. Sheridan, 1974: 46-50). Any move to include
measures of financial condition further weakens the postulate, since
its monistic assumptions cannot necessarily encompass broader
performance with success. Specifically, it downgrades the role of
non-distribution factors in the marketing mix and the contributions of
other company functions to the final accounts. Nonetheless, the present
brief enquiry usefully demonstrates the stability of the large
enterprise, an outcome with notable geographic implications incorporated
below in the overall solution to the applied problem.
A SOLUTION TO THE APPLIED PROBLEM
As a way of highlighting broader aspects of corporate behaviour, this
study grappled with the problem of identifying and assessing the
economic and spatial response of product franchisors to depressed
demand. The rural recession modified the distribution policy and
practice of the sample in three ways:
(a) revision of objectives to accommodate rapid market shifts and
increased prospects of failure;
(b) more pronounced goal-orientation, which frequently invoked
the substitution of spatial and non-spatial courses;
(c) the introduction of economising actions, a policy which
completely revised existing physical patterns.
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The enquiry posited a link among company structural attributes,
expressed in the intervening variable of channel authority, locational
tactics and business fortune., As anticipated, the inten$ity and
direction of the above changes varied with the type of organisation.
Economic power (evident in a firm's size, financial resources,
diversification and longevity) and positional influence (determined
by the siting of head-offices and the" extent of, contemporary distribution
f'acilities) acted through the' franchise code and representation strategy
to modify the downturn's impact. Thus, in aggregate terms, sizeable
conglomerates were the least affected, followed by large and then small
7
specialist machinery producers. In the equipment market, major
undertakings' advantages were "reflected in their resilience, an abili ty
to retract market coverage without significant loss of control (and,
probably, penetration), higher dealer continuation rates, maintenance
of existing retail locations and avoidance of network atrophy.
Despite these concordant findings, the supposed association of
firm characteristics with market and financial results can be accepted
only wi th limita tions . While the incidence of wi thdrawal from the
industry and the nature of much competitive distribution activity
accords with the hypothesized situation, the relative success of
different systems is not sufficiently explained. On the other hand,
the spatial argument seems highly relevant since it accurately accounts
for the response of suppliers exhibiting varying commercial statures.
Thus, the presumed interaction of firm factors, franchise management,
and geographical policies can be sustained and, with more precise
information, could probably be amplified to cover the parameters of
market control and economic performance. This solution to the applied
problem and qualified acceptance of the structural position can be
pursued at two levels -- in relation to farm machinery producers and
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product franchising -- as a prelude to specific comments about corporate
decision-making in Chapter Nine.
Agricultural machinery franchisors
Although the 1967-72 setback furthered many prevailing patterns
of the 1960s, it formed a distinct historical phase in the selected
industry. It whittled away marginality and chronic excess capacity.
A wave of failure and amalgamation lifted entry barriers, altered
competitive relationships in the closely-knit oligopoly, and
necessitated extension of product lines to assist the acquisition and
maintenance of sales forces 8 (cf. Bernasek and Kubinski, 1963: 476).
At the wholesale level, the decline encouraged rationalisation and
asset realisation through a rise in the thresholds of branch operation.
Expansion of corporate regions weakened adherence to political
boundaries and furthered a national orientation among primary members of
the equipment trade. In future, the reduction in outlets necessary to
serve a market demanding fewer machines of greater unit value could
allow smaller competitors to dispense with some independent
distributors and assume Australia-wide integrated marketing (cf. Barber,
1971: 76). In this respect, the rural crisis demonstrated to
machinery corporations the benefits of a Perth-Melbourne-Brisbane depot
pattern; they could also be acknowledged by other suppliers dealing
chiefly with non-metropolitan demand.
Further significant change appeared in the retail area. Raised
requirements for effective outlet operation again supported
rationalisation policies in the removal of marginal facilities and
concentration on fewer, bigger dealers centred in major towns (cf.
Tables 6.6 and 7.9). Such a move merely particularised the recession's
impact within the urban hierarchy -- it hastened centrifugal tendencies
in the country economy and beleaguered the less populous nodes. The
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trend could perpetuate many franchisors' long-standing difficulties
in finding suitable representation and thereby encourage corporate
distribution through retail stores. Although it accounted for up to
ten per cent of some machinery suppliers' turnover between 1967 and
1972, this mode was generally avoided because of cost and risk
disincentives. Yet, future company establishments could conceivably
prove a more attractive investment through horizontal expa~sion beyond
the sponsoring manufacturer's range. A move of this type would accord
with a related and widely-anticipated development fostered by the
recession's attack on brand exclusivity -- the American-style farm
supply supermarket. These facilities, which stress merchandising
technique and a greater segregation of the sales and service function,
could be used constructively to promote one line of goods backed up by
associated products but, among consortia of short-line business, they
are likely to advance cross-franchising.
Essentially, a lack of differentiation at the sales point would
represent a more Zaissez-faire form of marketing than the industry
9presently welcomes. The escalation of retail barriers prescribed by
a smaller number of cross-franchised outlets would upgrade the
influence of positional power and revise current channel relationships
in favour of dealers. Franchisors might be required to undertake
greater forward integration in their services and in the placement of
corporate stores to serve areas of inadequate penetration. Yet, since
this possibility could be averted through merger or different
representation policies, protracted discussion is still premature.
More generally, however, the issue questions the value of product
franchising as a distribution method in dynamic conditions -- both
during recession and in the future.
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Product franchising
As Slater (1964: 21) has pointed out:
editorialists like to wax enthusiastic about
the untold opportunities in franchising, and
as advocates of the system, we applaud this
healthy outlook. By the same token, we fear
that in their bullishness, the editors might
be overdoing it a bit: most franchisees have
done extremely well, but the franchisor did
not merely wave a magic wand and -- presto,
filled the parking lots.
In addition to indicating franchising's many positive features, events
in the farm equipment market throw new light on less sanguine
possibilities removed from the glow of the system's recent publicity.
Orderly marketing of producer durables depends heavily on accurate
stocking and forecasting, adequate wholesale and retail facilities
and organisational flexibility, especially as regards cost and asset
management. Excessive inventories in the industry under review
created severe dislocation through an inability of seasonality counters
such as early sales programmes to handle cyclical movements.
Accommodation of these more extenuated forces calls for increased
market research and long-term planning but the cheapest and most
effective solution probably lies in functional diversification. The
example of machinery producers suggests that the recent entry and
consequent lack of horizontal integration among many franchise
organisations, particularly in business and trade name applications, is
a point of potential vulnerability in the technique's growth.
Clearly, the value of this distribution method lies not in its
contractual relationship, as some writers have implied, but in its
implementation. On the question of risk and change, one of the more
perceptive critics, Ingraham (1963: 43) argues that franchising
seems well suited to fU£8tion under conditions
of change. As Alderson points out, it can be
classed as an ecological system because of the
peculiar nature of the bond among the components.
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The components are sufficiently integrated
so that the system can operate as a whole, but
[it] is simultaneously open to expansion via
the addition of components, and to improvements
in efficiency by the replacement of
components. In a franchise system, the
secondary units [dealers] share the risks
attendant to adjusting to environmental change.
This view may be accepted with certain reservations. A well-established,
high-level system is a malleable and resilient tool. Yet, like other
forms of business enterprise, franchising has a threshold below which
it cannot perform effectively for any channel party. For instance,
between 1967 and 1972, uni-functional suppliers would have required an
average annual turnover in tractors and machinery of at least $A3.00
million to contemplate using the practice successfully. Below this
volume, there appeared hybridisations or the complete collapse of
marketing"leading to corporate withdrawal from the induqtry. Whil~
the experience of marginal competitors was unfavourable, franchising
did not necessarily 'break down' in adverse conditions. Some participants
lacked certain prerequisites for satisfactory operations while others
upset delicate physical distribution balances by accumulating excess
stock. Such contingencies would have corroded almost any organised
selling method. Yet, in several cas@s, the.unique·internal allocation of
risk and overheads allowed stud.ied networks to handle short-term declines
of up to fifty per cent of average annual throughput without serious
disruption. It seems unlikely that either corporate or horizontal
modes would have performed as effioientlybecause of hindrances
imposed by fixed costs and inadequate administration respectively.
Although its strength clearly relates to the network control and
structural attributes of the franchisor, product franchising appears
adequately-equipped to accommodate the dynamic demands of recession
now and "henceforth.
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Generalisation of results
Exacting experimental conditions detailed in Column A of Table
8.11 urge caution in generalising the project's results. The
structural hypothesis was applicable to the product franchise system
of a producer-durables industry in a consumer marketing environment.
Unlike other depressions, the operative economic setback was localised,
temporarily-confined, and induced by income factors within the demand
function. Perhaps only amongst the-motor vehicle and" truck trades
could all these specifications be replicated. Strictly, therefore,
extension of the current findings should be limited to these fields.
Moves beyond the contingencies arrayed in Column A of Table 8.11 should
centre initially on Cells 3B and 6B, since the particular market and
duration of recession would probably alter attendant reactions little
from that observed in farm equipment supply. In fact, a longer, more
widespread or severe setback would conceivably emphasize the larger
concern's advantages and, hence, reinforce the claims of the central
hypothesis. Similar structurally-oriented patterns of corporate
behaviour could thus be expected within the oil, automobile, and
specialised household appliance industries in a major business setback
-- whether the Depression of 1929, the 'Credit Squeeze' of 1961 or
even the immediat.e ·economic downswing of 1974. -
However, the present conclusions may not necessarily apply to other
forms of franchising or marketing (Cells 1 and 2). Business and trade
name systems relate primarily to non-durable goods and services with
substantially different demand characteristics to the product-based
group. The effect of variation in the type of marketing or recession
is similarly obscure, since few Australian franchise organisations sell
other than directly to consumers, and supply-induced recession has been
rare in advanced economies since 1945. Yet, the contemporary fuel
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crisis with its implications for vehicle manufacturers could open
possibilities -- albeit unappealing ones. After the case of franchising
such investigations could lead towards a wider view of distribution
under economic contraction -- a useful practical endeavour and
worthwhile contribution to a discipline whose theoretical masterworks:
are not to be found in textbooks; they are
still to be developed (Halbert, 1965: 59).
The benefits to another nascent field, marketing geography, would also
be considerable.
~ ~
RESUME
Although an association of channel and network authority and general
financial performance could not be demonstrated conclusively, core
aspects of the main hypothesis had direct application to the conduct
of Australian farm equipment merchants between 1967 and 1972. An
integration of findings from large and small franchisors supported
the predicted relationship of company competitive powers expressed
through structural attributes, distribution control capacities, and
the choice of spatial strategy. This insight permitted a broad
interpretation of the recession's effect on the subject industry, the
adaptation of product franchise systems to uncertainty and the
universality of current results. Completion of the analysis now leads
to conclusions about selected processes of corporate spatial decision-
making in Part Four.
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CHAPTER EIGHT FOOTNOTES
1. In fact, finance companies, controlling wholesale floor-planning
while also selling near-new repossessions, became serious competitors
for machinery dealers.
2. Raw data were entered into the computations without adjustment.
Price increases between 1967 and 1972 were largely offset by the
indeterminate, raised, or floating wholesale margins which effectively
lowered producers' net sales during the period.
3. Three small suppliers, specialising in areas outside the
machinery market onslaught, were fortunate enough to escape the
recession's blight. In contrast, the most debilitating total sales
decline recorded in the division was fifty per cent from 1967 levels.
4. See The Australian Financial Review, 12 May 1970.
5. Overstocking led to severe price wars, expressed in inflated
wholesale margins and trade-in allowances at retail. See The Australian
Financial Review, 17 September 1970, The Weekly Times [Melbourne], 14
April 1971.
6. Specifically, Massey Ferguson was required to undertake heavy
overseas borrowing. See The Australian Financial Review, 22 June 1970,
14 December 1971 for further details of the company's problems.
7. Much of the recession's impact was therefore related to levels of
corporate exposure.
8. If further amalgamations ensue as a result of the recession, the
industry structure of the late 1970s could exhibit more pronounced
concentration. Remaining small firms would face a choice of intensive
specialisation for competitive advantage, merger, or product and
functional diversification. Either of the last two options -- probably
the more attractive for risk and profit-conscious management -- would
contribute to the corporate growth process described by Steed (197lc:
55) .
9. The development of restrictive trade practices legislation will
afford dealers greater discretion on exclusivity issue. Cross-
franchising is widely practised in the United States.
10. W. Alderson, Marketing Behaviour and Executive Action, Irwin,
Homewood, 1957, pp. 29-32.
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CHAPTER NINE
ASPECTS OF CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING DURING RECESSION
Until recently, the rise of the corporation had not attracted great
attention in geography. Now, however, its striking impact on advanced
and developing lands has demonstrated the need for information about
its geographical activities. Conventional theory, centred around the
small businessman, is of limited assistance in the quest. Yet, its
relevance can be gradually uplifted by study of the large producer's
decision-making and its relationship with that undertaken by the
entrepreneur. Such a method was adopted in this enquiry, whose chief
finding is the influence of firm size and other structural factors
expressed through channel management potentialities on high-level
commercial action during recession. Conclusions about establishment
turnover, scale effects and the substitutability of policy elucidate
further the processes and relationships governing major companies'
choice-patterns and show how they differ from those of the single-plant
operation.
PROCESSES OF DECISION-MAKING
Even among a few leading undertakings, much heterogeneity prevails in
competitive tactics. It is best countered by intensive, longitudinal
analyses of business adjustment, in which an awareness of line
management functions and their part in the proposal of geographical
moves is essential. Practical aids such as Stern's (1966: 13)
marketing planning schema offer an integrated view which is often
missing in the design of extensive surveys. This particular technique
treated location through underlying firm goals which it separated from
divisional objectives. In the subject industry, an oligopoly with
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numerous conglomerates, the former exercised a decisive influence on
the conduct of specialists, whereas the latter appeared to hold
somewhat more sway among diversified concerns whose chief interests
were in other product fields. Various responses to the setback were
therefore latent from the outset. But in contrast to the predictions
of traditional theory -- and, presumably, the position of the
entrepreneur -- most depression-bound suppliers seemed preoccupied with
aims other than profit maximisation. Balance sheet relativities were
a focal issue among minor distributors, while primary organisations
could still consider trading criteria -- market share, representation
and so forth -- as foremost in facility placement and the achievement
of future desires (cf. Webber and Daly, 1971: 16). Though not mutually
exclusive, the two orientations were based on a fundamental gap between
both groups' perspectives and expectations. Major concerns frequently
expressed their certainty of survival despite the dangers of the crisis
but such assurance was by no means universal in the small sector.
Much of the diversity in spatial behaviour among sampled contestants
could be traced to this distinction, illustrating the importance of
size factors in the determination of strategy. The response of the
bigger undertakings was also modified by the perceptions of the
participants in decision-making procedures. For example, one instance
of inter-divisional conflict over a spatial question accentuated
a range of formal pressures which could have scarcely impinged on the
deliberations of the local businessman. The nature and intensity of
the c0~porate policy-process sugg~sts even greater disparity between
the two actors' situations, as outlined with respect to establishment
turnover.
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Establishment turnover
Manufacturing investigations have fostered the notion that
commercial shifts involve long-term management choices and heavy
capital investment, making the penalties of error sufficiently severe
to predispose inertia (see Steed, 1971c: 54). This study confirms the
high cost burden in relocation. Yet, the conventional argument
neglects the stimuli to change inherent in the business cycle and
caused additionally by demand oscillation, monetary appreciation, and
the wish to realise assets. As one illustration, recession prompted
intense physical alteration over a six-year period among farm equipment
merchants, encompassing not only the wholesale and retail areas but
also production installations. Clearly, these results support Steed's
(1971a: 207) speculations about large producers' 'facility- transition.
Some of the mobility was probably due to the neglected option of
leasing, whereby location decisions need not presume extensive funding.
High-risk industries together with new and 'footloose' firms often
prefer this proposition as a means of reducing financial exposure and
hedging against functional diversification or technological progress.
Wider application of the principle should be anticipated in the
future, thus allowing spatial tactics to be accomplished in an
investment or operating framework depending on the certainty prevailing
(cf. Toffler, 1971: 65-68). Establishment movement could increase
commensurately, though perhaps not to the extent portrayed among the
selected companies which were under duress from the economic downturn.
Nonetheless, the magnitude of the observed change again points out the
cogency of the corporate phenomenon and its transcendence from the
entrepreneur. More specifically, it underlines the significance of
scale, and relationships governing the enterprise's policy determination.
RELATIONSHIPS IN DECISION-MAKING
Stern's model listed both the processes and the variables likely to
affect choices in the major concern's marketing sector. At a general
plane, diverse influences in the environment, the market and within
the organisation itself playa role. Physical movement occurs
chiefly as a part of product distribution. In this setting, it can
be substantially modified by communications demands or those of the
goods in question. Therefore, between proposal and implementation,
plentiful opportunities exist for the substitution of geographical
with other types of activity.
Substitutability of spatial policy
Most of a large undertaking's manoeuvres are contemplated in
response to its overall aims and divisional objectives. Rarely is
location regarded as an end in itself but one among many competitive
courses open to executives in achieving their ends. Several subject
businesses, for tnstance, executed spatial action through asset
realisation as a way of augmenting cash flows and counteracting
liquidity pressures. Others attained the same outcome in an aspatial
manner -- through short-term borrowing. An appreciation of the
rationale behind such varied behaviour demands a more intensive
focusing on the intra-firm situation than has previously obtained in
geography. In this respect, present conclusions about scale effects
provide some useful perceptions.
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Scale effects
The bearing of scale on the distribution of commercial facilities
can be interpreted at two levels. In the higher echelons of an
industry, it is expressed through company structural attributes and
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exercises a marked influence by laying the bases on which choices are
made. In a well-established field of production, a vendor's stature
is determined by a wide range of correlates, such as sales, investment
and financial strength, and operating stability. They are linked to
market representation through network control, a medium virtually
unrecognised in previous writing.
This project has also argued the effects of scale in the
divergence of the enterprise's decision process to that of the sing1e-
plant concern around which much work has centred in the past. The
distinction is amply depicted by the case of the recession; large
organisations' courses were devised with copious information through
extensive feedback mechanisms and proceeded in a calculated fashion
towards specified aims. The composition of strategy employed developed
pathways; it was not an ad hoc or infrequent exercise but, rather,
an ongoing task based on change in the milieu, market and intra-firm
position. In fact, several negotiations could have been undertaken
concurrently. Yet, for each, the corporation would have suffered
less aggregate financial exposure than the small businessman in his
one locational initiative. For the former, economic objectives are of
central interest and little adherence was found to accrue to lifestyle
factors which may pointedly affect the geographical predilections of
the entrepreneur (cf. Katona and Morgan, 1952: 80-81; Eversley, 1965).
While the pecuniary orientation vindicated the current concentration
on accounting statistics, their use and the subsequent application of
other accepted methods of industrial analysis must depend greatly on
the development of the conglomerate. Its growing complexity is
outpacing research efforts to find basic parameters, let alone its
locational matrices. Therefore, directions for future research are
critical.
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FUTURE RESEARCH THRUSTS
As a basis for the coming discussion, it is apposite to list briefly
this thesis' main findings and their relation to prior writing. The
study has established certain repercussions of recession at six levels
-- that of the Australian rural economy, country towns, product
franchising, the farm machinery industry, and its participant
manufacturers and dealers. Most importantly, conditions of extreme
uncertainty conferred an unusual view into the nature of corporate
spatial decision-making. As portraye.d by establishment mobility and
strategy substitution, its component processes and interrelationships
seemed removed from those of the entrepreneurial situationi it was
geared more expansively to serve different company aims. They were not
necessarily the aims of classical location theory and varied with the
characteristics of individual organisations. Apart from implying that
the assumption of continuing prosperity has weighed too heavily in the
past, these findings support the supposed divergence of the enterprise
and lone businessman. By centering on the former, little-explored
area, they afford some insight upon the interface.
To pursue this thrust, the ultimate objective of enquiries issuing
from this analysis would be a reassessment of conventional theories in
the light of the corporation's progress. A three-stage attack -is
envisaged. The immediate step is to verify present conclusions by
contacting a sample of extant and de-registered machinery firms smaller
than the nineteen selected here in order to examine their experiences
between 1967 and 1972. A later check on all subject groups· should
evaluate the recession's ppoZonged ramifications. Second, the results
must be generalised by considering the different states listed in
Table 8.11. The initial emphasis would deal with the outcome on
policy-formation of variation in the type, duration or extent of an
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economic setback or the nature of the market served. Subsequent
enquiries within other forms of franchising and marketing could
produce a theory of corporate location in franchise systems during
both depressed and ~avourable business eras.
Establishment of this bridgehead would introduce a third drive
designed to detect whether the behaviour reviewed here (or any other
aspects under further investigation) hold throughout the secondary
sector. Sophisticated comparisons of. tactical choice in horizontal
or fully-integrated vertical distribution could employ previously-
determined franchise information as a control. Recognition of the
effects of variation in experimental conditions (as demonstrated in
Table 8.ll) would foster a scientific approach to the discovery of
spatial regularities characterising the large firm's marketing -- the
sector which provides most opportunities for geographical change.
Emergent principles could be later integrated with results of research
into its manufacturing patterns and, finally, turned to improve the
applicability of existing theory.
Such planning presumes preparatory logistics work. Apart from
material on size concentrations collated by the Australian Bureau of
Statistics and the Industries Assistance commission, sources by which'
enterprises and their operations may be identified are lacking.
Although the new Census of Economic Activity is attempting to tackle
the definition problems! broader acknowledgement is needed of issues
relating to reporting and disclosure (cf. Mautz, 1968). Multi-
disciplinary conferences between company directorates, collection
agencies, and users of statistics would be a worthwhile measure to lay
the bases for future studies.
Assuming headway with these practical considerations and the
continued support of enlightened business management, a complementary
advance could be effected to the dynamics of corporate strategy and
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aspects of Australian economic geography. To avoid the confusion of
facts hampering conceptualisation in marketing, a focus on established
theory must always obtain (cf. Kernan and Sommers, 1968: vii).
A paramount responsibility is the assimilation of new empirical
conclusions with prior research into firm behaviour and plant location.
Given properly organised investigations and the growing importance of
both product distribution and the corporation to the nation's welfare,
marketing geography appears poised to make a significant applied
contribution and forge a new place in the mainstream of the discipline.
234
APPENDIX ONE
PARTICIPANT AND OTHER FIRMS
This Appendix presents a list of the nineteen agricultural machinery
companies which participated in the study and various other Australian
firms referred to in the text.
THE NINETEEN PARTICIPANTS
Alfarm Distributors pty Ltd,
Hume Highway,
ALBURY. N.S.W. 2641
Allis Chalmers Australia Ltd,
N.R.M.A. House,
26 Ridge Street,
NORTH SYDNEY. N.S.W. 2060
Australian Motor Industries Ltd,
155 Bertie Street,
PORT MELBOURNE. Vic. 3207
J.I. Case (Australia) Pty Ltd,
Windsor Road,
NORTHMEAD. N.S.W. 2152
Chamberlain Industries pty Ltd,
(until 1970) and, thereafter:
Chamberlain-John Deere pty Ltd,
\r1elshpool Road,
WELSHPOOL. W.A. 6106
Connor Shea and Co. pty Ltd,
Fourth Avenue,
SUNSHINE. Vic. 3020
Fiat of Australia pty Ltd,
Cnr. Egerton Street and Silverwater Road,
LIDCOMBE. N.S.W. 2141
Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd,
(Tractor and Implement Division) ,
1764 Sydney Road,
CAMPBELLFIELD. Vic. 3061
Horwood Bagshaw Ltd,
Victoria Street,
MILE END. S.A. 5031
Howard Rotavator Pty Ltd,
Boundary Road,
NORTHMEAD. N.S.W. 2152
The International Harvester Co. of Australia Pty Ltd,
171-205 City Road,
SOUTH MELBOURNE. Vic. 3205
Leyland of Australia Ltd,
(Tractor Division),
52 Joynton Avenue,
WATERLOO. N.S.W. 2017
Ralph McKay Ltd,
36-42 Hampstead Road,
MAIDSTONE. Vic. 3012
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Massey Ferguson (Australia) Ltd,
2 Devonshire Road,
SUNSHINE. Vic. 3020
Mobilco Ltd,
410-422 Whitehorse Road,
MITCHAM. Vic. 3121
New Holland Division of Sperry Rand Australia Ltd,
232 Princes Highway,
DANDENONG. Vic. 3175
David Shearer Ltd,
Adelaide Road,
MANNUM. S.A. 5238
(until 1972)
John Shearer and Sons' Ltd,
Share Street,
KILKENNY. S.A. 5009
Thiess Equipment Distributors Pty Ltd,
Alexander Avenue,
TAREN POINT. N.S.W. 2229
(until 1972)
OTHER FIRMS UNDER DISCUSSION
David Brown Tractors pty Ltd,
49 Derby street,
LIDCOMBE. N.S.W. 2141
(until 1972)
John Deere Ltd,
160 Sunnyho1t Road,
BLACKTOWN. N.S.W. 2148
(until 1972)
H.V. McKay Pty Ltd,
(until 1930) and, from 1930-58:
H.V. McKay Massey-Harris pty Ltd,
2 Devonshire Road,
SUNSHINE. Vic. 3020
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APPENDIX TWO
A COMPOSITE AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY
FRANCHISE AGREEMENT
This Appendix presents a composite franchise agreement typical of those
obtaining in the Australian agricultural machinery industry in 1967.
From the sixteen available contracts, representative clauses have been
selected to cover the thirty-nine subject areas listed in Table 5.5.
Rather than simply reproducing one firm's document, this procedure was
adopted to ensure confidentiality and avoid bias. For practical
reasons, however, the more detailed examples have been chosen to allow
a full view on the average marketing code. On the question of
manufacturer/dealer equitability, the collation attempts to maintain
a neutral stance.
DEALER AGREEMENT
for the Sale of
Products manufactured and/or sold by
SURROGATE COMPANY LTD
Made this................. day of.......... 19 •.•.•
between
SURROGATE COMPANY LTD
(Herein called THE COMPANY)
and 8 .
trading as ..
in the State of .
(Herein called THE DEALER)
Agreement Number .
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INTRODUCTORY CLAUSES
(1) Purpose of agreement
The Company believes that a well-informed and prosperous dealer
organisation is necessary to bring the full benefits of [its]
equipment to the primary producer. [It] commands facilities for
design, production, and supply of numerous types of agricultural
equipment and desires to maintain and extend the use of its equipment
by Australian primary producers in volume and efficiency. The Dealer
has been selected by the Company as a dealer in its equipment competent
to provide throughout the Dealer's territory adequate and continuous
sales effort and prompt efficient and courteous technical service. The
Company desires to assist its dealers to obtain the best possible
results and expects the Dealer to maintain suitable business premises,
sales, service and parts facilities to avail himself of the Company's
sales guidance, merchandising plans, advertising programmes, business
organisation methods (including financial recording and housekeeping)
and personnel training.
(2) Previous agreements cancelled
This agreement supersedes all prior dealer agreements whether
verbal or written subsisting between the parties immediately prior to
the date hereof in relation to goods of which the Company may be the
distributor and all such agreements are hereby cancelled by mutual
consent.
(3) Interpretations
In this agreement, unless the context otherwise requires, any word
importing the singular includes the plural and vice vepsa and any word
importing the male includes the female and neuter; machine means a
tractor or any tool, implement or appliance designed for use in
agriculture or pasturage and offered for sale or sold by the Company
and includes parts and accessories; industrial in. relation to use
means use other than agricultural or pastoral and in relation to
equipment means anything being ~s~d or ~ntended to be used for any
purpose other than agriculture or pasturage; person includes
corporation; and, in relation to the Company, Manag~r.means ,the Chief
Ex:ecutive Of'ficer 0f theflCompany ..
(4) Jurisdiction stated
All rights, duties, obligations, and liabilities under all orders
received by the Company from the Dealer shall be governed by the laws
of the State of It is understood, however, that such orders
are in a general form and that any provisions therein which may in any
wise be illegal or void under the laws of state, territory, or other
jurisdiction in which a contract is being enforced shall be deemed not
to be a part of the order.
(5) Products covered
The Company's products included in this contract are all
agricultural tractors, agricultural machines and agricultural
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implements for the time being manufactured and/or dealt in by the
Company, together with attachments, accessories, and parts (including
plough shares, and earth-engaging discs and points therefor).
(6) Contract non-assignable
This agreement cannot be sold, bartered, traded, transferred or
assigned either in part or as a whole by the Dealer without the prior
written consent of the Company.
(7) Franchise granted
The Company hereby extends a franchise to the abovenamed Dealer
for the sale of implements and machines, attachments and duplicate
parts (hereinafter referred to separately, or collectively as goods)
subject to the terms and conditions hereof and to such instructions as
may be given in writing by the Company from time to time.
GENERAL CLAUSES
(8) Design changes, product exclusions
The Company may discontinue the supply of any model of the said
goods or make any modification in the design of the components or
fittings or parts for any of the said goods at any time and shall be
under no obligation to make any such modification to any of the said
goods previously ordered or purchased by the Dealer whether they are
then new or have become used or second-hand and the Dealer shall not
alter any of the said goods whether new or second-hand or change or
substitute any of the components, fittings, or parts as sold by the
Company nor do anything that will in any way infringe, impeach or
lessen the validity of the patents or trademarks under which any of the
said goods may be made or sold.
(9) Passing of title to goods
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The property in goods delivered under this agreement shall not pass
to the Dealer before payment for them is made by the Dealer to [the
Company] ".
(10) Non-agency franchise
The relationship between the Company and the Dealer shall be that
of vendor and vendee and the Dealer shall under no circumstances be or
be deemed to be the agent of the Company and, except as may be
hereinafter provided, the Dealer shall not have any right or authority
express or implied to enter into any contracts or commitments, nor to
make any representation or condition, nor to give any warranty in the
name of or on behalf of the Company or purporting to bind the Company in
any respect whatsoever and the Dealer shall indemnify and keep
indemnified the Company against all actions, claims and expenses arising
out of any breach by the Dealer of this provision.
241
(11) Use of trade marks
The Dealer will sell the machines under their respective names or
trade marks and not otherwise, and will not use those names or trade
marks or any of them in connection with any firm name or telegraphic
address or in any form or connection to which the Company shall have
objected and, on termination or cancellation of this agreement, the
Dealer will cease and abstain from further use of such names and will
thereafter not use any word, expression or device so nearly resembling
any such name or mark as may tend to confuse or deceive the public.
(12) Definition of territory
The Dealer's territory comprises the town of•.....•.......•.•••••
and the surrounding districts (herein called the Dealer's territory).
(13) Exclusivity of territory
The Company hereby grants to the Dealer, subject to the terms and
conditions hereinafter appearing, the right within the territory... to
canvass for offers for the sale of or letting out on hire (on such
terms and conditions as the Company may from time to time in writing
direct> of new tractors, implements, equipment accessories and spare
parts. The Company reserves the right to make such amendments or
alterations to the territory as it shall from time to time consider
desirable for any reason whatsoever. The right hereby granted shall
not prejudice or affect the right of the Company or any subsidiary,
distributor, dealer, or agent of the Company to sell or hire any of the
said goods within or for use within the territory, which right is
expressly reserved, to the intent that the right hereby granted is
non-exclusive. The Company's ruling shall be final in connection with
any matter arising from or connected with infringement of the territory
or any infringement by the Dealer of any of the provisions of this
agreement.
(14) Types of prohibited sales
The Dealer recognises and understands that the Company may sell,
lease, or loan the goods covered by this agreement for use in the
Dealer's trade area to:
(a) the Commonwealth Government and any department and agency
thereof;
(b) State or local governments and any department or agency
thereof;
(c) manufacturers to be used by them in equipment of their
respective manufacture or assembly or the repair thereof;
(d) dealers or distributors of the Company's other product
lines for use by such dealers or distributors in the
operation of their business; and
(e) educational or charitable institutions or agencies.
The Dealer also recognises and understands that the Company may sell,
lease or loan the goods covered by this agreement through:
(a) Company-owned retail outlets, wherever located; and
(b) to dealers wherever located.
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No commissions will be allowed or paid to the Dealer on any sale
of the types referred to in this section made by the Company or any of
its dealers or distributors in the Dealer's trade area. YNhen, upon
request of the Company, the Dealer assembles, adjusts, or delivers to
the place specified by the Company any goods sold, leased, or loaned by
the Company for use in the Dealer's trade area, the Company will
compensate the Dealer for his services at the rates established by the
Company for such purposes and in effect at the time the services were
rendered.
(15) Policy on sub-dealers
A Dealer may distribute the goods within his territory through
agents or sub-dealers appointed by him. The Company accepts no
responsibility for arrangements between the Dealer and his agents or
sub-dealers.
(16) Instructions to dealers
All orders, directions or requirements to the Dealer, if made in
writing and signed by any manager or other duly authorised employee of
the Company shall, for the purpose of and incidental to this agreement,
be deemed an order, direction or requirement of the Company and the
Dealer agrees to be bound by them. The expression the Company shall
be deemed to include any manager for, or duly authorised employee of
the Company in the Commonwealth of Australia; and the word office
shall mean the Company's chief office which controls the Company's
business for the state in which the Dealer resides.
(17) Service of notices
Any notice under this contract may be served by letter signed by or
on behalf of the Company or the Dealer and posted to the address of the
other and shall be deemed to have been served on the day following
posting.
(18) Variations of contract
This agreement shall not be varied, added to or altered, nor shall
any obligation thereunder be waived or modified otherwise than in
writing under the hand of the Manager for the time being of the Company
or under the seal of the Company.
(19) Policy on competing products
During the continuance of this agreement, the Dealer shall not and
shall procure that no person, firm, or corporation on behalf of or as
agent for the Dealer or being directly or indirectly substantially
under the control of the Dealer or being a subsidiary of the Dealer
shall, without the consent in writing of the Company first had and
obtained enter into any agreement with any person, firm, or corporation
for the sale of any tractors, accessories, equipment attachments,
implements and spare parts other than the said goods.
(20) Powers of waiver
The failure or forebearance of the Company to enforce at any time
any of the provisions of this agreement, or to exercise any option or
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right which is herein provided, or to require at any time performance
by the Dealer of any of the provisions hereof shall in no way be
construed to be a waiver of such provision and shall not in any way
affect the validity or effectiveness of the agreement or any part
thereof, nor the right of the Company to thereafter enforce each and
every provision. The exercise of one right or remedy shall not
constitute an election or preclude the Company from exercising all the
rights and remedies available to it by law or hereunder.
OPERATING CLAUSES
(21) Policy on acceptance of orders
The Company may, at its option, accept any orders for any of the
said goods forwarded to the Company provided that, notwithstanding
anything herein contained or implied to the contrary, there shall be no
obligation upon the Company to accept any order from the Dealer or to
deliver any of the said goods so ordered to the Dealer. All orders
accepted by the Company shall be deemed to have been accepted subject
to and upon the condition that the Company is under no liability
whatsoever for failure to deliver or for delay in delivery from any
cause whatsoever and howsoever arising. Any order given by the Dealer
to the Company may be accepted by the Company as to part only of the
goods ordered. Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the
contrary and whether express or implied, the acceptance by the Company
of any order or any part of any order for any of the said goods shall
be revocable by the Company and be final and binding on the Company only
as to such of the said goods referred to in the order for which the
Company has given written notice to the Dealer in readiness for delivery
(hereinafter called delivery notice) ~
(22) Terms of payment
Payment for goods are to be made not later than the twenty-fifth
day of the month following the month in which the invoice is raised.
All goods supplied by the Company to the Dealer remain the property of
the Company until the whole of the purchase price and transport and
other charges are paid to the Company. Payment to the Company means
payment in cash, and payment by cheque shall not be treated as payment
until the cheque is honoured.
(23) Used equipment dealing
The Dealer shall undertake second-hand dealing in tractors and
agricultural machines and equipment as a corollary of being able to
offer to take the same tpade~ins on the sale of the Company's
products, and, to 'this end, the Dealer 'shall est-ablish a seaorid-hand
equipment trading fund available to finance such second-hand trading.
(24) Delivery and financial procedure
Delivery of any of the Company's products purchased by the Dealer
shall be at the Company's premises from which the goods are despatched.
Unless otherwise arranged at the time of order, payment of the price
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for the Company's products shall be made on delivery provided always
that, if in any case extended terms of payment are allowed, the Company
shall have an unpaid seller's lien upon the Company's products
concerned, and the Dealer shall not part with title to or possession of
those Company's products to any purchaser or bailee until payment in
full to the Company of the purchase price of those Company products is
made.
(25) Non-fulfilment of orders
The Dealer assumes all responsibility for loss or damage to the
products from any cause after despatch by the Company from its
factories or any of its branches to the Dealer, and no loss or damage
from any cause during the period between despatch of the products by
the Company and final payment in cash of the purchase price shall
relieve the Dealer from any of his obligations hereunder. The Company
shall not be liable to the Dealer in any manner whatsoever for loss,
damage, detention or delay in final delivery resulting from causes
beyond its control, or caused by act of God, fire, strike, war, civil
or military authority, insurrection or riot, embargo, car shortage,
wreck, delay by suppliers of materials, or delay in transportation; or
in any event for consequential damages, the Company's sole
responsibility being limited to fulfilment of the warranty referred to
[before] .
(26) Consignment conditions
If, by agreement, the Company supplies any of the Company's
products to the Dealer for sale on consignment, the Dealer shall hold
those Company's products and the proceeds of sale thereof in trust for
the Company and the following conditions shall apply.
(i) No property in Company products on consignment shall pass
from the Company until they are sold and the full retail
price therefor is received by the Company.
(ii) All moneys, cheques and negotiable instruments received by
the Dealer shall be paid into the Company's banking account
to the Company's credit without deduction for discounts or
otherwise.
(iii) The Dealer will insure with an approved insurance office
at his own expense, in the name of the Company, against loss
or damage by fire or other cause at their retail cash value
all products sent to him on consignment by the Company and
will indemnify the Company against loss or damage in the
event of his failure to comply with this clause.
(iv) The Dealer shall not deliver any products to a customer
from consignment stock without first securing a signed order
from the customer and ob,taining the consent of the Company
and any failure on the part of the Dealer to observe this
provision shall render him liable to pay for such products
at retail list prices.
(27) Retail pricing policy
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein or
implied, the Company reserves the right to alter or amend as it may in
its absolute discretion deem fit the dealer wholesale buying price
fixed by it from time to time by notice in writing sent by prepaid
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post to the Dealer at his address appearing in this agreement. The
Dealer undertakes that he will advertise and sell the [products] at
only the retail prices fixed by the Company from time to time. The
Company reserves the right to change its retail selling prices and
Dealer wholesale prices of the [products] at any time by telegram or
letter.
(28) Policy on written orders
Orders for equipment will be accepted by the Company from dealers
for fully-equipped machines only, and these must be on the official
order forms. These orders will be regarded as irrevocable contracts.
No machine will be despatched without a signed order form from a
dealer, or a signed [subsidiary] finance agreement.
(29) Spare parts policy
The Dealer undertakes to buy from the Company the whole of his
requirements of parts for the Company's products and to maintain
throughout the currency of this agreement a stock of such parts as is,
in the opinion of the Company's responsible officers, adequate to
service the Company's products in the Dealer's territory. The Dealer
undertakes to place orders for parts in accordance with regular parts
ordering programmes which the Company may conduct from time to time.
After expiration of thirty days from date of purchase, parts purchased
by the Dealer under this contract shall be returnable to the Company
only after submission of a detailed list by the Dealer and after
receipt of written approval from the Company. For current parts, the
Company will credit the Dealer with the ruling dealer price, less
fifteen per cent discount. Parts which are not current in the opinion
of a responsible officer of the Company will be credited less such
greater discount as the Company may determine. The dealer agrees to
pay all freights and charges incurred on parts which he returns to the
Company. [In normal circumstances], the Dealer undertakes to pay all
charges on the said parts ordered by him, other than freight, from the
Company's premises.
(30) Product insurance
Until the Dealer has paid the whole of the purchase price together
with transport and other charges, the Dealer shall at his own expense
insure and keep insured the goods in the joint names of the Company and
the Dealer.
(31) Product alterations
In order to maintain standardisation of models, the Dealer shall
not make any alterations to any product without the prior consent in
writing of the Company.
(32) Warranty
The Dealer shall have no authority to make or give any warranty
whatsoever other than that set out on the order forms as issued by the
Company. The Company's warranty in respect of new tractors, implements
and accessories as at the date of this agreement is set out hereunder:
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the Company warrants and guarantees, as regards
all new tractors, implements and accessories
supplied by it, that all precautions that are
usual and reasonable have been taken to ensure
excellence of materials and workmanship and that
each such tractor, implement and accessory is
free from defects in material and workmanship
under normal use and service, its obligations
under this warranty being limited to making good,
at a factory to be nominated by it, any part or
parts thereof including equipment and accessories
(except tyres, electrical equipment and
proprietary accessories and other articles and
parts not manufactured by or on behalf of the
Company) which shall, within six months (or, in
the case of wheeled tractors used in the sole
opinion of the Company entirely for agricultural
purposes, twelve months) after delivery of such
tractor, implement, or accessory to the original
purchaser, be returned to it with transportation
charges prepaid and which its examination shall
disclose, to its satisfaction, to have been thus
defective. The above warranty does not extend or
apply to any tractor, implement or accessory which
shall have been repaired, altered, neglected or
used in any way so as, in the judgment of the
Company (whose decision is final), to affect
adversely its s,tabili ty or reliability or to any
tractor, implement or accessory, any of whose
identification numbers shall have been altered or
removed.
The Company does not give any warranty in respect of any Company
tractor or any implements or accessories except the warranty contained
above, which is given expressly in lieu of all other warranties and
conditions expressed or implied and of all other obligations or
liabilities in its part. Tractors which are sent for repair will be
driven at the risk and responsibility of the owners only. Repairs of
tractors are undertaken only on the assumption that the owners give
authority to drive them on their behalf. The Company accepts no
responsibility for loss or damage to customers' goods howsoever
occasioned whilst such goods are in the Company's or Dealer's
possession. The above warranty is subject to alteration or amendment
from time to time at the Company's discretion. All other warranties,
whether express or implied by statute, common law or otherwise are
hereby expressly negatived and excluded.
(33) Collateral and set-off
The Dealer shall, upon request of the Company, endorse and deliver
to it to be held as collateral security sufficient good, well-secured
notes and book debts to cover any indebtedness for goods shipped to the
Dealer either on past due notes, open accounts, or for goods resold by
the Dealer. The Dealer shall guarantee the payment of said collateral
notes and book debts promptly at maturity, waiving presentation, demand,
protest, notice of protest and diligence both as to makers and
endorsers, and full power and authority is hereby granted to the
Company to make collections, enforce payment, renew or compromise such
collateral in its own name as it deems necessary and best, but it shall
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be under no obligation to collect such collateral or to protect such
collateral against the claims, if any, of third parties.
In case of default in payment of any of said collateral notes or
book debts, dealers shall remit cash for the full amount of the same
within ten days after maturity. On payment of Dealer's indebtedness in
full, all collateral in the Company's possession shall be returned to
the Dealer. Upon request, the Dealer shall execute and deliver to the
Company the title retention notes and such other security instruments
as may be required by Company covering unpaid goods shipped. Such
notes shall be taken as evidence of indebtedness and not as payment.
(34) Tenure of franchise
Except as otherwise provided below, this agreement is made for the
period ending but shall continue thereafter for consecutive
twelve month periods until cancelled by either party by sending to the
other notice in the manner specified at least thirty days before the
end of any such period.
(35) Dealer obligations
As evidence of the Dealer's intention to exploit his [franchised]
dealership to the full, he undertakes to order simultaneously with
completion of this agreement implements applicable to his territory
and will always maintain in stock machines and spare parts to be used
for demonstration and display purposes.
The Dealer undertakes without prejudice to any other obligations
already provided for in this agreement, to provide a motor vehicle at
his own cost for the following purposes:
(a) to canvass his territory for orders wi th or without the
Company's representatives;
(b) to convey the Company's service personnel when required for
starting and/or adjusting machines or implements;
(c) to convey the Company's representatives to effect
settlements and collect overdue accounts;
(d) to keep the Company's goods under the notice of farmers and
others in his territory and to thoroughly canvass the said
territory for orders and settlements himself or per medium
of his employees.
The building of the Dealer shall be of satisfactory appearance and
size to properly display, handle and store goods delivered under this
contract and in keeping with the sales potential of the Dealer's
territory. The Dealer shall:
(a) receive and distribute to probable customers advertising
matter and catalogues forwarded by the Company;
(b) maintain a record of the names and post office addresses of
probable customers in his territory described herein and make
such records available to officers of the Company when
required and forward schedules of the names and addresses to
the Company when required by the Company;
(c) advertise at his own cost the Company's goods in such manner
as he and the Company agree is adequate for his territory;
(d) furnish, when required, complete financial particulars of
a proposed customer;
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(e) not promise any customer that any machine or implement will
be kept in repair free'of ch~rgei
(f) pay at his own cost all car~age,' sto~age, pos~age, telegraph,
or telephone cha,rges in connection with the' f~anchise;
(g) be active at all times in the canvassing of his territory,
securing orders, and keeping prospective customers supplied
with the fullest information, and maintain a record for the
perusal of the Company's visiting representative of these
customers and the attention they have received;
(h) demonstrate the Company's goods to any potential customer
on his property, whether at the customer's request or
otherwise;
(i) keep a record of the type, serial number and purchaser of all
goods sold in the Dealer's territory, and to provide to the
Company at the end of each month a list showing such
information in respect of all goods sold during that month;
(j) at all times co-operate fully with the Company's
representative whilst he is visiting the territory;
(k) inspect and put into operation on his customer's property
any goods supplied to his territory whether direct from the
Company or from his own store, and ensure that every customer
is thoroughly conversant with the mechanical operation of the
goods and their particular application to his property;
(1) provide the Company from time to time with information
concerning the presence and performance of comparable goods
and equipment marketed or manufactured by other persons or
companies in the territory of the Dealer;
(m) not supply employees of the Company with money to defray
expenses unless specifically requested by the Company to do so.
(36) Company obligations
The Company will use its best endeavours to:
(a) supply the requirement for .•.products within a reasonable
time after the Dealer has ordered same;
(b) inform the Dealer of his service responsibilities to owners
of Company products already located in his sales and service
areai
(c) organise the Dealer's service department and train his
mechanics so that he will be capable of providing [Supe'rior',
Service] :: to present' and future ••• owners and a:L$o rea:Lise the
profit potential that is his through the sale of service
labour and genuine [spare] parts;
(d) explain the service aids that will be provided by the Company
and explain, interpret, and assist in implementing the basic
service policies of the Company;
(e) furnish the Dealer with a complete set of operator manuals,
service bulletins and warranty policy booklets and forms
applicable to this agreement;
(f) thoroughly explain and interpret the Company warranty policy
to the Dealer using the policy manual as a guide;
(g) examine the Dealer's service facilities and, in company with
the Dealer, fill out [the questionnaire] QuaZifieations .to
Certify ... Dealer's Service Shop and take the Dealer's order
for any special service tools that are necessary to qualify
his service department;
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(h) instruct and demonstrate to the Dealer and his servicemen
proper assembly and pre-delivery procedures and acquaint
the dealership with the operation and adjustment of any
machines that he may have received;
(i) discuss shop management practices and layout a planned
shop development programme for the Dealer's service
department and assist the Dealer in procuring and training
any additional mechanics who may be needed;
(j) review in detail with the Dealer the profit that can be
developed in parts and labour sales through good service
management -- this includes methods of service solicitation,
establishment of proper labour rates, selection and training
of mechanics, investment in appropriate tools and facilities
and service department accounting;
(k) advertise its products in such advertising media and in such
manner as in its judgement will best tend to promote their
general use, such advertising to be at the Company's expense;
(1) upon request, and voluntarily from time to time, supply ••. to
the Dealer [at set prices or free of charge] such catalogues,
circulars, and other advertising matter as in the judgement
of the Company may be necessary.
TERMINATION CLAUSES
(37) Termination by notice
The Dealer may at any time, with or without cause, terminate the
agreement by giving notice of termination to the Company's [local
representative]. Such notice of termination shall specify the date
upon which the termination is to become effective and not less than
ninety days shall intervene between the giving of such notice and
effective date. The agreement may be terminated at any time by mutual
consent, the effective date of termination to be as mutually agreed
upon. The consent on behalf of the Company shall be executed by its
[local representative]. The Company, with or without cause, may
terminate the agreement at any time by giving to the Dealer notice of
termination signed by the [local representative]. Such notice of
termination shall specify the date upon which the termination is to
become effective and not less than ninety days shall intervene between
the giving of such notice and such effective date. Notice of
termination shall be in writing. When issued by the Company, notice may
either be given to the Dealer personally or forwarded to him by mail.
When issued by the Dealer, notice shall be mailed to the Company's [local
representative] •
(38) Termination by event
The Company may without prejudice to any rights arising from any
breach by a dealer of any condition herein contained by notice in
writing to the Dealer, forthwith, from the date of such notice,
terminate this agreement in any of the following events:
(a) if the Dealer shall fail to observe or perform any of the
terms or conditions hereof;
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(b) if there is any default or undue delay on the part of the
Dealer in mak~ng payment for parts or accessories;
(c) if any disagreement shall arise between any of the persons
interested in the management, control or ownership of the
business of the' Dealer which, in the opinion of the Company,
may imperil the interests of the Company;
(d) if the Dealer dies or there is any change in the address or
in the constitution or management of his business by
dissolution of partnership or otherwise or, being a limited
liability company, there is a retirement or change of any of
the directors or re-arrangement of control or management;
(e) if the Dealer commits any act of bankruptcy or is made
bankrupt or compounds or makes an arrangement with his
creditors or executes a bill of sale or suffers or takes any
proceedings analogous thereto;
(f) if the Dealer, being a company, is 'WOlIJ:td ~p' ei,:ther
compulsorily or voluntarily or a receiver is appointed.
(39) Obligations on termination
Upon the termination of this contract howsoever occurring:
(a) all unfulfilled orders of the Dealer to the Company shall be
cancelled;
(b) all debts outstanding by the Dealer to the Company shall
forthwith become due and payable, notwithstanding that the
time for payment thereof has not arrived;
(c) any of the Company's products on consignment with the Dealer
shall forthwith be returned to the Company;
(d) the Dealer shall forthwith deliver to the Company all price
lists, printed matter, technical bulletins and advertising
signs and material in his possession relating to the Company
products and shall remove from his premises and vehicles all
references to the Company or its products or its trade marks;
(e) all records of the Dealer relating to the Company's products
and/or to purchasers or potential purchasers thereof shall be
made available to the Company;
(f) the Company shall, at the Dealer's expense, undertake all
unfulfilled service duties in respect of the Company's
products pursuant to the manufacturer's warranty applicable
thereto.
The Company may, at its option, re-purchase all or any of the Company's
products not re-sold by the Dealer upon the following terms:
(a) for tractors, machines and implements, the Company shall credit
the Dealer at net dealer price less ten per cent and less costs
of restoration to condition as new;
(b) for parts, attachments and accessories, the Company shall
credit the Dealer at net dealer price less fifteen per cent;
(c) the Dealer shall deliver to the Company's branch warehouse
freight paid Company products which the Company may
re-purchase under this option;
(d) the Company may set off the value of Company products which
it may re-purchase under this option against any moneys which
the Dealer may owe to the Company;
(e) this option shall be exerciseable by the Company by notice in
writing to the Dealer given before, on, or within sixty days
after termination.
Dated tllis day •..•.•.•.•••••••......•.•.••••••••••••••••.••.•••.••••••
Signed by or on behalf of the Dealer .
Witness •••.•..•••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Signed by or on behalf of the Company .
Witness •.•..•.••.••••..••.•.•.••••••••••
Issued from the Company's office
in tl1e S tate 0 f. . . . . . . . . • • • • . . • .
at •.••.••••.•••.•..••..••...••••
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APPENDIX THREE
ILLUSTRATIONS OF CORPORATE FACILITIES
Selected plates in this Appendix illustrate the type of corporate
facilities mentioned in the analysis. By including the offices of
companies which failed as well as those which survived, they afford
a visual appreciation of the recession's impact on the Australian
agricultural machinery industry and its implications for business
decision-making.
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